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ABSTRACT
ATTENDING TO PRESENCE: A STUDY OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS’
ACCOUNT OF SENSE COGNITION

Amy F. Whitworth, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2010

This project is guided and motivated by the question concerning the nature of the
phantasm as that which mediates between sensation and intellection in John Duns Scotus’
account of cognition. Scotus embraces Aristotle’s claim that the intellect cannot think
without the phantasm. The phantasm is in a corporeal organ, yet the immaterial intellect
must act with it to produce an intelligible species. In this project I examine the critical
elements of Scotus’ cognitive theory in order to understand the nature of the phantasm.
In the first chapter I discuss key elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics and give a
close, textual reading of De Anima guided by his claim that the relationship of the body
and soul is highly specific. I then focus on his claim in De Anima 2.12 that sensation
involves the reception of the sensible form without the matter.
In the second chapter, I discuss Scotus’ key theological notions that guide and
inform his cognitive project. The beatific vision requires the presence of the divine
essence in its own existence to the intellect. As the highest cognitive experience, the
beatific vision is definitive of all cognitive experience making the presence of the object
to the cognitive faculty of central importance. The discussion of the incarnation shows
that the world is sacralized and thus, is a worthy object of cognitive attention in itself.
In the third chapter, I discuss Scotus’ understanding of the body-soul relationship
focusing on his notion of person to both secure the unity of the human being and to
ground the mediation between sensation and intellection.
In the fourth chapter, I first discuss Aquinas’ claim that sensation requires a
spiritual change. While Scotus’ account is in many respects the same as Aquinas’, Scotus
does not maintain that sensation is primarily passive and is thus, able to account for
cognitive attention by way of his understanding of the unity of the sense organ, immanent
actions, and sensation as intuitive cognition. What emerges in this discussion is Scotus’
particular understanding of an intentio by which the nature of the phantasm can be
understood.
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1
Introduction
John Duns Scotus’ theory of cognition is an original confluence of elements taken
directly or in a modified way from a variety of traditions including the Greek
commentary tradition of Aristotle, the Augustinian illumination tradition rooted in
Platonism, the Arabic Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle by Avicenna and Averroes, and
the Christian theological tradition.1 The Aristotelian theory, filtered through these
various traditions, provides the fundamental framework of Scotus’ cognitive theory,
accounting for its basic structure and elements. The study of cognition, both sensitive
and intellective, that Aristotle presents in De Anima, however, is not completely worked
out, and while there has been some consensus on the meaning of particular passages in
Aristotle over the centuries, Aristotle’s intent still remains unclear.2
Aristotle’s ideas had been the subject of many commentaries and had thus
undergone various interpretations by the time they reached Scotus in the late 13th and
early 14th centuries in an historical context vastly different from the one in which
Aristotle himself wrote. Scotus is then not only dealing with the perceived intrinsic
inadequacies of Aristotle’s theory and its various interpretations, but also the concerns
1

For the Arabic influences see, for example, Etienne Gilson, “Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns
Scot,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen-age, Paris 2 (1926-1927): 89-149; (Arabic,
Neoplatonic and Christian) Mary Elizabeth Ingham, “John Duns Scotus: An Integrated Vision,” in The
History of Franciscan Theology, ed. Kenan Osborne (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1994),
191-2; (Avicenna) Joseph Owens “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and
Scotistic Metaphysics,” Medieaval Studies (1957): 1-14. For a discussion of the Augustinian influences
see in particular, E. Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, trans. B. Bonansea
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 20-21; Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns
Scot (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), 10; Jerome V. Brown, “John Duns Scotus on Henry of Ghent’s Arguments for
Divine Illumination: The Statement of the Case,” Vivarium xiv, 2 (1976): 94-113; D.E. Sharp, Franciscan
Philosophy at Oxford in the 13th Century (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964), 279-370. It is clear
that Scotus rejects the illumination of Augustine while embracing other aspects of Augustine’s theory.
These latter aspects will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
2
Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, “The Potential and the Agent Intellect,” in The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 595.
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and questions of his own day as found in his responses to his most influential
contemporaries including, but not limited to, Henry of Ghent, Peter Olivi, and Godfrey of
Fontaines.3 These concerns included the question of whether or not the Aristotelian
framework could account for the various cognitive activities and thus offer a cohesive
cognitive theory. Scotus’ theory of cognition is indebted to these rich and varied
traditions as well as to his contemporaries as they provide the context of his own thought
and in many ways the content such that he incorporates many of their elements.4 Still,
this debt neither renders Scotus’ cognitive theory wholly unoriginal nor his thought
unworthy of study in itself. Scotus’ own thought, more often than not, manifests itself as
a compromise between various competing claims. His theory of cognition is one of
complex mediation, not the result of mere reaction to the positions of others, but the
product of a careful, deliberate, and sustained consideration of the issues, guided by his
own insights and motivations. Scotus places a new emphasis on certain aspects of the
cognitive process, and thus, I will argue, lays the ground for a new approach to the
questions of how we know and what we know.
Scotus’ own approach to cognition is framed by and constantly attentive to the
status of the wayfarer, the human being pro statu isto, in this life. But though the status
of the pilgrim certainly imposes limits upon the cognitive ability in this life, these limits
are but temporary and do not intrinsically change the nature of the human intellect, its
natural activity, or its adequate and proper object, and Scotus always treats them as such.5

3

Katherine Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the
Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345 (Leiden: E, J. Brill, 1988), 56.
4
Tachau 1988, 56; see also Robert Pasnau, “Cognition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed.
Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 285-286.
5
Pasnau 2003, 294-95; Allan Wolter, “Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural,” New
Scholasticism 23 (1940): 281-317.
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His interests in cognition are steered beyond the limits of this life by his understanding of
the natural ability of the intellect, which is determined and defined by the object that
ultimately perfects the intellect in the next life, the beatific object. His understanding of
the beatific object informs the whole of his cognitive project, deepening his
understanding of certain elements in Aristotle’s framework and allowing him to address
unresolved issues in Aristotle’s account of cognition.
The question that motivates and guides this dissertation is the particular question
of the nature of the phantasm. The phantasm is that sense image that somehow mediates
between sensation and intellection. The agent intellect acts with the phantasm to provide
an object to the intellect. Given, however, that the intellect is immaterial and inorganic,
the question arises as to how it is able to act with the phantasm which is in a bodily organ
and under the material condition of singularity.
Aristotle claims that the intellect cannot think without a sense image, and
therefore, though not dependent on the body for its own operations, is dependent upon the
body-soul composite to provide such a sense image. While Aristotle does give a
somewhat detailed explanation of how he understands sensation, he does not give a
detailed explanation of how the intellect acts with the sense image nor does he work out
the problem of how the intellect relates to the body-soul composite.
Scotus embraces Aristotle’s claim that the intellect cannot think without a sense
image. Given his Christian beliefs, Scotus understands that the intellective part of the
soul is able to exist separately from the body, and yet, in this life, is dependent upon the
body. Whereas the sense has an external object, the intellect requires an internal object.
The intellect, in this life, has no direct access to the external object and therefore depends
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upon sensation, both external and internal, to provide a sense image or phantasm that the
agent intellect is able to act with in order to make an object present to the intellect. What
is the nature of the phantasm that allows it to be present to the agent intellect?
This is a complicated and involved question. In order to be in a position to offer
an answer, several other issues must be addressed and explained, for example how is
sensation to be understood as a process of the body-soul composite that is ultimately able
to produce a phantasm, and how is the relationship of the soul and body to be understood
such that there can be a real mediation between the distinct faculties of sensation and
intellection? In this dissertation I will address these questions in the following way.
In Chapter 1 I will discuss the basic elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics and
account of cognition. In this chapter I will first discuss key metaphysical notions. I will
then offer a detailed reading of De Anima in which I will emphasize the concerns that I
see are critical to Aristotle: the highly specific relationship between the soul and the
body, his concern to detail the characteristics of a body that can be ensouled, his
homonymy principle and understanding of ensouled being, and his understanding of
sensation as the reception of sensible form without matter.
In Chapter 2 I will discuss how two theological notions, the beatific vision and the
incarnation, both inform and guide Scotus’ cognitive process. The beatific vision
requires the presence of the divine essence in its own existence to the cognizer. Thus, the
intellect of the cognizer must be intrinsically capable of attending to the presence of an
extramental object existing in itself. Given that Scotus claims that the proper object of
the intellect is being, the cognitive faculties, both sense and intellect, are intrinsically
capable of noticing the existence of their objects. The notion of the presence of the
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object is critical to Scotus’ account of cognition. In the discussion of the incarnation I
will endeavor to show that the world and the object are worthy of being loved and are
therefore worthy of cognitive attention in themselves.
In Chapter 3 I will discuss how Scotus understands the relationship of the soul
and the body. In the course of this discussion I will address how Scotus understands
unity, the nature of the accident, the nature of a suppositum, and the nature of the
immateriality of the intellect. What I will show is that, for Scotus, the notion of person,
allows him to guarantee the unity of the body-soul composite such that the mediation
between sensation and intellection can be assured.
In Chapter 4 I turn my attention to the process of sensation. In the first part of the
chapter I discuss in detail Aquina’s distinction between natural and spiritual action in
terms of his discussion on sensation. I also consider the debate in the current literature as
a way of accessing the complexities of the issues in Aquinas’s account. Four questions
emerge from my discussion of Aquinas that serves as my organizational guide in
discussing Scotus’ account of sensation. In my discussion I will show how Scotus
answers these questions and then discuss the way he comes to understand sensation in his
mature work, the Quodlibetal Questions. This allows me to consider the nature of the
sensible species as an intentio, and thus, the nature of the phantasm.
The main text of Scotus that I use in this dissertation is his Quodlibetal Questions,
though I also use his Commentary on De Anima, Questions on the Metaphysics of
Aristotle, and the Ordinatio. The Quodlibetal Questions is one of Scotus’ most mature
works. The Quodlibetal Questions proves interesting as a text. Though the questions
were not of his own choosing, as Felix Alluntis and Allan Wolter point out in the
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introduction to their translation of the Quodlibetal Questions, God and Creatures, upon
revising these questions for publication, Scotus “wove in so much of his basic philosophy
and theology as to make this work one of his mainstays.”6 I not only found this to be the
case in my own study, but was further intrigued with the Quodlibetal Questions as a text.
Scotus arranges the questions in such a way as to create an extended argument that serves
to reveal the cohesiveness and depth of his own thought. Thus, when working with
passages from the Quodlibetal Questions, I found it helpful to consider several side by
side or to offer a close textual reading of an extended argument in order to follow the
path of his thought.

6

Felix Alluntis and Allan Wolter. God and Creatures. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1975, xviii.
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Chapter 1 Aristotle’s theory of cognition
The concern of this first chapter is to present the fundamental Aristotelian
structure which frames Scotus’ thought so that his particular concerns and eventual
solutions as a medieval Christian thinker can emerge and take shape in the chapters that
follow. My aim in this first chapter is to give an account of the central elements of
Aristotle’s thought and along the way draw attention to issues critical to the medieval
thinker. In the first part of this chapter, 1.1, I discuss the key metaphysical principles of
Aristotle’s system that guide and frame his approach to questions on the soul and
cognition. In the second part of this chapter, 1.2, I discuss key elements of Aristotle’s
discussion on the soul and its cognitive activities as found in De Anima.7 I conclude the
chapter with a brief critical summary.

1.1 Some Underlying Metaphysical Principles
Aristotle is a systematic philosopher such that every question, concern, or
problem is addressed within a carefully reasoned framework. The study of metaphysics
for Aristotle is a study of the underlying principles of this framework and indeed is a
study that only comes about through rigorous and abstract thought. To understand the
answers that he gives to any question, whether it is a question on the cognitive activities
of the human being or otherwise, requires, then, that certain principles of this framework
7

For the purposes of this dissertation, which is concerned with Scotus’ cognitive theory and how he
understood critical passages in Aristotle’s De Anima, when quoting from De Anima, I give the Latin
translation of the pertinent text. I use the Latin translation of De Anima as found in Averroes’ Commentary
of De Anima: Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953). For the English translation I use: Aristotle,
De Anima, trans. J.A. Smith in The Revised Oxford Translation of The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed.
Jonathon Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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be present in the mind of his reader. To that end, I discuss Aristotle’s notions of
substance, matter (potentiality), form (actuality), and the hylomorphic (hylo – matter +
morph – form) principle. My aim in this discussion is to briefly outline these notions in
as straightforward a way as possible without either oversimplifying or digressing into
resolutions of difficulties that lie outside the scope of this work.
Substance. Aristotle’s main discussions of substance are found in two different
texts, Categories and Metaphysics (VII-IX). There is still much debate over how
Aristotle finally defines substance, what counts as substance, whether the accounts of
substance given in these two texts are compatible, and whether Aristotle’s theory of
substance is ultimately defensible.8 My purpose here is simply to discuss Aristotle’s
notion of substance in a clear and concise way and so, while there does exist much
scholarly debate, for my purposes here, I will set aside these debates.
In the Categories Aristotle distinguishes ten categories of being. Substance is the
first of these categories, while what is predicated of substance makes up the other nine:
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, condition, action, passion.9 These terms
are meant to be understood as logical as well as ontological. They are grounded in reality
such that they indicate either the individual being, substance, or the aspects of being, that
which is predicated of substance, i.e., accidents. The first of the categories, substance,
8

Christopher Shields, Aristotle (New York: Routledge, 2007), 256. See pp. 256-257 for Shields’
discussion of the debate that exists between the compatibilists, those scholars who see the accounts of
substance found in the Categories and the middle books of the Metaphysics as compatible, and the
incompatibilists who, Shields explains, typically argue that the account given in the Metaphysics is more
mature and therefore “supplants” the account given in the Categories. For Shields’ more in depth
discussion of the Categories, see pp. 146-195 in the same text.
9
Aristotle. Categories. Trans. J.L. Akrill in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford
Translation, Volume One, ed. Jonathan Barnes, ( New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). Aristotle
gives different lists of the categories of being in different works, though the above list of ten categories
appears both in the Topics and the Categories. The medieval tradition recognized these 10 categories. For
a discussion on the medieval tradition see Chapters 4 and 5 in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval
Philosophy, 1989.
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answers the question what something is, whereas the other nine answer questions about
some particular characteristic of this something. According to Michael Frede, there is a
general agreement of most scholars that what Aristotle intends by the division of the
categories is a “scheme of classification such that all there is, all entities, can be divided
into a limited number of ultimate classes.”10 While it can be said that all that is can be
framed and understood by these categories, which Barnes in fact understands as “an
inventory of our world – our ontological catalogue,” what these categories actually mean
is not an easy matter.11
At the beginning of the Categories Aristotle offers a four-fold distinction of
things that are: (a) those things that are said of a subject but not in a subject (man is said
of the individual man but not in any subject), (b) those things that are in a subject but not
said of a subject (not as a part of the subject but nonetheless in the subject such that it
cannot exist separately from it examples being individual knowledge of grammar or
individual white in a subject), (c) those that are both said of a subject and in a subject
(knowledge is both in the soul and said of grammar), and (d) those that are neither said of
a subject nor in a subject (the individual horse or man).12 What emerges from this

10

Michael Frede, “Categories in Aristotle,” in Studies in Aristotle, ed. Dominic J. O'
Meara (Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 1.
11
Jonathan Barnes, “Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 79. See also Robin Smith, “Logic,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55-57. Here
Smith argues that understanding the categories is difficult and then examines side by side Aristotle’s
discussion in the Topics I.9 103b20-25 and Categories 4, Ib25-2a4. Smith argues that these passages could
be viewed in three ways, first as a list of types of predicates which arises out of reflection upon basic
questions of being, second, the categories can be understood as the highest genera, and third, the categories
are kinds of predication.
12
Categories 2, 1a20-1b6. For an insightful reading of this particular passage see Sheldon M. Cohen,
Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10-11.
Cohen explains that the terms “said of” and “said in (or “present in”)” should be understood as technical
terms instructive about the things that are. What Aristotle ultimately does in the opening chapters of the
Categories, Cohen observes, is to turn Platonism on its head, making primary substance the individual,
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fourfold distinction is Aristotle’s fundamental distinction between substance and accident
which governs the relationship between the first category of being (substance) and the
other nine (accidents). Aristotle defines substance (ousia) as “that which is neither said
of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the individual man or the individual horse.”13 Aristotle
further posits that “it is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a
subject,”14 and that “every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this’.”15 By contrast, an
accident inheres in a substance and thus exists in a derivative way.16 Aristotle further
divides substance into primary substance and secondary substance. A primary substance
is the existing individual whose existence makes possible the existence of all other
things.17 Secondary substances are the species and genera.18 An existing individual or
primary substance belongs to the species, which in turn belongs to the genus. Neither the
species nor the genus would exist if it were not for the existing individual. The idea of
substance that emerges here is that substance is a subject, that of which something is
predicated. Aristotle establishes in the Categories that the “highly actual concrete
singular thing” is primary substance because it alone has independent existence and thus,

concrete being rather than the forms, and the forms (species, genera) secondary substances and thus,
dependent on the individual concrete being.
13
Categories 5, 2a13-15. See also Cohen 1996, 6-7. Cohen discusses here the difficulties in the use of the
English word substance for the Greek word that Aristotle uses, ousia. The word substance is problematic
because it can mean stuff aligning it more with the way that Aristotle understands matter, or it can mean
essence which is clearly not the way that Aristotle is using it in the Categories. Cohen offers that at times
it might be better to use the word ‘thing’ in order to attend to the distinction between the individual being
and its though still uses the traditional translation of ousia as substance. I point this out here in a footnote
in order to both address the translation difficulties and to underscore how Aristotle definition of substance
here as the individual concrete being.
14
Categories 5, 3a9.
15
Categories 5, 3b10.
16
Barnes 1995, 77.
17
Categories 5, 2b5-6.
18
Categories 5, 2a15-19.
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is logically and ontologically first.19 In the Categories, substance is what is primary,
what is “basic and prior to all else.”20 A point that should be made here is that based on
this classification scheme not everything that exists is a substance. But the basic
distinction between what exists as a substance and what does not is based on the four-fold
distinction that Aristotle gives at the beginning of the Categories. This four-fold
distinction, however, falls short of providing an analysis of substance and its components
that accounts for it standing alone and not being said of or said in a subject. It is in the
Metaphysics that such an analysis is offered.
In the middle books (VII-IX) of the Metaphysics, Aristotle offers a complex and more
highly developed analysis of substance in which he considers whether substance should
be understood as form, matter, or the composite of both. What informs his discussion of
substance here is the principle of hylomorphism, Aristotle’s doctrine that each thing is a
unity of form and matter. I will discuss hylomorphism in more detail later. Nowhere in
the Categories does Aristotle mention hylomorphism or its components, form and
matter.21 So the discussion of substance in the Metaphysics has a decidedly different
approach, and given that in this text Aristotle is not simply offering a classification of
being, but a science of being, his discussion of substance engages the question of the
intelligibility of being.
At the beginning of Metaphysics VII Aristotle claims that there are several senses
in which a thing is said to be. Either ‘to be’ means “what a thing is or a ‘this’,” or ‘to be’
19

Josheph Owens, “Matter and Predication in Aristotle,” in Aristotle: The Collected Papers of Joseph
Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), 36.
20
Shields 2007, 257.
21
Shields 2007, 167-170. Shields here discusses the possibility that the categories are derived from
hylomorphism, that form is the basis of the category of quality and matter is the basis of the category of
quantity. Since form and matter make no appearance in the Categories, Shields thinks that this claim is
problematic. However, he points out that this is an approach that medieval thinkers took and has the
advantage of grounding the categories in the world.
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means “that a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate asserted
of it.”22 Aristotle qualifies this statement, however, claiming that while there are indeed
these several senses of being, that which is, in the primary sense, is the ‘what’ or the
substance of the thing.23 Thus, the meaning of substance here departs from narrowness of
the Categories. Perhaps to emphasize the greater breadth and depth that he will give to
substance in the Metaphysics, Aristotle then, identifies the question, what being is, with
the question, what substance is.24 According to Jonathan Barnes, this is Aristotle’s
leading question.25 The question of substance, here, takes on existential and ontological
import making it the most fundamental of all questions.26 Barnes contends that in this
one question Aristotle implicitly asks three questions: (1) What does it mean to call
something a substance, i.e., to call something ontologically primary? (2) What must that
which is called a substance be like in order to be ontologically primary? (3) What items
actually qualify as substances?27 It is clear that Aristotle is concerned here, among other
things, to provide the ground of the distinction between the substance and the accident,
between those things that cannot be predicated of something else and those things that are
predicated of something else, reaching beyond the discussion in the Categories. These
three implicit questions that Barnes observes here point to some of the difficulties that
Aristotle is addressing. Of these three questions, Barnes claims that it is the second that

22

Metaphysics 7.1, 1028a10-13.
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is most problematic for Aristotle to answer because he seems to be pulled in opposite
directions.28
On the one hand, Barnes observes, Aristotle clearly understands a substance as the
individual entity he indicates in the Categories.29 On the other hand, he wants substance
to be intelligible, that is, definable.30 The problem is that only common items, like
species or genera, are definable. This raises the question of the intelligibility of the
existing individual and hence, of the world.31 Barnes sees a tension in Aristotle:
“Substances are individuals: Mozart is a substance, man is not. Substances are
definable: man is a substance, Mozart is not.”32 In Metaphysics V, Aristotle claims that
substance is “the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else,”
and at the same time that a substance is “a ‘this’ and separable.”33 How Aristotle can
hold both of these accounts is problematic, but Barnes offers a resolution.
“This so-and-so” is the translation of Aristotle’s tode ti. This phrase, tode ti,
according to Barnes, is Aristotle’s attempt to resolve the tension between the
individuality of substance, i.e., that substance indicates the existing individual as seen in
the Categories, and the need for substance to be definable. The ‘this’ indicates the
individual, which for Aristotle, is “one in number” or as Barnes explains, “one item
which can be identified and distinguished from other items and re-identified again as the
28
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same item.”34 The ‘so-and-so’ indicates the definable, the ‘what’.35 What Aristotle
means by “separable” is unclear, but Barnes contends that it should mean that the
existence of the substance “can be explained without invoking the existence of anything
else.”36 Barnes observes that it is fairly clear that Aristotle understands substance as the
individual and as that which indicates what the individual is, the form or essence.
As abovementioned, at the beginning of Metaphysics VII, Aristotle claims that
there are several senses of being. Aristotle here continues the distinction drawn in the
Categories between the existing individual and the accidents said of this individual. But
he frames the discussion in Metaphysics in terms of ontology rather than logic, that is, he
asks in what senses can a thing be said to be? The primary sense in which a thing can be
said to be is the ‘what’ or the individual substance,37 while every other sense in which a
thing is said to be predicates something of substance. Aristotle here affirms what he
argues in the Categories, namely, that substance is “that which is not predicated of a
subject, but of which all else is predicated.”38 However, he observes that there is more
than one way in which substance can be understood, namely, either as the essence, the
universal, the genus, or the substratum.39 The substratum is “that of which other things
are predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else.”40 Now if substance is
understood as the substratum, it is necessary to determine the nature of the substratum.
Aristotle considers that it can have the sense of being matter, form, or the union of matter
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and form.41 Before turning to a discussion of each of these notions, what can be taken
from this discussion on substance is that Aristotle uses three criteria to determine what
substance is, subject, individual, and separable.42
Matter and Potentiality. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle defines matter as “that
which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity or assigned to any
other of the categories by which being is determined.”43 Matter in itself is not a
particular thing because, by definition, an individual thing is a composed of both form
and matter. Matter simply as matter has no actual existence, and this is due to the fact
that it is not formed matter and not being formed matter is without definition or
determination. In fact, Aristotle claims that matter is “unknowable in itself.”44 This very
lack of determinateness is what gives matter the capacity to be formed or determined. As
no particular thing and having not particular determination, matter is dunamis or
potentiality. Dunamis means the capacity of doing something or being something, a
power, capacity, or a potentiality.45 So while matter as pure potentiality has no existence,
potentiality itself is the power or capacity of matter to be formed, or to be acted upon, and
is thus a necessary condition of the existence of a composite being or substance.46
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Matter as potentiality is the principle of change for Aristotle. All things that
change are composed, in part, of matter.47 In order to explain how something comes into
being or changes, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle says that “everything that changes is
something and is changed by something and into something.”48 A something is already
formed matter, what is generated or comes into being is a this, a composite of form and
matter.49 Matter only has actual existence as formed, as S. Marc Cohen explains that
matter at every level except the lowest is “itself a compound of matter and form, and its
essential properties will be those of its form.”50 As formed matter a thing is actually a
specific something, and as this specific something, it has the capacity to be changed into
a specific something else because it is composed of matter determined in a certain way.
Aristotle says that when we look for the material cause of the human being, for example,
we must look to the proximate material cause. Rather than looking to the elements as
material cause, we need to look to the “matter peculiar to the thing.”51 This is because in
order for something to be changed into something else, it must already be that something
else, potentially. Thus, only matter that is already determined in some way has the
capacity to be or become a particular thing. For example, only certain kinds of matter
have the capacity to become a saw; a saw cannot be made out of wool.52 Wool can never
actually be a saw because in some sense, prior to being a saw, it would have to
potentially be a saw. But wool lacks such characteristics that would give it the capacity
to be a saw. Steel is able to be an axe because it has the capacity to have a sharp edge.
47
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Steel is potentially an axe. Potentiality as a power or a capacity is essentially what it is
capable of being, but this essential capacity comes not from matter, but from form.
Form and Actuality. Form is that which determines and identifies a being as what
it is. In the Metaphysics Aristotle identifies the form with essence: “By form I mean the
essence of each thing and its primary substance.”53 Essence is the word used to translate
Aristotle’s to ti ên einai, which literally means “the what it was to be” for a thing.
Essence is “what something is.”54 In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle claims that the
definition seems to be the “what it is” (to ti esti).55 But in the Posterior Analytics,
Sheldon M. Cohen explains, Aristotle is not concerned with the “what it is” question in
terms of substances, as is clearly the case in the Metaphysics where Aristotle contends
that “definition and essence in the primary and simple sense belong to substances.”56 In
the Metaphysics, Aristotle is concerned to show what substance is primarily, and what
appears to win out is that substance is primarily form which is essence.57 Thus, the
substance of the Categories is definable since, in being a composite of both form and
matter, it has definition and determining characteristics. Form determines and defines
matter and is therefore prior to matter. Form is actuality (entelecheia or energeia),
matter is potentiality (dunamis). The entelecheia or energeia can be understood as the
exercise of a capacity or the actualization of a potential such that, as Sheldon M. Cohen
explains, every “actualization or realization (energeia) of a dunamis is the completion
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(entelecheia) of that dunamis.”58 Since is matter is nothing in itself, unknowable in itself,
form as actuality, realizes the potentiality of matter. Thus, it is unity of formed matter
that has actual existence, not essentially, but such that existence follows from the form as
actuality.59
Hylomorphic union. Each individual being or substance is a composite, a unity of
matter and form, a unity of potentiality and actuality.60 Matter as potentiality is capable
of receiving the form which as actuality is only realized in matter. Barnes explains that
Aristotle originally understood matter as stuff and form as shape, his standard example
being the bronze sphere.61 The bronze is the stuff and the sphere is the shape. Stuff is
indefinable in itself for it lacks the structure or determinateness that shape gives to it. In
the Physics, Aristotle explains that every sensible substance is composed of two
principles, matter and form.62 Joseph Owens uses an analogy to explain how the matter
that is unknowable (potentiality) becomes knowable (actuality). As bronze is to the
statue, matter is the “underlying nature in any sensible substance to its corresponding
form.”63 Matter as the underlying nature in any sensible substance is in itself completely
indeterminate. In contrast, the form is the “fundamental knowable content” of the
sensible thing.64 The form actuates the matter and thus constitutes the particular thing.65
The result of the union of form and matter is the particular thing which is at once
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individual and knowable. That each particular thing is a union of form and matter is
Aristotle’s hylopmorphic principle. At the core of this principle is the claim that matter
and form are one and the same thing. In any given hylopmorphic union, the matter is
essentially what the form is actually, and therefore are somehow one.66
S. Marc Cohen observes that while Aristotle typically uses the artifact model of
the bronze sphere or bronze statue to illustrate the hylomorphic union, it has its
advantages and disadvantages. In such a model, form can be easily understood as either
the shape of the material or in more complex cases the functional organization.67 S. Marc
Cohen explains, however, that a major disadvantage of the artifact model, to Aristotle’s
own theory, is that it characterizes the connection of form and matter as contingent and
thus oversimplifies the hylomorphic union.68 In all but the simplest of cases, the artifact
model is unable to appreciate the complex unity of the form and matter relationship. In
highly complex cases, for example, living being, it is only highly formed matter that has
the capacity to receive a form, a soul, that has complicated material requirements. The
more complex a being, the less contingent the relationship between form and matter
appears to be.

In De Anima, Aristotle considers the case of living beings, devoting

much time to understanding the characteristics of a body that can be ensouled.

1.2 De Anima
From the outset of his study of the soul in De Anima where he claims that the soul
is the principle of animal life, Aristotle concerns himself with the difficulties of his task.
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Aristotle’s stated aim is to understand first, the soul’s essential nature, i.e., the nature of
the soul’s substantiality, and second, the soul’s properties or affections including those
properties had by the soul itself and those had by the composite of the body and soul.69
What complicates the study of the soul, the principle of animal life, is its relation to the
body. Early in Book I Aristotle observes that most of the affections or movements of the
soul involve the body. 70 The only possible exception is thinking unless it be shown that
thinking is impossible without the bodily imagination.71 Aristotle understands the soul’s
affections as enmattered accounts (logoi), meaning that with most of the affections of the
soul there is a concurrent affection of the body. 72 An enmattered account involves both
psychic conditions and material conditions, or as Amelie Rorty characterizes it, cognition
and the body.73 Aristotle offers the example of anger as such an enmattered account:
“anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body (or part
or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that end.”74
Aristotle considers whether the affections of the soul should be studied by the
physicist (physikos) or the dialectician (dialektikos); the physicist specifies the material
conditions, the dialectician specifies the account or form.75 But Aristotle contends that
simply supplying the material conditions and the form is not enough, a proper definition
69
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of the affections of the soul must also include a teleological account, i.e., it must specify
the purpose or end.76 In other words, as Rorty points out, in order to understand the
relationship between the material conditions and the account or form, we must know the
“end designated in its logos.”77 Given the nature of the affections of the soul as
enmattered accounts, a study of them requires more than either the physicist or the
dialectician alone can give. Rorty aptly characterizes Aristotle’s study of the soul as a
philosophical bio-psychology acknowledging that it is broader than contemporary
philosophy of mind or contemporary philosophical psychology.78 In the Metaphysics
Aristotle considers whether matter should be part of the definition of substance.79 In the
De Anima, in striving to give an account of living being and its activities, Aristotle
refines his hylomorphic doctrine in order to expand and deepen how he understands the
relationship of form and matter, actuality and potentiality. From the beginning of De
Anima, Aristotle alerts his readers to the intimate relationship between the soul and the
body.
In the rest of the first book of De Anima, Aristotle analyzes his predecessors’
notions of the soul observing two traditional characteristics used to distinguish the
animate from the inanimate: movement and sensation.80 As Aristotle has identified (most
of) the affections of the soul as enmattered accounts, that he begins his discussion of
previous theories of the soul with movement and sensation is important. Any account of

76

De Anima 403b7-8: “. . .alius vero dat formam existentem in hoc propter ista.”
Rorty 1992, 8..
78
Rorty 1992, 7.
79
Metaphysics 7.10-7.11. At 1037a25-29, Aristotle clearly claims that the material parts will not be present
in the formula of a substance for they are only parts of the concrete substance. At 1036a1-8, Aristotle
claims that the concrete thing has no definition. The concrete thing is known by its universal formula, but
since matter in itself is unknowable, what is known is simply the form or essence.
80
De Anima 403b24-26: “Et hoc ponemus principium, dicendo quod habens animam videtur differre a non
animato his duobus proprie, scilicet motu et sensu.”
77

22
movement or sensation will have to be grounded in the relationship of the soul to the
body. It is from this point of view that Aristotle examines his predecessors’ ideas and
admonishes them:
The view we have just been examining, in company with most theories
about the soul, involves the following absurdity: they all join the soul to a
body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason
of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it. Yet, such
explanation can scarcely be omitted; for some community of nature is
presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the
one moves and the other is moved; but it is not the case that any two
things are related to one another in these ways. All, however, that these
thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul; they do
not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it
were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed
by any body—an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and
shape of its own. It is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could
embody itself in flutes; each art must use its tools, each soul its body.81
In this passage Aristotle clearly finds fault with those who do not specify either
the reason that the soul is joined to the body or the bodily requirements for such a union.
He reasons that given the fact that “one acts and the other is acted upon,” the relationship
of the soul to the body is a special case. In fact, he finds the view that a study of the soul
that only focuses on the soul’s characteristics and not those of the body is absurd
because: “each body seems to have a form and shape of its own.” The relationship
between the soul and the body is a highly specific one, comparable to the relationship
between an art and its tools.
From Book I of De Anima, we can take the following points: 1) the soul is the
principle of animal life, 2) any account of the soul will require an account of the specific
81
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characteristics of the body as well as the relationship between the soul and the body, and
3) any account of the affections of the soul will require an account of the material
conditions, the form, and the end or purpose. Aristotle, thus, sets up the guidelines for
the study of the soul.
Aristotle begins Book II of De Anima by asking what the soul is, immediately
drawing upon the hylomorphic principle. His answer begins with a brief discussion of
substance recalling the discussion in the Metaphysics where substance is considered in
different senses, as matter, form, or the compound of both. Substance can be considered
in the sense of matter, i.e., “that which in itself is not a this,” in the sense of form or
essence, i.e., “that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a this,” or in the sense of
the compound of matter and form. Aristotle identifies matter as “potentiality” (dunamis)
and form as “actuality” (entelecheia) and then adds an important qualification of
actuality, distinguishing two kinds: knowledge and reflecting. 82
Aristotle next considers that among substances are to be found both bodies and
natural bodies. He notes that some natural bodies have life, some do not. Life is here
defined in terms of activity: “self-nutrition, and growth, and decay.”83 Aristotle then
claims that “every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a
composite.”84 In the Metaphysics Aristotle explicitly identifies the soul as primary
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substance and the body as matter.85 And in De Anima, Aristotle identifies the body as the
subject or matter of the composite, for the soul cannot be a body.86

The soul, then, is the

form, more specifically, “the form of a natural body having life potentially within it.”87
What does Aristotle mean that the soul is the form of a natural body “having life
potentially in it?
Above, Aristotle defined life in terms of activity: nutrition, growth, and decay.
What Aristotle means by a body that has life potentially in it, is not a body that is not
alive, but a body that is alive and therefore has the capacity for life as activity.88 A living
body is a body that has life (as activity) potentially in it. Only a living body has the
capacity to carry out life activities. However, unless some of these activities are being
exercised there is no life. So it seems that Aristotle runs into problems using the
hylomorphic principle to specify what the material component is in the composite of the
living being. As seen above, the matter of the composite must potentially be what the
form is actually. The problem here is that Aristotle identifies the matter in the body-soul
composite as the already ensouled body, the living body, and thus, as Akrill explains, the
body does not have life potentially but necessarily.89 In fact, Aristotle further claims that
a body that is no longer alive is a body in name only raising the thorny problem known as
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the homonymy principle.90 For example, Aristotle asks us to suppose that an axe is a
natural body, such that being an axe is its essence.91 If the essence of being an axe is no
longer present, then the axe is an axe in name only.92 So too with an eye that is deprived
of sight; an eye without sight is an eye in name only.93 Thus, if we try to specify the
body without the soul as the matter in the body-soul composite, S. Marc Cohen explains
that “we must fail, for if what we pick out is not alive, then what we pick out is not a
body.”94 While this is certainly a difficulty, I agree with Cohen here that the point of the
homonymy principle is to remind us of the “crucial importance of function in the
definition of a living creature,” and the fact that Aristotle contends that what a thing is is
always determined by its function.95 At the beginning of Book I of De Anima, Aristotle
claims that to grasp the nature of an affection of the soul, an enmattered account, we need
to specify the material conditions, the formal conditions, and the teleological conditions.
A teleological account always includes the function of the being. The problem with the
living being is that its functioning is at once psychic and bodily. So that while the soul is
not a magnitude or a body, it (or at least some of its powers) cannot exist without a
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specific kind of body. To know the soul is to know the living body. Aristotle must adjust
his hylomorphic principle in order to comprehend the wholeness of the living being.96
This brings us back to the two types of actuality that Aristotle distinguishes:
knowledge and reflecting. The special case of the living body as a substance is a special
case of hylomorphism because it requires a higher degree of unity of form and matter
than the case of the bronze sphere because it has to function as a whole. Moreover,
Aristotle has to account not just for the existence of a living being, but the living of the
living being. This means being able to account for both life and the exercise of that life.
The unity of a living being has to be a functional unity where the matter is of such a kind
that it has the capacity to carry out the functions of life. But such a capacity is held only
by the body that is already living.
To address the complicated status of the living being, Aristotle distinguishes a
first actuality (entelecheia) and a second actuality (entelecheia). The first actuality can
be understood as a capacity or aptitude and is contrasted with the second actuality which
is the exercise of this capacity. Sheldon M. Cohen explains that first actuality stands to
second actuality as a sort of dunamis or power.97 But, according to Cohen, Aristotle
defines dunamis most basically as a source of change, the ability to change into
something else.98 The ability to change into something else is the kind of change that
Aristotle calls a kinesis.99 But not all dunamis is change of this type. There is that
change which is the exercise of a capacity. The first actuality is this second sort of
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change, it “marks a things’ ability to exhibit or become what it really is, rather than for it
to become different.”100 Aristotle says that the soul, like knowledge, is such a first
actuality. Knowledge is a first actuality (entelecheia) that makes possible the second
actuality or exercise of knowledge, reflection. Thus, the soul is the first actuality of a
“natural body having life potentially in it.”101 A body that potentially has life is a body
that is organized, that is, has organs which have the power or capacity to carry out the
exercise of life activities. Thus, the soul is, more precisely, the first actuality of a natural
organized body.102
Aristotle contends that the soul is the “what it is to be” for a body with organs,
the soul is “an account or essence,” as well as “the cause or source of the living body.”103
In fact, the soul is the source of movement, the end, and the essence of the whole living
body.”104 As the essence and actuality of the living body, the soul or some parts of it
cannot exist separate from the body.105 Aristotle emphasizes here that the soul is the
actuality of certain kind of body and again claims that it is a mistake not to specify the
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characteristics of the body required for the soul because the actuality of any given thing
requires a matter that has the appropriate potentiality.106
The way that Aristotle characterizes the unity of soul and body goes well beyond
the hylomorphism of an artifact. Whether artifacts have real essences, or whether beds
have a higher degree of unity than that of a heap are questions that are open to debate.107
The case of the living being stands apart from these artifacts in that there seems to be a
higher degree of unity of form and matter. When Aristotle defines the soul as the form of
the body that potentially has life in it such that the soul is the “what it is to be” of an
organized body, he is not concerned simply about the substantiality of the soul but is also
addressing the nature of the relationship of the soul to the body, rejecting any
contingency in the relationship between this body and this soul.108 Recall that Aristotle
rejects the notion that he attributes to the Pythagoreans that “any soul could be clothed by
any body.” Rather, Aristotle contends that each body seems to have a form and shape of
its own. Since matter in itself has no determinateness, then matter without being highly
formed, cannot account for the intricate and definable structures found in the bodily
organs necessary for life. But since the body and bodily organs exist for the sake of the
soul, and the soul is the actuality of the a body with organs, then the structure of the
bodily organ must be understood as form. But the bodily organ as formed is the ensouled
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bodily organ. Moreover, it is an organ that is attached to the living body. The point is, in
no way can inanimate matter account for the physical structures of the bodily organ
required for the activities of life, like nutrition, growth, or sensation.109 When Aristotle
defines the soul as the form of a living body, he is defining the relationship of matter and
form as essential. The living being is an essentially ensouled being. While it is well
agreed upon that Aristotle has this notion of an essentially ensouled being, how it is to be
understood and its significance has given rise to much debate.110 For the purposes of this
dissertation, I simply want to stress the intimate relationship between the soul and the
body. It is within the intimacy of this relationship that Aristotle explains the various
powers of the soul, nutrition, sensation, and thought. Both nutrition and sensation are
powers of the soul that depend on the body but thought is seen to be a different kind of
power that does not itself depend on the body.111 Though sensation is dependent on the
body and thinking is independent from the body, Aristotle holds that a kinship exists
between them. In the discussion on sensation that follows, I will pay particular attention
to this kinship using it to guide the way into the main focus of this discussion, intellective
cognition.112 Aristotle gives his main discussion on sense cognition or sense perception
in De Anima.
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Sensation. Aristotle characterizes sensation or sense perception as a “qualitative
alteration” and says that only that which has soul is capable of sensing.113 Sensation
requires the composite of the body and soul and more specifically, an appropriate bodily
organ:
A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated. The sense
and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same. What
perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that
either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude;
what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude.114
Sense perception involves one or more of the five senses, each of which has its own
proper organ and its own proper object. Whereas in nutrition, the soul acts upon its
object, food, it is the other way around in sensation which depends on “a process of
movement or affection from without.”115 What Aristotle observes about sensation is that
it only happens when there is an external sensible object present. He compares sensation
to the combustible which requires an external agent to ignite.116 Since sense perception is
a process which requires the material bodily organ and the material sensed object,
somehow the material object acts through a medium upon the sense organ; the organ is
thus affected qualitatively by the sensed object. This change of quality can be understood
in a certain sense as a transition from potentiality to actuality, e.g., the sense is potentially
113
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what the sensed object actually is. Actually sensing the object means that this object acts
upon the sense so that the sense actually becomes what it only potentially was.
Aristotle gives a detailed account of what happens in the process of each sense.
Each sense has its own proper object that cannot be perceived by another sense such that
when the sense perceives its own proper object, it does so without error.117 Examples of
the proper objects of the various senses include: color for sight, sound for hearing, and
flavor for taste.118 In addition to the proper sensibles, there are the common sensibles
which include: motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude, and are not proper to any
one sense but common to all.119 In an interesting passage, Aristotle explains the
difference between an incidental object of sense and a proper object of sense. The
example that Aristotle uses for an incidental object is a white object that we see that is the
son of Diares (in the Latin text below we see that it is Socrates). We see the white object
because color is the proper object of sight whereas the son of Diares is only incidental to
our perception of white.120 The point that Aristotle emphasizes here is that white is a
proper sensible because it is perceptible in itself, that is, it affects the senses whereas the
“son of Diares” does not. Moreover, Aristotle says that the very structure of each sense is
adapted to the nature of its perceptible object.121 Here again, Aristotle attends to the
specific characteristics of the body that the sensitive part of the soul requires in order to
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sense. Moreover, what is sensed is that which in its nature is able to be sensed. What
senses is that which in its nature is able to sense.
In an important passage in De Anima 2.5, Aristotle claims that “Everything that is
acted upon or moved is acted upon by an agent which is actually at work.”122 What is
acted upon is in a state of potentiality in relation to the actuality of the agent. The
different senses of potentiality and actuality need to be distinguished, and here Aristotle
uses the example of being a knower. Someone can be a knower in the sense that she is in
the class of beings that are able to know, in the sense that she actually possesses a certain
kind of knowledge, and in the sense that she actually is exercising that knowledge such
that it is in this third sense that she is most actually a knower.123 When she is in the first
sense of being a knower, she is in a state of essential potency where she requires a change
of quality, that is, acquiring knowledge by way of repeated instruction.124 In the second
sense of being a knower, when she actually possesses a certain knowledge, she is in a
state of accidental potency. When she actually exercises the knowledge that she has she
is not fully actualizing herself as a knower. To understand the transition between having
knowledge and exercising it requires a more careful consideration of the being “acted
upon.”
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Aristotle distinguishes two meanings of being “acted upon:” first, “to be acted
upon” means “the extinction of one of two contraries by the other” and second, “the
maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is
acted upon, as actual to potential.”125 Aristotle specifically discusses in this passage the
transition from merely possessing knowledge to being an actual knower and contends that
such a transition either ought not to be thought of as an alteration at all or else a different
kind of alteration.126 The process by which one who has the power to know and who then
learns or acquires knowledge by way of the one who actually knows ought only to be
understood as a process of acting upon in the sense that a change to a thing’s disposition
and nature has occurred.127 To be a knower fully requires that someone first acquires
knowledge and then exercises it. By acquiring knowledge something about the knower’s
disposition has fundamentally changed so that she is now in a different state of
potentiality such that she now has the capacity to exercise that knowledge. Aristotle says
that the process of sensation is comparable to intellection. Aristotle says that, at birth, a
living thing, in terms of sensation, is already in the same state of potentiality as the state
of possessing knowledge, and thus, actual sensation corresponds to the exercising of
knowledge.128 The sense is already disposed to sensing such that it only requires that
there be an external sensible object present to it for it to actually sense. The point here is
125

De Anima 417b2-5: “Et passio etiam non est simpliciter, sed quedam est aliqua corruptio a contrario, et
quedam magis videtur esse evasio eius quod est in potentia ab eo quod est in actu et simile.”
126
De Anima 417b5-7: “Ista igitur est dispositio eius quod est in potentia apud perfectionem; non enim
considerat nisi habens scientiam. Et hoc aut non est alteratio, quoniam additio in ipso erit ad perfectionem,
aut est aliud genus alterationis.”
127
De Anima 417b10-16: “Quod autem revertitur ad perfectionem ab eo quod in potentia existit in capitulo
intelligendi non est rectum ut vocetur disciplina sed opertet ponere ei aliud nomen. Qui autem addiscit
postquam fuit in potentia, et accepit scientam ab eo qui est in perfectione Doctor, oportetaut ut non dicatur
omnino pati, aut ut dicatur quod alteratio est duplex, transmutatio sciliect ad dispositiones non esse, et
transmutatio ad habitum et naturam.”
128
De Anima 417b17-19: “Et prima transmutatio sentientis est a generante, ita quod, cum fuerit generatum,
statim est sentire etiam, sicut scientia est. Et quod est etiam in actu est simile considerationi. Sed tamen
differunt, quod agentia in hoc sunt extrinseca, ut visum et auditum, et similiter alia sensibilia.”

34
that the change involved in sensation is unlike ordinary change. It is a change in which
that which that which has the capability of sensing actually now senses.
In the process of being acted upon, the sense and the sensed object lose their
dissimilarity such that the sense which is acted upon becomes like in quality to the object
that acted upon it.129 The sense organ is that part of the body “which is potentially such
as its object is actually.”130 The sense organ has a structure that is adapted to its proper
object. Its proper object is by nature perceptible; the sense organ by nature is that which
is able to perceive. What makes an sensible object what it actually is, i.e., actually
sensible, is its form, not its matter. Somehow the sense is potentially what it senses, not
the whole of the material object but just what makes the external sensed object sensible,
and this is the sensible form. But the sense does not become exactly what the object is,
rather it becomes only a likeness or receives a likeness. How does the sense receive the
form of its object?
In order to answer this question we need to consider the elements that are
involved in the process of sensation as well as Aristotle’s characterization of the way the
form is received by the sense organ. I will discuss the former first. Aristotle discusses
each sense in detail, for my purposes here, I will discuss sight only. The object of sight is
the visible, and this is color.131 Every color, Aristotle explains has the power to move the
transparent where the transparent is that which is visible, though not in itself, its visibility
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comes from the color of something else.132 Color sets in movement the transparent air
which is the medium between the visible external object and the eye. A medium is
necessary because if the object of color is placed on the eye, the eye will not see.133
Somehow the color (and in the case of hearing, sound) acts upon the transparent medium
which then acts upon the eye. All sensation involves the external object, the medium that
is acted upon by the external object and which then acts upon the sense organ, and the
sense organ itself.134 When a proper sensible acts upon the sense its effect is to bring
about a perception of it. For example, when an odor or smell acts upon the sense of
smell, Aristotle says that its effect is to make something smell it.135 While the air is
certainly affected by the smell, that is, moved by the smell to act up the organ of smell,
the air itself does not smell the odor because it is not capable of doing so, only the sense
organ of smell is capable of doing so.136 Only that which is capable of smelling the odor
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can be acted upon in such a way that sensation occurs, and in order for sensation to occur,
an ensouled and properly structured sense organ is required. I am now able to address
how Aristotle characterizes the reception of form by the sense organ.
Aristotle explains that the sense and the sense organ are in fact the same, but their
essence is not.137 While what carries out the act of perception is the bodily organ or that
which has “spatial magnitude,” the actual acts of perception are themselves distinct from
the bodily organ: “what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude.”138 In a wellknown but controversial passage in De Anima II, 12, Aristotle explains the activity of
sense perception:
Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the
power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the
matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a
signet-ring without the iron or gold, what produces the impression is a
signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or gold;139
Aristotle compares the act of sensation, the reception of the sensible form without the
matter, to the way in which “a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without
the iron or gold.” The impression is made by the gold ring not qua gold but as it is a solid
object in the shape or form of a signet ring. The wax receives the form of the ring not the
matter of the ring. But the reception of form without the matter of the agent, Joseph
Owens explains, is common to all change for Aristotle and is not peculiar to the kind of

est igitur differentia inter olfacere et pati? Dicamus igitur quod olfacere est sentire; cum autem aer patitur,
velociter fit sensatus.”
137
De Anima 424a 24-25: “Et in quo est ista potentia est primum sentiens. Sunt igitur idem, in esse autem
diversa.”
138
De Anima 424a 27-28: “Illud enim quod sentit est aliqua magnitudo, et non secundum quod sentit;
neque sensus est magnitudo, sed intentio et virtus illius.”
139
De Anima 424a 18-22: Et dicendum est universaliter de omni sensu quod sensus est recipiens formas
sensibilium sine materia, v.g. quod cera recipit formam anuli sine ferro aut auro, et recipit signum quod est
ex cupro aut ex auro, sed non secundum quod est cuprum aut aurum.”

37
change that happens in sensation.140 What then, is the kind of change that Aristotle wants
to indicate in his description of sensation as the reception of the sensible form “without
the matter?” Does it involve a bodily change, a psychic change, or both? How is this
phrase, “without the matter,” to be understood? These are critical questions not only in
terms of understanding the process of sensation but also in terms of understanding the
likeness of the sensible object that now exists in the soul at the level of the body.
In De Anima II, 12, 424a18-19, Aristotle, as quoted above, defines sensation as
the reception of the sensible form without the matter. At 424b3 he contrasts this
reception by the sense with the example of the plant being warmed or cooled as a process
of receiving the forms of sensible objects “with their matter.” Aristotle claims that plants
are unable to perceive because they do not have a mean. Without the mean, a plant has
no principle in it for taking in the sensible form without the matter; plants are affected by
sensible forms with their matter. Though it is true that the hand can be warmed in the
way that the plant can, there is a simultaneous awareness of this warmth by the sense, an
awareness that is not present in the plant. Aristotle at De Anima III, 2, 425b11-15 claims
that through the power of sense we are both aware of the sense object and aware that we
are sensing. There is a vast amount of literature on De Anima 2.12 concerning just what
Aristotle means by receiving the form without matter. I will discuss first a traditional
understanding of this passage and then briefly discuss some of the current debate.
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Owens contends that in defining sensation as the reception of the sensible form
without the matter, as opposed to the plant that receives the form with the matter,
Aristotle is distinguishing between the cognitional and non-cognitional reception of
form.141 Whereas the plant’s reception of form is merely physical, i.e., the plant is not
aware of the received warmth, the sense is cognitional, that is, aware.142 The point is not
to say that matter is not involved in sensation, for Owens contends that, for Aristotle,
matter is involved “in every cognitive act by a man, as well as by every sensible agent
that imparts the form.”143 The point is rather to understand the precise meaning of matter
in this phrase, “without the matter.”
Owens argues that it is not meant in a “jejunely physical sense,” that is, ‘matter’
here seems to mean the highly specific nature of the ring, gold, as opposed to its generic
nature, solid body.144 Owens argues, the “generic nature of a solid body always
accompanies the notion of a device,” since for Aristotle, an accident is inconceivable
apart from the substance in which it inheres.145 The device is the signet, and as device it
is an accident of a solid body. So the distinction between matter and form in this
particular instance, Owens argues, is a distinction between a body specifically
determined, gold, and the notion of body in general as determined by a specific accident
like a device. The reception of the form is indifferent to the gold. Thus, according to
Owens, “the agent impresses the form on the patient as the form of a solid body,” not as
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the form of gold.146 If the phrase “without the matter” is meant to bear the weight of the
distinction between the cognitional reception of form and the non-cognitional reception
of form, how is this meaning of matter relevant?
Owens contends that Aristotle here means the matter of the agent rather than the
matter of the recipient. But even so, matter here can take on a highly specific meaning as
shown in his above argument. In this way it is relevant to cognitional receptivity because
it raises the issue of what the sense is sensing, and appears to be an explanation of the
fact that each sense is aware of proper and common sensibles.147 It is here, though, that
Owens looks to the Greek commentary tradition for its interpretation on this passage.148
Owens contends that this tradition understands the reception of the sensible form without
matter to mean a solely cognitive reception, that is, form is received by form. While the
sense organ is material, it does not receive the sensible form according to its materiality,
but insofar as it is in act, that is, as it is a sense power at the level of form.149 It cannot be
the case that the sensible form is received into matter because then a new composite thing
would be formed. Rather, the form is received by form thus giving support to Aristotle’s
claim that the sense and the sensed are one in actuality just like the knower and the
known are identified.150 Owens appeals to Metaphysics, 1041b7-28 to make his case.
The form is what causes a thing to be and to be what it is. The sensible form received
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without matter makes the sense be the sensed immaterially.151 Owens thus concludes this
lengthy argument based on the highly refined understanding of matter that he offers, as
well as the commentary tradition, to contend that Aristotle’s claim that the sensible form
is received without matter is meant as an explanation of the sensible objects themselves
and not merely proper or common sensibles. Indeed, Owens argues that, “it is meant as
an explanation of the nature of cognition itself insofar as cognition and immateriality
coincide,” for “to be a thing immaterially is to be aware of it.”152
This argument of Owens goes hand in hand with an argument he gives in another
article in which he emphasizes that the form received without matter should be
understood as a tool, an instrument in a causal chain.153 He appeals to De Anima III, 8
where Aristotle draws an analogy between the soul and the hand: “the hand is a tool of
tools, so thought is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.”154 Owens
here contends that the underlying framework is one of “efficient causality through the use
of instruments;” by means of a causal chain the external sense object acts on the
percipient.155 Owens concludes, “The mind is a form that makes use of the received
forms as instruments for cognition, and correspondingly the sense uses the forms of
sensible things.”156 The form is received without the matter because matter as
indeterminate is unknowable and therefore cannot be instrumental in cognition since it is
form that provides the perceptual and knowable content.157
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Both of Owens’ arguments serve to draw attention to two important principles
that underlie Aristotle’s theory of cognition: (1) The identity of the knower and the
known, and (2) In sensing the object we are aware that we are sensing, in knowing the
object we are aware that we are knowing.158 Based on these principles, the sensed or
cognized object is primary in Aristotle’s cognitive theory for it is only in cognizing the
object that the mind can think itself.159
One of the debates in the current literature centers on the question whether the
reception of the form without the matter requires a bodily change or is simply a
psychological or “spiritual” change, that is, a change to the soul that indicates perceptual
awareness.160 In his text, Sense and Perception, D. W. Hamlyn explains the reception of
form without matter as the sense organ receiving “a quality of the object without the
material in which the quality inheres.”161 Though, according to Hamlyn, the sense organ
receives a quality, for example, color, he rejects that the eye becomes colored when we
see color.162 Seeing something colored must mean more than simply being stimulated by
a colored object. Somehow the “sense-organ and its object acquire the same quality” in
perception.163 Hamlyn’s account emphasizes that the affection of the sense organ is a
necessary condition of perception, suggesting that perhaps there is a bodily change but
remains unclear on this point.164
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Richard Sorabji offers a literalist interpretation of De Anima 2.12.165 Sorabji uses
Descartes as a point of contrast with Aristotle, strongly advising against a Cartesian
interpretation of Aristotle since for Aristotle there are no purely mental acts; every
affection of the soul for Aristotle is a physiological process.166 Sorabji reads Aristotle’s
conception of the soul as biological, that is, the soul is coextensive with life such that
perception “manifests life” not consciousness.167 This means, according to Sorabji, that
perception is not something mental in the Cartesian sense, but is a physiological change
where the organ is literally colored in the perceptual process.168 Sorabji argues that sense
perception involves a change in the body where, for example, the eye jelly literally
becomes red. What is received is not little bits of matter, but color patches or perceptible
forms.169 In his article in which Sorabji replies to claims made by Burnyeat, he explains
the eye jelly is itself transparent, and this is what enables it to receive or to take on color
patches.170 Sorabji draws a comparison from the sea’s taking on color to explain how the
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eye jelly literally becomes colored.171 The mechanism by which the sea takes on color is
different from that of the eye, as the case of the sea depends upon a distance of
viewing.172 The way in which the color patch is received in the eye is comparable to the
sea’s receptivity in that it “lacks the material basis of a body’s own color, but it looks the
way a body’s own color looks, as opposed to being, for example, a mere encodement.”173
In other words, the color patch exists in the eye without the same material basis that the
body’s own color has in the body, yet it is not simply an encodement for, as Sorabji
further explains, the color patch exists in the eye in such a way that it would be able to
stimulate the medium in such a way that the ophthamologist looking at the eye would see
the color patch there.174 Thus, Sorabji’s claim that the eye literally becomes colored
means that a patch of color comes to exist in the eye, and this is a physiological change.
Sorabji not only argues that sensation is a physiological process that involves a bodily
change, but also contends that Aristotle’s De Anima fits well his other texts which reveal
a whole program in which Aristotle gives physiological processes as the material causes
of mental events.175
Against such a view is the “spiritualist” reading offered by Myles Burnyeat.176
Burnyeat sees himself following a long line of interpreters, John Philoponous, Thomas
Aquinas, and Franz Brentano, all who deny the literalist reading and argue that receiving
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the form without the matter is “just one’s becoming aware.”177 According to Burnyeat,
perception is simply awareness and does not require any bodily change. Burnyeat argues
while there are “no physiological sufficient conditions for perception to occur,” there are
only necessary conditions that are states of receptivity to sensible forms.178 Burnyeat
ultimately does not see Aristotle’s program as including or requiring an explanation of
perception beyond the claim that there just is some physical matter, for example, the
matter of the sense organ, that is “pregnant with consciousness,” that is, simply and
fundamentally both alive and endowed with the capacity to perceive.179 Unlike Sorabji,
Burnyeat contends that Aristotle does not offer a “bottom up” approach in his account of
sensation, that is, Aristotle does not consider that there is any physiological event that
underlies perception.180 All that the reception of form without matter means is perceptual
awareness.
These two accounts, on the one hand, Sorabji’s claim that sensation involves a
bodily change and should be understood as a physiological process, and on the other
hand, Burnyeat’s “spiritualist” reading that sensation is simply perceptual awareness that
requires no bodily change, though it does require certain necessary conditions for
receiving the sensible form, help to frame the issues that complicate an understanding of
Aristotle’s own account of sensation. These are not the only thinkers who weigh in on
these issues, but my purpose in discussing Sorabji’s and Burnyeat’s accounts is to bring
out the critical issues, not only in the current literature, but also those confronting the
medieval thinker. In my discussion in Chapter 4 of Aquinas’ and Scotus’ accounts of
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sensation, these same issues will be a focus as well. I turn now to Aristotle’s
understanding of imagination.
Imagination. After discussing sensation, Aristotle turns briefly to the imagination
(phantasia) before proceeding to intellection. In De Anima III, 3 Aristotle defines the
imagination as “that in virtue of which an image arises for us.”181 He explains that while
imagination is different, in various ways, from both perceiving and discursive thought, it
is also the case that where there is no sensation there is no imagination, and no judgment
exists without imagination.182 So he concludes his examination of imagination by
claiming that it must be “a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of
sense.”183 Imagination takes its name from light for light is what makes sight possible.184
The imagination for Aristotle is bodily, its images (phantasms) are in the internal sense
organs and in this way resemble sensations.185
The images (phantasms) of the imagination play a critical role in intellective
cognition. In De Anima III, 7 Aristotle explains how these images serve the intellective
soul “as if they were contents of perception.”186 Dorothea Frede argues that the
imagination, particular, the imagination’s image (phantasm) establishes the connection
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between the intellect and the sense object.187 Aristotle contends that the intellective soul
never thinks without an image (phantasm).188 And what it thinks is the forms in the
images.189 As Frede explains, since both practical and theoretical reasoning have need of
images, and sense perception cannot provide the necessary images for a variety of
reasons, the imagination provides them.190 The imagination produces the image or
phantasm of sensations such that through the image the intellective soul can think the
form of the sensible object. The imagination then plays a critical role in cognition. It is
the necessary link between the sense and the intellect while preserving the separation
between them.191
Intellection. Aristotle devotes precious little time to his discussion of intellection
to the consternation of his many and varied commentators.192 The point of my discussion
here is to briefly discuss what Aristotle does say and point to some of the problems that
arise. To facilitate this discussion on intellective cognition I begin by quoting the most
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critical and perhaps difficult to understand passage in which Aristotle explains
intellection:
Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two
factors involved, a matter which is potentially all the particulars included
in the class, a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all
(the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these
distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul.
And in fact thought, as we have described it, is what it is by virtue
of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue
of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense
light makes potential colours into actual colours.
Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since
it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the
passive factor, the originating force to the matter).
Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual,
potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it
is not prior even in time. It does not sometimes think and sometimes not
think. When separated it is alone just what it is, and this alone is immortal
and eternal (we do not remember because, while this is impassible, passive
thought is perishable); and with this nothing thinks.193
Aristotle begins the passage by reminding his reader of the ground of the being of classes
of things and of the whole of nature; every single thing is composed of matter and form,
potentiality and actuality. Matter is distinguished from form as that which is “potentially
all the particulars in a class,” whereas form is the cause that “makes them all.”
What then are these two distinct powers in the intellective soul which Aristotle
speaks of in De Anima 3.5?
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Aristotle’s route to explaining intellection lies in its kinship to sensation.
However, while Aristotle uses sensation as a model for intellection, there are some
critical differences that are worth pointing out here. First, the activity of sensation
requires the complex of the body and soul together such that the sensitive part of the soul
is inseparable from the body and the power of sense operates by way of a bodily organ
whereas the intellective part of the soul is itself separable, differing as what is eternal
from what is perishable.194 Second, sensation depends on a movement caused by an
external object while the intellective soul requires an internal object and is impassable.195
Third, Aristotle contends that whereas sensation apprehends individuals, intellection
apprehends universals.196 While these are stark differences, the parallels between
sensation and intellection are just as sharp.
Aristotle regards thinking as being a kind of perceiving for he says that in both
“the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something which is.”197 Just as a the sense
must be capable of receiving the form of the object that acts upon it, the thinking part of
the soul must also be capable of receiving the form, and that means that the thinking part
of the soul must be “potentially identical in character with its object without being the
object.”198 Thus, like sensation, intellection is grounded in the metaphysics of actuality
and potentiality. All change is governed by form such that what is able to become is that
194
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which is capable of being formed, of receiving a form. In receiving a form, what existed
only potentially, now exists actually. So it is the case with the intellect.
In De Anima 3.5 Aristotle distinguishes two powers of the intellect, the power that
becomes all things, the possible intellect, and the power that makes all things, the agent
intellect. The activity of the possible intellect is pure receptivity. The agent intellect’s
activity is “making all thing,” and Aristotle compares it to light in the sense that light
makes potential colors into actual colors.
Throughout De Anima, Aristotle emphasizes that all powers of the soul involve
the body, the exception being the intellective power. The intellective power is immaterial
and inorganic. Thought, Aristotle says is, separable, impassible, and unmixed since it is
solely activity. This means that thought operates at the level of form and is not mixed
with matter. Moreover, actual knowledge is the same as its object, and what the intellect
knows is the form of the object, as Aristotle explains in De Anima 3.4:
If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul
is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different
from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore
be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object. Thought
must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.199
Like sensation, intellection requires an object and therefore must be acted upon or receive
an object. In sensation the relationship between the sense and the sensible object is not
problematic because the sense organ and the sensible object are both material. However,
given the immateriality of the intellective power, it cannot be acted upon by that which is
material, and therefore requires an immaterial object.
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Now, Aristotle contends that everything is a possible object of thought. Of those
things that involve no matter, thought and what is thought are the same, for example
speculative knowledge and its object. Those things that involve matter, however, are able
only potentially to be thought and must be disengaged from matter in order actually to be
thought.200
Though the intellect is immaterial, and thought is as well, still Aristotle contends
that the “soul never thinks without an image.”201 Since Aristotle understands the mind as
a tabula rasa202, as nothing, “pure from all admixture,” until there is actually thought, the
intellect is dependent on images, which serve as the contents of perception.203 These
images are of course provided by way of sensation and the imagination and therefore are
understood by Aristotle as containing the object of perception. However, sensation and
imagination are themselves bodily processes. So, while on the one hand, the intellect has
something to think about by way of the image, on the other hand, how intellect accesses
the image is problematic since the image being in a material organ cannot act on the
intellect. Indeed, Aristotle explains that what the intellect thinks is the form in the
images204, but how this occurs is left unspecified.
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Conclusion
The points to be taken from this discussion are as follows. First, Aristotle’s
cognitive process is framed by his metaphysics of potentiality and actuality at both the
level of sensation and the level of intellection such that in each, the process of cognizing
the object can be understood as a process of becoming that object in a sense. The faculty
of sense is somehow potentially the object and in sensation actually becomes what it was
only potentially prior to sensation. The faculty of intellection, likewise, possesses
potential knowledge that is actualized in the process of intellection such that actual
knowledge is understood by Aristotle as identical to the object of knowledge; when the
mind is thinking, it is the objects that it thinks. Second, in sensation the sense is acted
upon by an external object; in intellection an internal object must be present to the
intellect. Third, the sense apprehends the particular, the intellect knows the universal.
Fourth, in sensation the form of the material object is received by the sense without the
matter and a likeness or sensible species of the material object in its particularity is
produced which becomes the phantasm. The phantasm resides in the internal sense
organs and as such is material. Fifth, the intellect never thinks without the phantasm, but
the intellect itself does not depend on the body or its organs for its own activities. Sixth,
as the intellect requires an internal object, Aristotle conceives the intellect as having a
passive or receptive component, the possible intellect and an active component, the agent
intellect. Whereas the possible intellect receives a potentially knowable object, the agent
intellect shines its light on this object making it actually knowable. The nature of the
intellective process is complicated and needs to be worked through. Aristotle here is
careful to distinguish between accidental potency and essential potency. Prior to there
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being any object present to the intellect, the intellect is in essential potency to knowledge.
After there is an object present to the intellect, the intellect is now in accidental potency,
meaning that there is a potentially knowable object present to the intellect, but not yet
actually known.
I do not mean to reduce the whole of Aristotle’s cognitive project to these six
points, but only to indicate those Aristotelian principles which the medieval thinker in
embracing the Aristotelian framework had to work through. These issues as will be
shown in the following chapters of this dissertation were what accounted for Scotus’
cognitive structure but at the same time presented problems that had to be addressed.
The medievalist’s understanding of cognition (cognitio), as rooted in Aristotle, is
not limited to intellectual awareness or activity but includes sensory awareness or
activity. Intellectual cognition not only begins with the data provided by sensory
cognition but, in accordance with Aristotle, must always be accompanied by the
phantasm which is the sensible image produced by the activity of the imagination on the
sense data.205 Cognition then includes the whole process from the external senses to
intellectual understanding. However, Aristotle observed early in De Anima that
intellectual activity seems to be the activity of a different kind of soul from the sensitive
soul. Thus, he questions whether the intellective soul might be independent from the
body, not only in terms of being able to exist separately from the body, but also in terms
of whether the intellective activity is an activity that does not depend on the body.206 The
medieval thinker having different motivations addresses this same question. This
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question of the independence of the intellectual soul or intellective activity leads to
another, namely, how can the activity between the sensitive soul and the intellective soul
be explained? As I am especially concerned with Scotus’ understanding of sensation as a
necessary process by which an object is ultimately made present to the intellect (with the
help of the agent intellect), how Scotus answers this question needs to be addressed. In
this chapter I endeavored to emphasize those elements of Aristotle’s thought that I think
are especially critical and helpful in understanding Scotus’ project. These elements
include Aristotle’s understanding that the relationship of the soul to body is highly
specific as seen in his continued emphasis on describing the characteristics of a body that
is ensouled and can therefore carry out the activities of the soul, the homonymy principle
which deepens our understanding of the unity of the ensouled being, and the complexities
of the claim that sensation involves the reception of the form without matter.
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Chapter 2 Informing Theological Notions
The Aristotelian themes discussed in chapter one form the basic structure of
Scotus’ metaphysics and theory of cognition. However, his theological concerns and
beliefs, rooted in his Christian faith, shape his understanding and use of Aristotle’s
framework. I contend that rather than rendering Aristotle’s framework inadequate as the
basis of Scotus’ account of cognition in which he must address the intellect’s natural
suitability for the beatific vision as the culminating cognitive experience for the Christian
as well as the intellect’s cognitive activities in this life, Scotus’ theological concerns push
the limits of the Aristotelian framework without breaking it. For example, the beatific
vision is the face to face vision of the divine essence as it is fully present in its own
existence. Such an experience requires that the extramental divine essence be present to
the intellect of the blessed. In this life, however, the only objects present to the intellect
are internal objects. The intellect, in this life, does not enjoy the direct presence of the
external sense object. Though the beatific experience lies outside of the Aristotelian
project, the way that Scotus understands the beatific vision informs the way he
understands the cognitive activities in this life, including sensation, in such a way that
problems that arise in understanding Aristotle’s project can be addressed.
In this chapter, I discuss those theological issues that I see as critically important
to Scotus in terms of his cognitive project. These theological issues include the nature of
the divine essence as the object that ultimately perfects the human intellect, the nature of
the beatific vision as the moment that defines the most perfect relationship between the
knower and known, and the doctrine of the incarnation which reveals for Scotus the
dignity of the material object, a dignity that reflects the unity of the divine essence, and
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thus makes the material object a worthy cognitive object in itself. This chapter is divided
into three parts. In part 2.1 I discuss the divine essence, in part 2.2 I discuss the beatific
vision, and in part 2.3, I discuss the incarnation. I conclude this chapter with a brief
summary that emphasizing the critical issues..

2.1 The Divine Essence
The divine essence cannot be known by the human intellect pro statu isto, in this
life, where the human being is a wayfarer. That this is the case is certainly not unique to
Scotus, but the question whether this conditional limitation of the wayfarer is to be
answered theologically, for example, as punishment for sin, or to be answered
philosophically, for example, by the natural correspondence found between the
intellective power of the soul and the sensitive power of the soul in the process of
cognition, is not a question to which Scotus offers a definitive answer.207 Scotus’
concern lies in the question of the intrinsic capacities, i.e., the natural powers, of the
human intellect, which are not defined by the conditional limitations imposed upon it pro
statu isto but rather by its nature as an intellect. Allan Wolter points out that Scotus
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contends that “an intellectual power rooted in a spiritual nature, be it a pure angelic spirit
or the soul-form of a body, is incapable of being limited to a certain sphere of objects by
an intrinsic limitation.”208 Since Scotus contends that whatever one intellect can know,
any intellect can know, any limitation that constrains the human intellect in this life is
extrinsic, not intrinsic.209 So Scotus is interested in understanding the natural capacities
of the intellect as such and makes these capacities the ground of his cognitive theory.
Scotus does embrace the Aristotelian claim that, in this life, knowledge begins
with sensation as well as Aristotle’s dictum that the intellect must have recourse to the
phantasm in order to know.210 It is for this reason that the human intellect in this life is
unable to cognize the divine essence, for as will be discussed in more detail in the next
section of this chapter, the divine essence is known by the human intellect only through a
face to face vision. Such an encounter demands the immediacy of the object as it is
present and existing in itself. In the Aristotelian framework, the intelligible object is
made present to the intellect by way of the phantasm, an image based on the activity of
sensation. The intellect’s object is also abstract, that is, an intelligible form or universal.
What the beatific vision requires, however, is the unmediated presence of the divine
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essence, present and existing in itself.211 The point to be taken here is that the human
intellect, once free of the limitations of the wayfarer, can in fact know the divine essence,
if God so wills it, and this means that the capacity to know the divine essence already
intrinsically exists in the human intellect and is not something that the human intellect
must acquire later.212
The claim that the divine essence can be known by the human intellect is
supported by Scotus’ complex metaphysical system which, while an integration of
theological and philosophical principles, is made solid through intricate philosophical
argument.213 Underlying this system are Scotus’ claims (a) that being is the primary
object of the intellect, (b) that being is univocal to God and creatures, and (c) that the
ground of being is the ground of knowing. I will discuss each of these briefly in order to
establish a groundwork for the more specific discussion of the divine essence.
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First, (a), Scotus argues that the primary object of the human intellect is being.214
Two things here need to be understood, namely, the meaning of the notion of primary
object, and how being qualifies as a primary object. I will take up the former first. As
the primary object of the human intellect, being is that object that is most suited to the
intellect; being is the intellect’s primum obiectum adaequatum.215
To be adequate means to be “properly proportioned or commensurate” to the
power in question, which is, in this instance, the power of intellection.216 An adequate
object is the primary or proper object of a faculty of the intellect as such.217 Allan Wolter
explains that the notion of an adequate object, for Scotus, contains at least two distinct
requirements: (1) it must be able to motivate the intellect and (2) it must be formally or
virtually coextensive with whatever the intellect is able to know.218
In terms of the first requirement, (1), motivation, Wolter explains that the act of
motivating is an act by which the object is able to elicit from the faculty, here, the
intellect, “an awareness of itself both as to its formal content and its virtual
implications.”219 Scotus clearly says that in this life the object that moves the intellect is
the quiddity of the sensible object.220 But the quiddity of the sensible object is not the
adequate object of the intellect as such, that is, without the limitations of the wayfarer.221
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The second requirement from above, (2), the adequate object is that which is
formally or virtually coextensive with whatever the intellect is able to know, means that
when any object is known fully by the intellect, then everything that can be known about
the object is actually known.222 The adequate object of the human intellect is that object
which exhausts the natural power of the intellect, such that the intellect continues
searching until fully satisfied by the object.223
Scotus makes a further distinction in regards to the ways in which an object is
adequate to a faculty. An object is adequate to a faculty either in terms of the primacy of
virtuality or the primacy of commonness.224 The example of the primacy of virtuality is
God’s knowledge of his essence. The divine essence is the object that motivates the
divine intellect such that when God knows his essence he knows all that is virtually
contained in his essence.225 An example of the primacy of commonness would be color as
the object of sight. Color is a common concept or ratio that can be predicated of all
sensible objects capable of motivating sight.226 The object that is adequate then, is that
object which naturally motivates the intellect and towards which the intellect is inclined,
and is therefore, coextensive with its power.
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I turn now to the question of being as the adequate object of the intellect. Scotus
claims that being is the adequate and primary object of the intellect because in being
there is both the primacy of commonness and the primacy of virtuality:
For whatever is of itself intelligible either includes essentially the notion
of “being” or is contained virtually or essentially in something else which
does include “being” essentially.227
Scotus further contends that all primary intelligibles, for example, genera, species,
individuals, the essential parts of genera, the ultimate differences in some of these, as
well as the Uncreated Being, include being quidditatively.228 With regard to the
intelligible elements of these primary intelligibles, that is, the qualifying concepts of the
ultimate differences and proper attributes, being is included virtually.229 Thus, being is
shown to be the adequate and primary object of the intellect because anything that is
intelligible either includes being essentially, commonly, or is contained virtually in that
which does include being essentially. The point to be taken here is that since being is the
adequate object of the intellect, any object is intelligible insofar as it is.
In the case of (b) the claim is that being is univocal to God and creature. The
grounds for this claim are found in the discussion of (a) above where Scotus contends
that being is included quidditatively or commonly in all genera, species, individuals, the
essential parts of genera, and the Uncreated Being. Scotus offers two arguments in
support of this claim that being is predicated commonly of created and uncreated being.
The first argument rests on the fact that the intellect can be certain about the being of an
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object while at the same time be in doubt about delimiting differences.230 For example,
Scotus claims that he can be certain that God is a being while remaining uncertain about
whether he is infinite or finite, created or uncreated.231 Indeed, that we have uncertainty
regarding such differences presupposes, for Scotus, a prior certainty.
The second argument that he offers in support of the claim that being is univocal
to God and creatures follows from the reasoning that God cannot be naturally known
unless being is univocal to God and creatures. In the same way, the human intellect does
not know substance or its essential parts, form and matter, except by way of being
commonly predicated of substance and accident:
We can argue in the same way of substance and accident, for substance
does not immediately move our intellect to know the substance itself, but
only the sensible accident does so. From this it follows that we can have
no quidditative concept of substance except such as could be abstracted
from the concept of an accident. But the only quidditative concept of this
kind that can be abstracted from that of an accident is the concept of
being.232
It is precisely because being is univocal or common to substance and accidents that we
can have a concept of substance at all or even know the essential parts of substance,
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namely, form and matter.233 Or to put it differently, from the fact that we have a concept
of substance, which we cognize indirectly through the sensible accident, we are able to
reason towards that which commonly underlies subject and accident such that from the
knowledge of one we can arrive at the knowledge of the other. Being is precisely that
which underlies the subject and accident. It is predicated univocally, commonly, of both.
In the same way being is predicated univocally of God and creature. The point to be
taken here is that Scotus at once founds and makes intelligible his system through his
understanding of being. Since being is univocal to the created and uncreated, it is a
common foundation that comprehends all that Scotus wants to include: the whole range
of created beings and the Uncreated being. In this claim of univocality then Scotus
makes available all that is, all that partakes of being, to the intellect.234
Before concluding this discussion on the univocality of being, it is appropriate
here to discuss briefly how Scotus conceives of metaphysics, his understanding of
essential order, especially that between the infinite and the finite, and the nonmutual
relationship between God and creatures. The reason that it is important to discuss these
notions here is that while I do think the claims made at the end of the last paragraph in
regard to the univocality of being are strong and far reaching, I want to indicate the limits
within which Scotus is working.
Following Aristotle, Scotus is in agreement with other Scholastics such as
Thomas Aquinas, as well as thinkers such as Avicenna, that the subject of metaphysics is

233

Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 3: “Et ita nihil cognoscetur de partibus essentialibus substaniae, nisi ens sit commune
univocum eis et accidentibus.” Philosophical Writings, trans. Wolter 1987, 6.
234
Wolter 1946, 12.

63
being qua being.235 Thus, metaphysics is a science that deals with the nature and
existence of God, and as Scotus explains, is a transcending science for it is concerned
with the transcendentals.236 To understand how metaphysics is a science of
transcendentals and to appreciate the nature of transcendentals themselves, it is helpful
first to consider Scotus’ concerns about the nature of being prior to its division into the
ten categories of Aristotle and the concepts that can be formally predicated of God. As
already established in the above discussion, Scotus contends that being can be univocally
predicated of the created and the Uncreated. However, this is not to be understood as
suggesting that there is a mutual relationship between God and creatures.237 God always
transcends every order since God’s being is always of a different order. So Scotus
contends that being, before divided into the ten categories of Aristotle, is first divided
into infinite and finite.238 That there is such a disjunction between the infinite and the
finite is based on a universal rule whereby given the positing of the less perfect extreme
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of some being is posited, it can be concluded that the more perfect extreme is realized in
some other being.239 Thus, to posit the finite being of the creature is to be able to posit
the infinite being of God. This disjunction between the infinite and the finite is an
example of an essential order.
An essential order here means that the prior must exist simultaneously with the
posterior, i.e., the members related by an essential order must coexist.240 Moreover, the
posterior member is always imperfect.241 Based on the definition of an essential order that
Scotus gives in the Quodlibetal Questions, Wolter explains that an essential order “stems
from the very nature or essential constitution of a thing rather than from something
incidental to it.”242 In the question on the existence of God, Scotus discusses in more
detail the nature of an essential order. He explains that an essential or per se cause is a
cause which naturally produces its effect.243 Peter King explains that a cause is an
essential or per se cause if “its effect is a per se object of its causal power,” i.e., the per se
cause produces its effect “by its own nature.”244
Scotus distinguishes essentially ordered causes from accidentally ordered causes
in three ways: 1) In essentially ordered causes, the second cause depends upon the first
in its own causal activity, 2) In essentially ordered causes the higher cause is more
perfect, 3) All essentially ordered causes are simultaneously required to produce the
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effect.245 King uses the example of a builder, who in the activity of building is the per se
cause of the house. If in building the house, however, the builder causes traffic
congestion in blocking roads where building houses, this traffic congestion is only
accidentally caused rather than essentially.246
The point that I want to emphasize here is a point that Wolter makes, namely, that
the essential order between disjuncts like infinite or finite, contingent or necessary, prior
or posterior, substance or accident, to name but a few that Scotus mentions, adds to the
intelligibility of his system without denigrating either extreme, and this is due to the
nature of essential order.247 The essential order coheres together Scotus’ metaphysical
system. For example, God, as infinite being, is absolutely different from the creature in
its finite being. God as prior is perfect, creature as posterior is imperfect. The point is
that the essential order that exists between the infinite and the finite lessens their extreme
radicality. I can now turn to a discussion of the transcendentals.
Being is the first of the transcendentals. 248 The transcendentals are real concepts
that can be predicated commonly of God and creatures, prior to the division of the
categories.249 As a real concept the transcendental refers not to the conceptual order but
to the metaphysical order of reality.250 In themselves the transcendentals are indifferent to
the distinction of infinite and finite. As they apply to God they are infinite, as they apply
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to creatures they are finite. Scotus does not limit the transcendentals to being, one, true,
and good, but extends the definition to:
whatever pertains to being, then, insofar as it remains indifferent to finite
and infinite, or as proper to Infinite Being, does not belong to it as
determined to a genus, but prior to any determination, and therefore, as
transcendent and outside of any genus.251
In other words, the transcendentals are all notions that can be predicated
commonly of God and creatures or predicated of God alone, and transcend the
categories.252 The point that should be taken here is that Scotus endeavors to show and
account for, how that which is, is fully available to the intellect.
To sum up the points of these discussions (a) that being is the primary object of
the intellect and (b) that being is univocal to God and creature, I turn to what Scotus
claims in his Quodlibetal Questions, “What is ground for being is also ground for
knowing.”253 Based on the previous discussions this means at least three things for
Scotus. First, being is the guarantee of the object’s intelligibility. Second, whatever is
knowable in the object can be known by the intellect. Third, whatever one intellect can
know, any intellect can know.254 These three points will now guide the discussion on the
divine essence.
In Question 1 of the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus directly considers the nature of
the divine essence. He attends first to the definition of terms, among them, essence.255
He first asserts that “in the divine there must needs be some real entity, which is there by
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the very nature of things and is actually existing.”256 This is so because unless there were
some being that is “real, first, unique,” and which “requires no prior entity,” none would
be first nor would there be a posterior.257 It is, then, this real entity that is the essence of
God.258
Scotus is guided in his discussion here by Augustine’s arguments in De Trinitate,
“The name ‘essence’ is derived from ‘to be;’”259 ‘to be’ in Latin is “esse.” Essence is
rooted in being and is, therefore, that which concerns the being of an entity in the most
proper way such that: “God is most truly called “essence” to whom “to be” belongs most
properly, and truly.”260 Guided still by Augustine, Scotus writes:
. . . so that perhaps God alone should be called essence. For he is truly
unique, because incommunicable, and he revealed this as his name to
Moses his servant when he said: ‘I am who am.’261
God is what he is in himself absolutely and does not derive his being or essence in
relation to another. His essence is the formal reason of his being. The formal reason of
his being could not be a relational term such as ‘Father.’ God’s true nature and name
derives from what he is in himself, and therefore, from his essence which is most
properly his being.
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Scotus endorses Damascene’s claim: “Of all the names given to God, the main
one is that of ‘He who is.’”262 Scotus’ favorite way of thinking about the essence of God
in the Quodlibetal Questions, as shown by often he makes reference to it, is the metaphor
of an infinite sea of being, borrowed from Damascene: “For like some infinite and
limitless sea of substance, he contains all being in himself.”263 Scotus uses this metaphor
to explain the nature of God’s essence:
Therefore, essence is not just that first entity which is somehow distinct
from the essentials, but is one complete entity which unitively contains all
the essentials. The very term “sea” seems to imply this, because of the
immensity of what the sea contains unitively.264
The image of the sea expresses at once the infinitude and simplicity of the divine essence,
for Scotus contends that what is infinite cannot itself be made up of parts.265
Scotus next turns his attention to the nature of pure perfection, a notion that he
borrows from Anselm. Scotus claims that the divine essence is “that which includes all
that is pure perfection.”266 A pure perfection is, according to Anselm, “something it is
better for anything to have than to have what is not it, i.e., to have anything incompatible
with it.”267 Scotus’ notion of the supremely perfect being is that being which can have
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every pure perfection.268 His proof is that anything supremely perfect can lack no pure
perfection otherwise it would not be supremely perfect. But no pure perfection is
incompatible with another pure perfection because if such an incompatibility existed
between two pure perfections, that would mean that one would be better than the other,
and vice versa. Such circularity is impossible, Scotus contends, because then “one and the
same thing would be less perfect than itself.”269 So God as a supremely perfect being is
replete with every pure perfection. Infinity is a pure perfection that the divine essence
enjoys and is of critical importance to Scotus.
Scotus rejects Aristotle’s claim that there is no actual infinite. According to
Aristotle, “The infinite is that whose quantity is such that no matter how much one
removes from it, there is always more for the taking.”270 Such an understanding of
infinite precludes perfection because it is only potentially infinite, as Scotus explains,
“For this reason, no matter how much is removed, what one takes will still be finite and
will represent only a certain part of the infinite potential whole.”271 In other words,
Aristotle’s infinite is not actual, never whole, never complete and therefore in lacking
wholeness, lacks perfection.
In Quodlibetal Questions 5.6 Scotus changes Aristotle’s notion of the potentially
infinite in quantity to that of “quantitatively infinite in act,” by which he imagines that
“all parts that could be taken were taken at once or that they remained in existence
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simultaneously.”272 Rather than each part being actualized in succession, Scotus argues
that it can be conceived that all the parts are actualized all at once. This allows him to
conceive of the supremely perfect being as the supremely infinite being, “an infinite
being that cannot be exceeded in entity by any other being” and therefore “will truly have
the character of something whole and perfect. It will indeed be whole and complete.”273
The metaphor of Damascene’s sea, which captures this wholeness in its
immensity and infinitude, guides Scotus’ conception of the infinitude of the divine
essence. What must be made clear here is that Scotus understands ‘infinite’ as an
intrinsic mode of the divine essence. An intrinsic mode is an essential mode rather than
an existential mode.274 An intrinsic mode is a qualification of a subject so identified with
it that is “neither really nor formally distinct from it, yet it is possible to conceive of the
subject without the mode as a first intention (real concept).”275 Alluntis and Wolter point
out that Scotus only ever discusses the intrinsic mode in detail in connection with
magnitude.276 Magnitude, as an intrinsic mode, is “the degree of intensity or measure of
intrinsic excellence” of a formal perfection like infinity.277 As discussed above, being is
first divided into infinite and finite, such that infinite is proper to the Uncreated Being,
whereas finite is proper to created being. Infinity is not defined overagainst the finite.
Alluntis and Wolter explain, “Infinity is that mode which transcends every finite mode by
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a non-finite degree.”278 For Scotus, any hierarchy of being is a finite order, that is, what
separates the beings in the hierarchy is a finite measure. This is, again, because for
Scotus, being is either infinite or finite. If being is infinite there is here no hierarchy of
beings because there is only one infinite being. Where there is a hierarchy there is only
finite being. The infinite is what “exceeds the finite in entity beyond any relative
measure or proportion that can be assigned.”279 For Scotus infinity is neither an attribute
that accrues externally to the being that is infinite nor is it to be thought in the mode of a
coextensive property like good or true are to being. Rather what it expresses is an
intrinsic, essential mode of that entity, as Scotus explains:
It is so intrinsic that if we abstract from all its properties or quasiproperties, we have still not excluded infinity, but it remains integrally
included in that one single entity itself. Hence if we consider that entity
most precisely, namely without any property, it will be true to say it has a
measure of intrinsic excellence all its own which is not finite, since any
limitation of degree is repugnant to it. Therefore it is infinite. That which
is infinite, considered precisely, and not under the aspect of some
attributable property such as wisdom or goodness, can also be aligned
according to an essential order with something it excels, but its superiority
will not be measurable in any definite degree for then it would be finite.
Therefore, the intrinsic mode of anything intensively infinite is infinity
itself, which intrinsically expresses a being or essence which lacks nothing
and which exceeds everything finite beyond any determinable degree.280
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Allan Wolter explains that for Scotus the infinite or finite disjunction is a transcendental
disjunction that divides real being.281 Being is either infinite or finite such that the
infinitude or finitude indicates whether the magnitude of perfection is unlimited or
limited.282 The being that is infinite is infinite precisely because it is infinite being. As
infinite being it transcends any finite order. As an intrinsic mode, Wolter explains,
infinity is an essential mode that is “bound up with the actually existing perfection.”283
And it is the case then that “every perfection in God may be said to be formally
infinite.”284
The divine essence is supremely perfect and infinite, as such it is the primary and
adequate object of the divine intellect, which is itself supremely perfect and infinite. The
object that is adequate to any intellect must be a really existing object, present to the
intellect, and moreover, is that which perfects the intellect as the act of the intellect. Such
an object is known as the beatific object whether Scotus is considering the divine,
angelic, or human intellect. The beatific object is that object that
as supreme contains in itself the perfection of all objects and has the
power to perfect the intellect. Now the beatific object is that which quiets,
satisfies, and perfects the intellect.285
The divine intellect, however, does not have to seek out its object, the divine
essence, for its essence is always present to it. God’s beatitude does not require a
conceptual relationship between the operation and its object because God’s operation
“has a true union or identity with the object.”286 Scotus explains further that the adequate
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object of the divine intellect cannot be “common by way of abstraction from all the
objects it knows, but rather one that is common to all per se objects by a community of
virtue.”287 By knowing the divine essence, God knows all that is contained in the divine
essence.
The created intellect does not enjoy such a unity of identity with the beatific
object but rather only the unity of relation.288 It follows then for Scotus that the human
intellect seeks out and does not rest until it finds that object which perfects it, the divine
essence that is whole, complete, and infinite:
For in the most perfect of all objects, which contains in the highest all the
perfection of every object, this intellective power is to the highest degree
perfected, satisfied, and quieted, and so beatified.289
To sum up this rather lengthy section, the critical points to be taken are that the primary
and adequate object of the human intellect is being, being is predicated univocally of the
created and the Uncreated, being is the ground for knowing, and the divine essence as
that which has real being, is whole, perfect, and infinite, is that object which perfects the
human intellect. The divine essence is the primary and adequate object of the divine
intellect. It is the perfect extreme of being. While being is the primary object of the
human intellect, it is the perfect and infinite being that perfects it. The human intellect, in
its natural capacity, is capable of knowing what is, and what perfectly is.
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2.2 The Beatific Vision
Beatitude is both that which motivates and guides Scotus’ epistemological
endeavors for it is the terminus ad quem of the human intellect, and as such informs the
whole of Scotus’ epistemological project.290 Beatitude is the most perfect community of
the knower and the known that the human intellect can attain. In God, this is a perfect
unity because there is an identity of the divine intellection and the divine object. In
human cognition, this community of the knower and the object is founded on a relation as
Scotus explains:
Created beatitude, however, does necessarily require a relationship to the
object, and this is a real relation. The reason for this is that the operation
can have no greater unity with the object than the unity of a
relationship.291
It is this relationship between the human intellect and the divine essence that I will now
consider. At the beginning of question 13 of the Quodlibetal Questions, in which Scotus
is concerned about whether the acts of knowing are essentially absolute or relative, he
posits that the “ultimate perfection of the living nature is what such a nature desires
above all else by natural desire.”292
To desire is an activity of the will, to know is an activity of the intellect. The will
and the intellect are both powers of the soul such that for Scotus there exists only a
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formal distinction between them rather than a real distinction.293 Simply put, for Scotus,
there is no real distinction between the soul and its faculties.294 Although Scotus partially
agrees with Bonaventure that beatitude is a joint venture between the will and the
intellect, Scotus considers beatitude to be primarily a function of the will.295 The ultimate
perfection desired above all else is beatitude which as the final end is “an activity or
consists in an operation.”296 It is by way of a cognitive act that there is a vision of the
divine essence. That there is enjoyment of the essence is by way of the will. The
intellect, by the grace of God, cognizes the divine essence in its presence, and the will
loves it.
Thus, Scotus contends that the ultimate perfection of a living nature must have a
real relationship to the most perfect object that it is naturally designed to have.297 It is the
very nature of beatitude that it “connects or joins the nature with its ultimate end in an
unqualified sense, namely with the extrinsic object that beatifies.”298 Thus, Scotus agrees
with Augustine that the true definition of beatitude can be expressed as possession: “He
alone is blessed who has all he wills and wills nothing wrongly.”299
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What the intellect naturally seeks out and what the will naturally desires is that
most perfect object that, in possessing, perfects the intellect and will. In the beatific
vision the intellect knows its object as it exists in itself, for as Scotus understands it, it is a
“face to face vision of this object, since the act of knowing it tends to this object as
present in itself with its own actual existence.”300
Thus, beatitude requires that there be a real object, that is, an extramental one, for
otherwise the intellect would be able to be satisfied with a nonexistent object, which
Scotus argues is impossible.301 As we saw, Scotus uses Damascene’s metaphor of the sea
to ground his understanding of the divine essence. He returns to this metaphor
throughout the Quodlibetal Questions fully exploiting it not only to reveal the immensity
and infinity of the divine essence but also to show its actual existence. In Question 6 of
the Quodlibetal Questions Damascene is one of the authorities that Scotus appeals to in
order to support his claim that “the divine essence qua essence has its own real or
extramental magnitude,” which he infers from a previous claim that the divine essence
has extramental or real existence.302
Scotus contends that it is always necessary to assume “the existence of some
entity which is real, first, unique, and requires no prior entity.”303 If the existence of such
a prior entity is not assumed, there would be no posterior entity.304 Scotus seems here to
be appealing again to the law of disjunction between the prior and the posterior. That the
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existence of the posterior is posited allows the conclusion that a prior so exists. In any
case, in the divine there is real existence.
That Damascene calls the divine essence a sea means for Scotus that it enjoys “a
kind of priority and contains primarily all divine perfections,” and is therefore infinite.305
Scotus argues that the essence is infinite extramentally, i.e., really, precisely because the
essence is absolutely first.
Reason also shows that this is the case in terms of the nature of infinity as an
intrinsic mode of the essence. Since infinity is an intrinsic mode of the divine essence, it
follows, Scotus argues, that it only belongs to its subject intrinsically in the real or
extramental order.306 It is the case that a being of any absolute quiddity is either
intrinsically finite or infinite. But since it has already been shown that the divine essence
is infinite it cannot be finite. Its infinity is real just as the divine essence is extramental.
Since beatitude is a face to face vision, it requires a real object. The divine
essence is such for Scotus. But a face to face vision is accomplished by intuitive
cognition, that is, a cognition of the object that is present as present and the existing
object as existing.307 Beatific knowledge cannot be abstractive because abstractive
knowledge is indifferent to the existence or non-existence of its object.308 And so Scotus
defines beatitude in terms of cognition as an intuitive knowing where the “beatific object
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is reached immediately and in itself.”309 For Scotus, this claim means that the beatific act
“is necessarily an intuition of its object” such that “it is knowledge of that object as
existing and present in its own existence. . . indeed in its real existence as something
present.”310
Scotus further contends that the intellect cannot be perfected or “be perfectly
satisfied by any object unless it contains the full plenitude of its first object, that is to say,
unless its primary object finds its highest possible expression in that object.”311 But such
plenitude can only be infinity. Thus, Scotus concludes that any power capable of
beatitude requires an object that is infinite. Infinitude then is the “per se condition of any
object that is fully satisfying and therefore beatific.”312 The human intellect, then, is must
be understood in such a way that it will not rest but will “push on farther” (imo potentia
ulterius inclinatur) until it knows its ultimate object which is itself infinite.313 The
intellect is geared toward the infinite. The nature of the wayfarer is not simply
metaphorical or merely theologically driven but is an apt description of the human
intellect that constantly seeks to go beyond even what it may understand as its own limits.
To be a wayfarer is to be on a journey, but a journey takes place in time, one place to the
next, moment by moment. The journey of the wayfarer is fragmented by time. The
intellect in the state of the wayfarer does operate under certain conditions, namely, that
knowledge begins with the senses and that the intellect has recourse to the phantasm in
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order to know. While Scotus certainly does not see these limitations as intrinsic to the
intellect, he does not necessarily regard them negatively. That is to say, while they do in
fact constrain the intellect, they cannot ultimately change the nature of the intellect.
This is an important point for at least two reasons. First, Scotus is obviously
interested in maintaining and understanding the psychic unity of the soul in this life.
Second, since the intellect as such is ultimately perfected by the most perfect infinite
object, the divine essence, in this life this capacity remains an intrinsic capacity of the
intellect, though certainly not realized. Still, it speaks to how the intellect tends to its
object, be it the divine essence or the sensible object in this life. Certainly, the sensible
object is not an infinite object as it is a finite being, but it is endowed with “haecceity,” a
positive principle that determines it to an individual that is repugnant to further division,
and thus, is itself a unity over and above the number of its parts.314 What Scotus offers
here is the true finite disjunct to the infinite. The infinite is that which is utterly
indeterminable. The finite is that which is utterly determined. Scotus’s understanding of
the sensible object as non-repeatable individual affords the intellect an object that it can
truly tend towards.
To sum up this section, the most important point to be taken is the nature of the
beatific vision as that moment in which the intellect cognizes in a face to face vision that
object which perfects it precisely as it is infinite. Such a vision requires that the intellect
be capable of intuitive cognition, knowing an object immediately as it is present and
314
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existing. This face to face vision of the divine infinite object, I claim, is the basis of
Scotus’ contention that the sensible object endowed with haecceity is intelligible in itself.
While it is the case that Scotus rejects that haecceity can be known in this life, still,
because we experience objects as individuals and our intellect intrinsically tends towards
the infinite, the sensible object is a worthy object of study.

2.3 The Incarnation
For the Christian thinker in the Latin West, the moment of the incarnation is of
critical importance and inspiration. While it is certainly a theological notion, it plays a
role in Scotus’ understanding of the material world. What is of interest to me is how the
incarnation informs Scotus’ thought and perhaps gives him access to material reality from
a different vantage point. In the way that only that which is other or that which lies
outside of a framework is capable of bringing forth the reflective capacity, the incarnation
unsettled Aristotelian logic and categories for they are unable to comprehend such an
event where the divine becomes human. Scotus modifies Aristotle’s system for his own
project, and in doing so, he allows theological notions like the incarnation to reveal a
world that the Aristotelian system cannot. I will extend here the argument that I began in
the last section on the beatific vision.
The nature of the beatific vision revealed the nature of the human intellect as that
which is intrinsically capable of cognizing the divine essence, indeed, as an intellect that
tends towards, seeks out, and is perfected by the infinite object. Such an intrinsic
capacity is not changed by an extrinsic limitation, merely temporarily constrained. The
point being that the intellect naturally seeks out and tends toward the infinite. The
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opposite extreme of the infinite is the most specialized species, the fully determinate
individual. The intellect is naturally equipped, if not to fully cognize the individuality of
the object, to appreciate it and to push farther into knowing it. But is the object worthy of
such care and concern? Certainly it is the case for the beatific object. But I argue that it
is also the case for the material object by way of Scotus’ understanding of the
incarnation. It is this understanding that gives him the vantage point of loving the object,
thus realizing even the material object as something capable of being studied and worthy
of being attended to. Certainly one could argue that Aristotle goes a long way in rescuing
the material object from the status of appearance that Plato gives it. Whereas for Plato
the material object is but an appearance or copy of the form, subject to change, and
unintelligible in itself, Aristotle gives intelligibility to the material object by placing the
form in it and explaining it by way of the categories of being and the four causes. The
material object is what it is in relation to the system and workings of nature. And while
this goes a long way to appreciating the object in its own existence, the material object is
still ultimately understood as an individual in the species. The principle of individuation
is matter according to Aristotle. While Thomas Aquinas follows Aristotle on this point,
Scotus, as seen above, contends that there must be a positive principle other than matter
that is the principle of individuation.315 Scotus argues that matter cannot account for the
individuality of the object nor account for its unity.
It is the backdrop of the incarnation that gives Scotus the space to look at the
object in a new way. To show how this is the case, I will draw extensively from the
profound reading of Scotus’ understanding of the incarnation that Louis Mackey presents
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in his chapter, “The Theological Circumstance of Scotist Speculation,” as well as from
Richard Cross’ works, Duns Scotus and The Metaphysics of the Incarnation. I will attend
to Mackey’s argument first.
Mackey points out that while most theologians, including Aquinas, understood the
incarnation as “God’s response” to the sinfulness of humanity, Scotus joined a minority
tradition that rejected the notion that the incarnation was “mandated by the fall” of human
beings.316 In fact, the way Scotus sees it, according to Mackey, is that the incarnation was
“immediately intended by God as an end from all eternity.”317
Mackey lists the logical order of divine previsions, that is, God’s fore-ordained
knowledge:
1) God knows himself as the highest good;
2) he knows all the things that are to be created;
3) he predestines some to grace and glory;
4) he foresees those that are to fall in Adam; and
5) he preordains or foresees their redemption through the passion of his
Son.318
Mackey points out that though in the above logical order the redemption comes after the
fall, what is important is that the glorification of the human being (3), is prior to the sin of
the human being. The human being is already destined to glory before she sins. It is
because she is destined for glory, that is, already endowed with a capacity for glory, that
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she is able, even can be, redeemed. In the same way, that which is loved is already able
to be loved. Scotus explains:
Christ in the flesh, just like all the elect, was foreseen and predestined to
grace and glory before the passion of Christ was foreknown a medicine
against the fall.319
In fact, Mackey observes that for Scotus, the fall of humanity is not the cause of the
predestination of Christ, rather, Christ “would have been predestined to be the Son of
God even if rational creatures had not fallen, “even if,” Scotus says, “none were to have
been created save Christ himself.””320 Mackey emphasizes that there is a divine order
based on divine love, love being a center-post of Scotus’ decidedly Franciscan
understanding of reality:
1) God first loves himself;
2) he loves himself in others;
3) he wills to be loved by another who is able to love him supremely;
4) he wills the union with himself of that nature that ought to love him
supremely, even if no one falls; and
5) after the fall, he foresees the mediator coming to suffer and to redeem
his people.321
It is the case that Christ comes as mediator and sufferer in response to the sin of
humanity, but Christ as a whole, body and soul, is already glorified. He is already
glorified because it is his nature to love supremely God and thereby be in union with
God.
These two lists that Mackey offers are meant to show Scotus’ motivations. The
first motivation concerns the liberty of God, an important claim of Scotus. Certainly,
Mackey argues that the only way to make sense of the suffering of Christ is the fall. Still,
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God does not act in a constrained way but rather from “an absolutely original intention of
the divine will.”322 Mackey explains this divine intention eloquently:
Occasioned by our lapse, it was not coerced thereby. Comprehending sin,
it was simply a more comprehensive reaffirmation of the primordial
volition. Having willed to assume and glorify our humanity, God also
willed the cost of its reparation. Christ’s passion is not a concession to sin
but the projection through sin of the original divine ordinance of
incarnation. It follows not from the fall—nothing follows from sin except
the death of the sinner—but from the gracious liberty of God.323
The liberty of God is not the only motivation that emerges from a study of the above lists.
The second motivation is grace. God creates freely, but if, as Mackey has observed
Scotus as saying, “the incarnation is effected in the divine will prior to the creation,” then
“the world is sacralized from the beginning.”324 The way Mackey understands this is that
the
divinization of the creature precedes its making: deificari anticipates
creari. . . since the grace of the sanctifying union goes before the gratuity
of creation and motivates it, the order of nature is subsumed into the order
of grace from all eternity.325
What this means is that since the incarnation was preordained prior to the fall as an end, it
informs the teleological structure of the created world as a world that is already capable
of being loved, of being glorified. Again as Mackey contends, the world for Scotus was
“created in order that the union of the creature with God . . . might be realized in and for
the creature.”326 The incarnation is the point of, as well as the beginning and end, all
created things. The incarnation reveals not only the divine essence but also the essence
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of the created object. Mackey reads Scotus as contending that “the purpose of the
creation is the full manifestation and accomplishment of the Incarnation.”327
Cross shows that Scotus offers an argument based on natural reason that
concludes that the incarnation would have happened irrespective of the Fall of Adam.328
The two principles that Scotus uses to reach this conclusion are:
(a) In any well-ordered action, the end is willed before the means;
(b) In any well-ordered action, a greater good is willed before a lesser one.329
Based on these two principles, Cross claims that Scotus establishes the following order in
God’s actions:
1. God predestines Christ’s soul to glory.
2. God predestines Christ’s human nature to depend on the Word.
3. God predestines some other creatures to glory.
4. God foresees the Fall of Adam.
5. God predestines Christ to redeem fallen humanity.330
Cross argues that the order of the above divine actions is based on the two principles (a)
and (b).331 For example, God must have predestined Christ’s human nature before any
other nature because the glory of Christ’s human nature is a greater good than the glory
of any other nature. In like manner, Cross works out fully the above order. What is
interesting in Cross’s argument is not only that he shows that Scotus uses natural reason
to support his theological claim that the Incarnation was pre-ordained before the fall, but
also that Cross observes that this argument “ties in neatly with his [Scotus’] relatively
327
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lowly view of unfallen humanity.”332 Cross had earlier pointed out that Scotus’ account
of original sin is much weaker than Augustine’s, and moreover, the supernatural gifts lost
in the fall by humanity were minimal, and, thus, their loss “has only the smallest effect on
human existence.”333
In sum, the points to be taken from this discussion on the incarnation is that the
incarnation for Scotus is not a response to the fall but something pre-ordained by God.
Thus, in terms of the argument that Mackey offers, what clearly emerges is the
worthiness of the created world. That the world can be redeemed means that it is
intrinsically capable of being so redeemed. Thus, the act of redemption is not something
that is an external act to the world for as such it could not have redeemed the world. The
point is, for Scotus, that the world is already capable of being loved, and is therefore,
worthy of being attended to as a cognitive object. In terms of the argument that Cross
makes, the point to take is that the order of the incarnation prior to the fall of man is a
rational order.

Conclusion
I conclude this chapter by emphasizing that the nature of the divine essence, the
nature of the beatific vision, and the incarnation guide Scotus in his cognitive project.
Scotus is interested in the intellect and its object, both at the level of the natural capacity
of the intellect and the object, and at the level of the wayfarer. The theological notions
reveal the natural capacity of the intellect and its object. This in turn reveals how the
intellect seeks out and attends to the object in this life, constrained by limitations, but not
332
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changed by them. Moreover, the material object, according to the argument concerning
the incarnation, is an object capable of being loved, intelligible in itself, worthy in itself
of attention.
In Chapter 1, the fundamental framework and principles of the Aristotelian
framework were discussed in order to show the structure of Scotus’ cognitive theory. In
chapter 2, critical theological concepts that influence Scotus’ cognitive theory were
discussed in order to emphasize the critical concerns that Scotus has in working out his
cognitive theory. While the discussion in this chapter pertains most directly to the natural
capacities of the intellect and the object that ultimately perfects it, it sheds light on the
nature of the intellect and its object pro statu isto. Three critical claims of Scotus
emerged. First, while the intellect in this life is constrained, its ultimate nature is
unchanged. Second, Scotus does not view the dependence of the intellect on the senses
in a negative way but rather observes that there is a harmony and unity in the human
being’s psychic life. Third, the beatific vision requires the presence of the divine essence
to the intellect itself, and thus, the intellect is intrinsically capable of attending to the
presence of an object. This third claim is important because, while in this life the
intellect enjoys only the presence of an internal object, it nonetheless fully capable of
attending to the presence of an extramental object. This is not only the case due to the
beatific vision, but also as will be shown, because the intellect as a superior cognitive
faculty is able to know whatever the inferior faculty is capable of, that is, the sense
faculty’s knowledge. Not only is the intellect capable of attending to a present object, it
requires the presence of an internal object, and thus, in this life, requires the activity of
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the senses. Thus, the relationship between the sense faculty and the intellective faculty
comes front and center as what both informs and underlies Scotus’ cognitive project.
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Chapter 3 The Relationship of the Soul to the Body
The aim of this chapter is to examine how Scotus understands the relationship of
the soul to the body. This relationship is the framework by which and in which cognition,
both sensitive and intellective, occurs in this life. What complicates understanding the
nature of this relationship, and thus how cognition works in this life, is that the body is
material and the soul is immaterial. Materiality and immateriality are complex and not
easily defined and thus further complicate this issue. Given the immateriality of the soul
and the materiality of the body, the unity of the human being comes into question not
only in terms of how to account for the wholeness of the particular human being, but in
terms of her own cognitive activities which require such an underlying unity. Since the
aim of this dissertation is to show how Scotus understands how the immaterial intellect is
able to act with the material phantasm in cognition, it is critical to show how Scotus
understands the body-soul relationship as it is this relationship that makes possible the
activity of the intellect with the phantasm. This chapter is divided into five parts. In part
3.1, I examine Scotus’ complex and profound understanding of unity with the aim of
making clear that unity which is proper to the human being. In part 3.2, I discuss the
unity of the human being giving particular attention to the problematics of Scotus’ claim
that within this unity exists a plurality of substantial forms.334 In part 3.3, I turn to
Question 9 in the Quodlibetal Questions where Scotus considers the nature of the
substantial or informing form, and I use this question to frame an extensive discussion of
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the following three notions: per se being, the nature of the accident, and the immateriality
of the intellective soul. In part 3.4 I offer a particular reading of Scotus’ claim that the
human being, due to her intellectual nature, is a person. I propose here that the notion of
person is that which best comprehends and guarantees the unity of the human being. I
conclude this chapter with some critical remarks that both serve to summarize the main
points of this chapter and to introduce the discussion of sense cognition in chapter four.

3.1 Unity
Scotus understands unity or “the one” to be that which is indivisible in itself and
divided from all else.335 Unity is one of the transcendentals, those attributes of being
prior to the division of being into infinite and finite, and is therefore co-extensive with
being.336 Posterior to this division of infinite and finite being, uncreated and created
being, there are different grades of being, and, thus, different grades of unity such that
each grade of being has its own proper unity.337 Wolter explains that the most perfect
grade or form of transcendental unity, that which is most deservedly called unity, is the
unity of singularity (unitate singularitatis), that unity exhibited in the ultimate reality of
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the individual being, and this singularity is a numerical unity.338 Numerical unity, Wolter
explains, is a real attribute that “expresses a formal perfection of the individual.”339
As a point of contrast to the unity of singularity, there is the unity that Wolter
calls a “unity of kind,” a unity that exists between individuals that share a common nature
(natura communis).340 Influenced by Avicenna, Scotus argues that the common nature,
really in individuals, is itself indifferent to singularity or universality, “horseness is just
horseness.”341 The common nature is less than numerical, less than the unity of
singularity which properly designates the existing individual as such.342 As Wolter
explains it, the common nature is “prior by nature to any determination.”343 But, it is the
unity of singularity that is itself somehow “coextensive with all real being” and, thus, is
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the highest expression and realization of unity.344 It is important to understand fully the
unity of singularity as it is the standard by which all other kinds of unity are measured.
The unity of singularity, for Scotus, is that unity that is impossible to be divided
further. It expresses the ultimate reality of the individual and is realized in Scotus’ notion
of “haecceity” which is his principle of individuation.345 Scotus does not often use the
term “haecceity,” but he understands by it that which ultimately accounts for the unity of
the individual. In a discussion in book 7, question 13 of the QMA, Scotus gives his
argument.
The individual is that which is “not divisible into many, and is distinguished from
all others according to number.”346 Scotus explains that this means that to be divided into
subjective parts is repugnant to the individual, and this repugnance can be accounted for
only by something in the individual.347 One of the proofs that he offers for this is based
on his contention that the division into subjective parts is an imperfection and, therefore
is not found in God.348 From this, Scotus concludes, a repugnance to being divided into
subjective parts is due to a perfection in the individual.349 Haecceity is just such a
perfection for Scotus conceives of haecceity as a positive nature that makes something
intrinsically one that is whole and perfect of itself.350 Since being and unity are
coextensive, an individual being exists insofar as it remains a unity. Haecceity, together
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with the common nature, accounts for the individuality of the particular being.351
Mackey explains that, for Scotus, the individual must be understood as the “negation of
the “dividual” (dividuum).”352 Thus the unity of singularity is a unity of indivision, and
Mackey understands this to mean, in a Scotistic positive sense, integrity or a “fully
determinate and irrefragable uniqueness.”353 The most perfect expression of unity is that
which can neither be determined further nor divided further. Thus, unity is not simply
negative, indivision, for Scotus; the unity of singularity is a perfection that is to be
understood positively as a fully determined and complete wholeness.
Based on the coextension of unity with being, Scotus distinguishes at least six
different degrees of unity: (1) the unity of a collection or aggregate, (2) the unity of
order, (3) the unity of accident, (4) the unity of a composite, i.e., substantial unity, (5) the
unity of simplicity, and (6) formal identity.354 In addition to these six degrees of unity,
Richard Cross also identifies a seventh, the unity of homogeneity.355 Scotus organizes
this list from lesser to greater unity. Thus, as he points out, the unity of order is greater
than the unity of a collection, and so on. An example of a unity of a collection is a heap
or a bundle, a series of efficient causes is a unity of order, a white man is an accidental
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unity, a human being is a substantial unity, and the human soul is a unity of simplicity.356
As this chapter concerns the unity of the human person, I will examine here in more
detail, the unity of accident, the unity of substance, and the unity of simplicity.
The accidental unity results from the union of an accident and a substance, like
white and man. Following Aristotle, Scotus understands that the accident qualifies
the substance in some way. What is of import to this discussion is how Scotus
understands the accident itself and the manner of its relationship with a substance.
Scotus understands the accident itself as a singular thing, an entity that is individuated
independently of the subject to which it is united.357 Richard Cross points to a passage in
the Ordinatio in which he contends that Scotus explicitly claims that an accident is to be
understood as an individual item:
In every categorial hierarchy there can be found something intrinsically
individual and singular of which the species is predicated—or at least
there can be found something not predicable of many.358
Cross also quotes a passage from the Quodlibetal Questions where he explains that
Scotus is less explicit but nonetheless supports this same claim:
In the second sense of this first member [i.e. ‘being’ or ‘thing’ taken in its
broadest sense], however, we say a thing is what can have entity outside
the soul.359
In both of these passages it is clear that the accident as that which exists as a category and
also as that which exists extramentally can be understood as a singular, individual thing.
When it is united to a substance which is itself an individual, it is a unity of two
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individual things that is somehow greater than the unity of collection or aggregate. How
is this possible?
In terms of the manner of the relationship of accident to substance, according to
Cross, Scotus modifies Aristotle’s distinction between substance and accident. As
discussed in Chapter 1, accidents are distinct from substances because, whereas
according to Aristotle, substances exist in themselves, accidents exist in another. Cross
argues that Scotus replaces this Aristotelian distinction with the notion of inherence.
Cross contends that an accident, for Scotus, is an entity that has a natural tendency to
inhere in a substance; a substance has no such natural tendency.360 Inherence is what
explains how an accidental unity thus differs from the unity of a collection.
A substantial unity exists where there is a composite made of that which is
intrinsically actual, form, and that which is intrinsically potential, matter.361 A material
substance is made up of prime matter and a substantial form.362 Scotus does not
understand prime matter as pure potentiality, but rather, in order to account for
substantial change which requires that some basic stuff remain constant, Scotus claims
that matter has an actuality all its own, that is, has its own properties, its own nature.363
Matter, for Scotus, can exist (theoretically) and be understood independently from form.
Both matter and form are essential parts of the material substance.364 Indeed, every
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essence or quiddity is made up of matter as such and form as such, whereas, the
individual substance is made up of this matter and this form.365
A substantial form as one essential part of a material substance is itself an
individual, that is, for Scotus, the substantial form is individuated independently of the
prime matter to which it is united and is individuated independently of the composite of
which it is a part.366 While Aquinas, too, understands form as an individual, form is not
an individual in its own right, rather it is by way of its instantiation in matter that it is
individuated.367 That Scotus understands that the substantial form is an individual in its
own right amounts, Cross contends, to a rejection of Aquinas’ understanding of form, and
therefore of the notion of form simply as the structure of matter.368 Cross argues that
Scotus recognizes that form understood as the structure of matter is not enough to explain
how different structures of matter yield different sorts of material substances.369 Scotus
understands form as playing an explanatory role; it must explain how a particular
substance is a natural kind.370 Scotus sees the substantial form as an individual that has an
essence and thus certain essential properties.371 Moreover, the substantial form is the
formal cause of the composite of which it is a part. Rather than inhering in matter,
Scotus understands the substantial form to inform matter.372 The substantial form
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naturally tends to be a component part of a composite.373 When an accident inheres in a
substance, the substance is qualified in some way; when a form informs matter, it
communicates actuality to matter such that a new individual substance comes into being
that is “an absolute entity really distinct from all its parts.”374
Scotus understands this new absolute entity, this material substance as a whole
over and above its component parts. Richard Cross offers a detailed analysis of Scotus’
views on material substance in which he delineates four conceptions of material
substance, all of which Scotus ultimately rejects: material substance is not identical to its
parts, it is not a mere aggregate of its parts, it is not an aggregate of matter and form, and
it is not the aggregate of matter, form, and the relation between them.375
Since Scotus recognizes a relation as a thing, Cross contends that Scotus is
committed to the claim that a relation of two things “adds some further entity over and
above the absolute parts.”376 The substantial unity or unity of the composite has
properties different in kind from the properties of its parts.377 The wholeness of the
material substance accomplished by the substantial unity is not reducible to its parts. It is
a whole new entity with its own form, the form of the whole. In the QMA Scotus
considers the nature of the form/matter composite:
First, we can think, without any contradiction, of matter side by side with
form, each existing in itself and there would be no composite. Or to put
this in another way,--according to Bk. VII near the end—the composite
has some cause of its unity in itself that does not stem from just having
[matter and form] as its part—which parts though of as non-united can be
understood to exist in themselves without contradiction. Therefore, from
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the end of Bk. VII, there is something in the composite besides matter and
form, whereby it is one.378
Here Scotus refers to Aristotle’s explanation of the syllable “ba” such that it is not simply
its components, “b” and “a,” that can account for its being as “ba,” there must be
something else.379 The point is that the syllable “ba” possesses characteristics that are
unique to it and not possessed by its components. When conjoined, the “b” and the “a”
exist in a unity that is its own being and has its own wholeness. The form of the whole is
not the form that is a component of the substantial unity but is the form “in virtue of
which the composite is a quidditative being.”380
The unity of simplicity is a unity of true identity. Scotus explains: “for whatever
is there is really the same as whatever else is there, and is not merely one by union as is
the case in the other modes.”381 The human soul enjoys a unity of simplicity, as
abovementioned, though it is itself composite and its parts are formally distinct.382 Like
Aquinas, Scotus contends that the nutritive, sensitive and intellective souls are really
identical and numerically one.383 The formal distinction for Scotus is a distinction that
lies between a real distinction and a merely conceptual one. Two realities or aspects of a
thing are formally distinct if in reality they are truly identical, in fact, not even God could
separate them, and yet, they are defined independently of each other, for example,
378
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whiteness and color.384 The unity of simplicity then, is not a union of thing and thing as
we see in the unity of collection, order, accident, or composite, rather, it is a unity of the
real identity of formally distinct realities.385
What we can take from this section on unity is that since unity is coextensive with
being, there is a proper unity to every level of being. Since the created world is a
reflection of the uncreated, the creature is an expression of the creator, the unity of
singularity reflects the divine unity as it expresses the most perfect realization of the
created unity. All other unities are understood as they relate to the highest expression of
unity. What defines accidental unity is the notion of inherence. What defines substantial
unity is the act of informing such that it brings about a new, whole, individual being. The
unity of simplicity is a unity of formally distinct entities.

3.2 The Unity of the Human Being
The human being is a composite of a material body and an immaterial intellective
soul joined together in a substantial unity resulting in one essence, nature, or substance.386
The intellective soul is the specific form or proper form of the human being.387 Scotus
contends, however, unlike Aquinas, that the intellective soul is not the only form within
the human composite, which also contains a form of the body (forma corporeitatis) as
384
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well as forms for each of the organs.388 According to Aquinas, it is not possible for there
to be more than one substantial form in any given substantial composite.389 Moreover, it
is the substantial form or the human soul that gives being to the human composite for, as
Cross explains, “one form is a necessary condition for the presence of exactly one
existence.”390 Thus, by way of the substantial form, which communicates being to the
body, the human composite is a unified whole.391 For Scotus, the unity of the person is
more complicated because he does contend that a plurality of forms is found in the
human composite, but in such a way that he can preserve the unity of the human person.
To understand how he preserves this unity we must first understand why Scotus rejects
Aquinas’ view and maintains that there is a plurality of forms, and second, show how he
understands this unity.
Richard Cross shows that there are several reasons, both theological and
empirical, that Scotus offers in support of the plurality of forms. Cross, along with
Bonansea, contends that the main reason Scotus rejects Aquinas’ view that there is only
one substantial form per composite substance has to do with the empirical fact that once
the animating soul has left the body, the body remains intact, albeit temporarily.392 As
both Cross and Bonansea explain, Aquinas is unable to account for the continued
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existence of the body after death.393 Scotus posits the form of the body to explain the
continued existence of the body after the animating soul leaves. Given this plurality of
forms, how does Scotus account for the unity of the individual human person?
The convertibility of unity and being functions as a guiding principle and the
degrees of unity function as a roadmap to understanding how Scotus addresses this
question. There are several answers given in the literature that I will consider before
offering my own understanding of this issue.
As pointed out above, Scotus considers that the intellective soul is the specific or
proper form of the human being. D. E. Sharp points out that the intellective soul, for
Scotus, is also the animating soul, which is the formal principal of being and operation.394
She explains that Scotus defends himself on the charge that a plurality of forms destroys
the unity of the human being by claiming that forms of the organs and the form of the
body, in relation to the intellective soul, are only partial actualities.395 The intellective
soul is, for Scotus, that form by which the whole composite comes together as this one
being.396 The forms of the organ and the form of the body are inferior forms in relation
to the intellective soul, which functions in an ultimate way. Sharp explains that since
there is but one ultimate form in the human composite, by which the other forms are fully
actualized, the unity of the human being is preserved. Bonansea follows closely Sharp’s
reading of Scotus pointing out that Scotus is in close alignment with the Augustinians
such that it is by way of the subordinate relationship between the lower forms and the
393

Cross 2003, 272; Bonansea 1983, 16.
Sharp 1964, 313. Scotus, Oxon. 2, d. 16, n. 6: “Anima est immediatum principium formale essendi et
principium immediatum operandi.” This is not a controversial view.
395
Sharp 1964, 314. Scotus, Oxon. 4, d. 2, q. 3, n. 46: “Totius compositi est unum esse et tamen includit
multa esse partialia.”
396
Scotus, Oxon. 4, d. 2, q. 3, n. 46: “Concedo quod formale esse totius compositi est principaliter per
unam formam et illa forma est qua totum compositum est hoc ens.”
394

102
intellective soul that the unity of the human being is achieved.397 Cross gives a detailed
analysis of Scotus’ position in which he explains Scotus’ response both to Aquinas and
Henry of Ghent. In this analysis Cross emphasizes that Scotus consistently distinguishes
between the form of the body which accounts for the “form and layout of the body and its
parts,” and the animating form (the intellective soul), which is responsible for bodily
functions in every animate being.398 Given this plurality of forms, Cross has a different
reading from Sharp or Bonansea on how Scotus maintains the unity of the human being.
Cross appeals to Scotus’ third degree of unity, substantial unity, within the metaphysics
of potency and act to explain how Scotus maintains the unity of the human being.399
Cross argues that, according to Scotus, in the case of a composite with two substantial
forms, “matter and the lower substantial form constitute a composite.”400 A lower-order
composite, matter with the form of the body, then, stands in relation to a higher
substantial form, the intellective or animating form, as potentiality to actuality.401 While
there is clearly a relationship of subordination here, Cross sees it as a “pattern of
hierarchically arranged composites” each of which satisfies a “unity requirement.”402
Since these unities are themselves each substantial unities, there is one part that stands in
potentiality to the other. Cross contends that this part is a material cause and given this,
shows that Scotus understands the relationship of the forms within the composite to be
one of essential order.403 The forms within the composite are hierarchically and
essentially ordered to the ultimate substantial form, the intellective soul, thus
397
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guaranteeing the unity of the human being.404 Mackey offers yet another reading of the
Scotistic account of the unicity of the human being, based on the formal distinction.405
By way of the formal distinction, Mackey argues that Scotus is able to account for “an
integral entitative unity” which is over and above a unity of order.406 There is
consistency in the literature that Scotus understands that the whole is greater than its
parts, such that a substantial union brings about a whole being which has properties
different from its components. The question is whether these various readings of how
Scotus understands the unity of the human being can account for the wholeness of the
individual human being? I appreciate Cross’ analysis of substantial union and Mackey’s
reading of the formal distinction as going further than a relationship of subordination in
accounting for wholeness. I contend, however, that Scotus has a response to all of these
readings found in his discussion of per se being in question nine of the Quodlibetal
Questions. I will now discuss this question.

3.3 On Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions: Can an Angel Be Made into an
Informing Form?
In this section I will examine three notions: per se being, the nature of the
accident, and the immateriality of the soul. I will follow Scotus’ discussion in Question 9
of the Quodlibetal Questions where he asks whether God can make the angel become an
informing form.407 An examination of these notions is important because from it I will be

404

Cross 1998, 71.
Mackey 1997, 160.
406
Mackey 1997, 160.
407
Quodl. 9.5 [2]: “Sed quaeritur de informatione formali, an scilicet Deus possit facere Angelum esse
formam informantem.”
405

104
able to show both how Scotus secures the unity of the human being as person and how
through the particular emphasis he gives, he also offers a guide to his readers as to how
he grounds and explains the cognitive activity between the immaterial intellect and the
material sense. What is at issue in Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions is the
intricate nature of the informing form itself and what kinds of relationships it has with
matter. Scotus uses the case of the angel as a way into this question. The angel is an
immaterial form, an incorporeal being with an intellect and a will such that each
individual angel is its own species. As its own species, the individual angel is a
subsistent individual. Can such a being inform matter?
Since Scotus is interested in the case of the angel, before discussing the arguments
in Question 9, it is helpful to consider his remarks in Question 2 of the Quodlibetal
Questions where he clarifies that the angelic nature is an immaterial form. As an
immaterial form, the angel is a “this” of itself, not dependent on matter for individuality,
which, of course, Scotus rejects as the principle of individuation. Against those who
claim that matter is what individuates, Scotus responds that “every immaterial form is a
“this” of itself or by reason of what it is.”408 Moreover, it is not by way of its quiddity or
essence that the immaterial form is a “this” or a singular individual.409 Thus, Scotus
contends that the angel, as such a specific nature, cannot be
realized in multiple instances because such a unique singular and
individual form would contain in itself intensively and extensively the
total entity of that form, as is clear from the case of the sun.”410
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A specific nature is intrinsically repugnant to being multiplied into many or predicated of
many. If one conceives of a specific nature in such a way that it can be several, Scotus
argues that one would be in contradiction.411 To further clarify the nature of an
immaterial form, Scotus examines the intellective soul of the human being.
Scotus argues that the intellective soul, in its nature and prior to being conjoined with
the body, is the end product of a creative act, i.e., generation.412 Earlier, in line with
Aristotle, Scotus explained that the end product or term of generation is a substance or
substantial being.413 He now further clarifies that the end product of a creative act is an
individual or a this.414 What this means is that the soul, as an immaterial form, is
individuated independently from its union with the body.415 Each soul is distinct and
unique by its own nature, apart from its being in matter. Scotus considers that one might
argue, then, that rather than matter, it is the soul’s aptitude to exist in matter that
individuates it.416 But the aptitude to exist in matter is posterior to the soul’s absolute
nature, and interestingly, Scotus contends that: “this soul has this aptitude to be in this
body, and this aptitude for just this body is repugnant to another soul which has the
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aptitude to be in another body.”417 The aptitude to exist in matter is particular to the
individual intellective soul, which has an aptitude to exist in a particular body and no
other. But an aptitude is not an absolute entity. The aptitude to exist in a particular body
is had by a soul that is already singular by its own nature such that it is its singularity that
determines the aptitude to exist in a particular body. Neither matter nor the aptitude to
exist in a particular material body can account for the singular individuality of the
intellective soul.
What we can take from this discussion is that the intellective soul, like the angel, is
the end product of a creative act and as such is an individual ‘this’. That the intellective
soul, like the angel, is a specific nature, means that its intrinsic singularity is repugnant to
being multiplied. So the question that Scotus asks in Quodlibetal Questions 9, whether
an angel can be made into an informing form, can shed light on how it is that the
intellective soul, which is similar to the angel, is able to be conjoined to the body. With
these remarks in mind, I now turn to that question.
Scotus claims that there exists a hierarchy of forms, which is itself arranged
according to degrees of perfection.418 The angel represents in this hierarchy a perfection
over and above the intellective soul. Like the angel, the intellective soul can exist
independently from a material body. But the intellective soul, when it is not joined to the
body, does not enjoy the same level of perfection that the angel intrinsically has. The
intellective soul enjoys a union with the body. That it has this capacity is naturally
417

Quodl. 2.18 [6:]: “Istud no evadit argumetu, quia natura ipsa absoluta est prior natura ipsa aptitudine, et
haec anima habet aptitudine hac ad corpus, et illi anime reugnat aptitudo huiusmodi ad corpus hoc, et
convenit sibi alia aptitudo ad aliud corpus.”
418
Quodl. 9.9 [4]: “Angelus est perfectus in specie perfecta, imo perfectiori, quam sit aliqua species
substantiae materialis ordo enim specierum est ut ordo numerorum,” Scotus here references Aristotle,
Metaphysics 8 1043b33-1044a). See also Quodl. 9.15 [6] where Scotus refers to the “order of perfection
among forms,” “ordo perfectionis in formis.”
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intrinsic to it, for Scotus argues, if its nature is not essentially able to be independent then
it can never attain such independence.419 The capacity to exist in union with a material
body distinguishes the intellective soul from the angel. How is this capacity to be
understood?
In the hierarchy of forms, lower forms are distinguished from higher forms
according to their relationship with matter, that is, their dependence or independence
from matter. The way a lower form actualizes matter must be different from that form,
the intellective soul, which can both actualize matter and exist independently from
matter. In Article II of Question 9 Scotus considers four arguments that demonstrate that
the angel cannot be an informing form. While he says that only the first two are
conclusive, I will discuss each one here since there are interesting points to take from all
four arguments. The first argument is based on per se being, the second is based on the
ability to actualize matter, the third is based on remoteness from matter, and the fourth is
based on the intellective function.

3.3.1. First Argument - Per se Being
In the first argument, Scotus claims: “What is simply subsistent per se cannot be
the form of matter.”420 Just as matter needs itself to be of a certain structure (all actually
existing matter is already formed) or to have a certain capacity to receive a certain form,
forms that inform matter must themselves be intrinsically capable of existing in matter.
419

Quodl. 9.14 [5]: “. . . cuilibet actui simpliciter, per rationem propriam, vel convenit apitudo ad per se
informandum, vel repugnat informare.” What Scotus argues here is that the ability to inform matter is part
of the essence of the act, that is, “rooted in its proper nature.” That the soul is able to exist independently
of the body is part of its essential nature, just as that it is able to know the divine essence in the beatific
vision is part of its essential capacity.
420
Quodl. 9.7 [3]: “. . . illud quod est simpliciter per se subsistens, non potest esse forma materiae.”
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Not all forms have such a capacity. Moreover, this capacity to exist in matter does not in
itself prevent the form from existing separately from matter. Scotus argues that the angel
is a being that subsists per se and therefore cannot be a being that informs another being.
In order to clarify what it means to subsist per se, Scotus offers three different meanings
of per se being. I will address each separately.

3.3.1.a. First meaning of per se being - Accident
The first meaning of per se being which Scotus offers designates “something
which exists in isolation or apart from a subject.”421 The example he gives is curious:
“an accident can be a per se being when it does not inhere in a subject.”422 When does an
accident not inhere in a subject? According to Aristotelian metaphysics, accidents by
their nature exist by way of the subject in which they inhere, for accidents are said of the
subject.423 How can it be that an accident ever exists apart from the subject? One case in
which an accident can exist apart from a subject is the theological doctrine of
transubstantiation, to which Scotus alluded at the beginning of question 9, “God causes a
material accident to exist without its subject in the sacrament of the altar.”424
In the sacrament of the altar, the material accidents of bread and wine exist even
when the substance of bread is replaced by the substance of the body of Christ. The
accidents of bread remain even though the substance of bread does not. This happens,
though, only by divine intervention. Thus, it is not something easily recognized or
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Quodl. 9.7 [3]: “. . . uno modo intelligitur ens per se solitarie,” trans. Alluntis and Wolter 1975, 220.
Quodl. 9.7 [3]: “. . . accidens potest esse ens per se quado non est in subiecto.”
423
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 73b5-10.
424
Quodl. 9.2 [1]: “quia Deus facit accidens materiale sine subiecto in Sacramento Altaris.”
422
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explained by reason.425 However, it is clear that the case of transubstantiation influences
the way he understands the nature of accident such that he is able to give careful
consideration the notions of essence and accident. Since I am here concerned to show
why Scotus can argue that the accident is an example of the first sense of per se being,
i.e., something that can exist in isolation or apart from its subject, it is helpful to consider
passages from Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (QMA ) where he is concerned
with the nature of the accident as well as a passage from a mature work, Quodlibetal
Questions. I will consider the passage from the QMA first in which he asks whether it is
of the essence or nature of the accident to inhere in a subject. In his discussion he makes
several distinctions, the first involving two different senses of accident:
Reply: to begin with one must distinguish what is meant by “accident.”
For “accident”: [a] if it refers to what the name signifies per se, as the
concept on which the name is imposed per se, i.e., “accidentality” itself,
“inherence” would seem to be synonymous with this, and in this sense no
question would arise. [b] If it refers to something that is called “accident”
concretely, for example, quantity, then there [is] room for a question,
hereafter it will be understood in this sense.426
The distinction between the above two senses of “accident” is based on its different
significations, the mental entity or concept and the extramental entity or thing. On the
one hand, there is the conceptual meaning of accident and here ‘accident’ and inherence
are synonymous. On the other hand, when the actual concrete accident is considered, the
425

Mackey 1997, 196. Mackey contends that Scotus does not seem entirely satisfied with
transubstantiation: Scotus juxtaposes an argument for consubstantiation, where the substance of the bread
would exist alongside the substance of the body of Christ, next to an argument for transubstantiation in
such a way that the argument for consubstantiation is more compelling rationally. Scotus ultimately
accepts transubstantiation, a doctrine which the church had recently adopted, but nonetheless leaves in his
strong arguments for consubstantiation.
426
QMA, bk 7, q. 1, 8[2]: “Responsio: distinguitur primo de accidente. Quod ‘accidens’, si accipitur pro
illo quod per se significat nomen, ut pro conceptu quem importat nomen accidentis per se—qui est ipsa
accidentalitas-synonymum videtur cum hoc quod est inhaerentia; et tunc nulla est quaestio. Si accipiatur
pro illo quod denominat hoc concretum ‘accidens’, puta pro quantitate, sic quaestio habet locum; et sic fiat
deinceps sermo.”
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relationship of accident to inherence is not clear. Scotus considers an accident a thing
that has its own existence such that when considered in this way it is considered not only
apart from the substance in which it inheres but apart from inherence at all.427 This is in
line with the previous discussion, which according to Cross, it is clear, for Scotus, that
accidents count as individual things, as beings that can be known.428 Cross explains that
for Scotus, since accidents are principles of acting, that is, principles for knowing a
substance, as they are themselves objects of sense cognition, therefore, they are things
that exist both as mental entities and extramental things.429
Accidentality as a mental entity is the common nature of accident under the garb
of universality. So indirectly, the word “accident” refers to the extramental common
nature in referring to the concept.430 If “accident” simply refers to the concept, then it is
the essence of accidentality that is its sense, i.e., its definition. But since an accident is a
thing, it has its own essence and essential properties. When “accident” is understood as
the actual accident, inherence is not strictly synonymous with it.
Said in another way, the definition of accident includes the notion of inherence
such that in this sense accident and inherence are synonymous. To say that an accident
inheres in a subject is an analytic statement. It simply clarifies the nature of accident.
This is certainly in line with the way that Aristotle understands accident. But there is
another sense [b], where “accident” signifies an accident in a concrete sense, that is, as a
particular thing that is understood as an accident, for example, quantity or quality. Scotus
427

Cross 1998, 94.
Cross 1998, 95.
429
Cross 1998, 95-96.
430
Perler 2003, 166-169. Perler explains that Scotus understands words as referring to the mental concept,
but not as mental concept, rather as that which itself refers to the extramental entity. Words neither simply
signify the extramental thing nor just the mental concept. Words signify “the representational content of a
species” which does not simply exist conceptually but exists in the extramental thing as the common
nature.
428
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claims that in this sense, accident is not necessarily synonymous with inherence. Since
an accident is a thing, it has an essence and essential properties. Thus, when considering
the accident as a thing, inherence becomes one of its essential properties. It seems that
there are at least two motivations behind this second sense of accident.
First, a particular instance of an accident can be considered apart from the
substance that it might really inhere in. And when considered simply as itself, inhering is
a property of it, not its meaning. In the case of transubstantiation an accident really does
exist apart from its substance. That this can happen is not simply due to a miracle. The
accident itself must be intrinsically capable of existing independent of the substance or it
would never be able to so exist. The notions of accident and substance remain the same,
but as they are manifested in reality in the sacrament of the altar, accidents exist apart
from the substance that is no longer present. The framework of signification at the level
of name to concept and concept to essence remains intact but cannot speak to what
happens in the eucharist, in terms of inherence.
Second, another motivation of Scotus concerns the fact that substance is never
directly or immediately experienced.431 What moves the sense is not the substance but
the accident.432 Accident is directly known, substance is indirectly known. While it
might be the case that substance is more primary than accident since accident is said of
substance, it is the particular accident that is perceived. The fact that Scotus distinguishes
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Wolter 1946, 63-64. Wolter writes, “Scotus never tires of pointing out that we have no immediate
knowledge of substance as such.”
432
QMA. bk 7, q. 3, [2]: “Quod species substantiae non sit in intellectu, probatio: quia tunc species
substantiae prius esset in sensu et sic posset substantia cognosci a sensu, cuius oppositum est manifestum,
quia omnia sensibilia sunt quantittes vel qualitates.. . . Aliter dicitur quod non est in intellectu nisi species
accidentis, et immediate causatur illa species ab accidente, et mediate a substantia. Et primo repraesentat
accidens, et secundario substantiam. . . Quia illa cognitio quam habemus de substantia est perfectior
cognitio cum attingitur quam cognitio accidentis; tunc, licet accidens sit primum cognoscibile respectur
intellectus nostri generatione, . .”
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this second sense of accident, conceived as a thing, is motivated not only by a theological
concern, but also the way substance is experienced.
Scotus now examines the nature of inherence and claims that it has two different
meanings:
[a] one is the actual union of an existing accident with its existing subject
as a kind of act with the potential. [b] The other is an essential order or
dependence of the accident upon substance according to the essential
natures of each.433
Scotus claims that while [a] is evident because it concerns actual existence, [b] abstracts
from existence and therefore needs proof.434 What should be noted about [a] is that
Scotus understands the relationship of accident to substance as a “kind of act with
potential” and is thus referring here to accidental unity, which, like substantial unity, is
grounded in a metaphysics of potency and act. But the union of accident and substance
does not result in a subsistent per se being. The accident qualifies the substance. Scotus
further argues that usually the two senses of inherence would be “actual or aptitudinal”
but he rejects this distinction because it cannot account for the separated accident.435 It is
necessary in transubstantiation that the accidents of bread and wine remain as accidents
in order to signify the body of Christ. But their being as accidents cannot be founded on
their actual inherence in a subject, since there is no subject in which to inhere, so it must
be founded on something other, namely, the essential order that exists between the
essential natures of accident and subject. This latter kind of inherence applies to both the
433

QMA, bk 7, q. 1, 9[2]: “Tunc distinguitur secundo de inhaerentia, quod inhaerentia est duplex. Una est
actualis unio accidentis exsistentis cum subiecto xsistente, ut actus aliqulis cum potentiali Alia est
dependentia sive essentialis ordo accidentis secundum quiditatem suam ad substantiam secundum
quiditatem suam.”
434
QMA, bk. 7, q. 1, 9[2]: “Prima patet. Secunda probatur, quia demonstratio abstrahit ab exsistentia et a
consequentibus rem in quantum exsistit.”
435
QMA, bk. 7, q. 1, 10[2]: “Hoc forte consuevit dici de inhaerentia actuali et aptitudinali. Prima non
semper inest accidenti; secunda semper inest, sive exsistenti sine subiecto sive non exsistenti. –Contra:
aptitudinalis in accidente separato non verificat aliquam praedicationem denominativam sicut secunda hic.”
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concept of accident and to the separated accident, which remains accident even if not
inhering in a subject.436
Scotus takes his examination of the notion of inherence a step further as he
considers the distinction between “to be of the essence of A” and “to be A itself.” Scotus
argues,
Thirdly, there is a clarification of “to be of the essence.” For “to be of the
essence of A” is not the same really or essentially as “to be A itself.” The
first indeed implies the second but the converse is not true, for what is of
the essence of A is precisely that which is included per se in the
quidditative concept of A and therefore, is posited in the essential notion
of its quiddity, and not as something added. Something can be really
identical with A although it lies outside its concept, for example, unity,
truth, etc. are outside the concept of being, which is prior to these [proper
attributes], according to Avicenna, V [of his Metaphysics]. However, this
does not say these are really distinct things other than being.437
Unity and truth lie outside of the concept of being in the sense that they are formally
distinct from being but really identical with it. In light of this distinction, Scotus writes
that Avicenna calls, in an extended sense, unity and truth “accidents” in relation to the
concept of being for they are not part of the concept. The other example that Scotus
gives is that of the intensification of whiteness. If a minimal whiteness is intensified in
its whiteness it is identical to it in reality but the degree of intensification is something in
addition to the concept of whiteness itself.438

436

Of course the real problem here is that the accidents of bread no longer signify bread but the body of
Christ. Still their presence as accident is required. Somehow their natural signification is nulled, but they
are still able to signify.
437
QMA bk. 7, q. 1, 11[2]: “Tertio exponitur illud quod dicitur ‘de essentia’. Non enim idem est esse de
essentia a et esse idem essentialiter vel realiter ipsi a. Primum quidem infert secundem, sed non e
converso. Quia de essentia a praecise est illud quod includitur per se in conceptu quiditativo a, et ideo
ponitur in ratione eius quiditativa, non ut additum. Potest autem esse idem realiter ipsi a licet sit extra
conceptum eius, puta ‘unitas’, ‘veritas’ etc. extra conceptum entis qui prior est illis, secundum Avicennam
V. Non tamen ista dicunt rem aliam ab ente.”
438
QMA, bk 7, q. 1, 11[2]: “Exemplum hic de gradu addito albedini remissae quando intenditur:
secundum unam OPINIONEM est idem realiter, non tamen de essentia eius.”
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There are at least three points to be taken from this discussion. First, the accident
can be understood as a per se being not simply because it can be considered in itself apart
from the substance but because the accident is actually a thing in its own right,
independent from substance. Moreover, when the accident is considered as a concrete,
extramental being, what Scotus observes is that neither kind of inherence is a part of its
essence.439
The second point concerns the distinction between “being of the essence of A”
and “being A itself.” Since inherence is not strictly of the nature of an accident, the
example of the accident speaks to the very problem at issue for Scotus in Quodlibetal
Questions 9, namely, the nature of the informing form. If it is the case that an accident is
in a sense in its nature indifferent to inhering, then it is easy to see how a substantial form
in its nature can be indifferent to informing. The issue is of course how the intellective
soul which is an informing form can exist separately from the body.
The third point has to do with the nature of cognition. The relationship of the
intelligible species to the intellective soul is not one of form to matter, but one of accident
to substance.440 The intelligible species itself is an accident such that it is that which has
a representational content that signifies the extramental common nature. As an accident
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QMA, bk 7, q. 1, 12[3]: “Ad quaestionem igitur primo dico quod neutra inhaerentia est de essentia
accidentis secundo modo sumpti, scilicet accipiendo ‘accidens’ pro eo quod hoc nomine denominatur,
ut’quantum’, ‘quale’ et huiusmodi.”
440
Perler 2003, 167. See also QMA, bk. 5, q. 7 where Scotus asks about the possibility of some accidents
which are only numerically different existing in the same subject. He is here concerned about the nature of
the existence of both the sensible species and the intelligible species in the sense organ or intellective soul,
respectively. It is clear that he understands the species as accidents. For example at 3 [1]: Scotus writes,
“Ergo videtur quod species sit accidens reale.” Etzhorn and Wolter provide a nice explanation for the
meaning of the word species in footnote 1 where they also write, “ In all cases it [the species] is an
accidental quality in the subject in which it exists, whether that be the object itself, the medium, or the soul
of the knowing subject.” (438)
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itself, in its nature, the intelligible species is indifferent to inhering and that this is the
case will help explain its presence to the intellect, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Based on the above discussion concerning the nature of accident and the nature of
inherence, Scotus clearly distinguishes between the concept of accident and the concrete
accident in itself. What determines the nature of the accident is not its relationship to
substance. This relationship lies outside the nature of the particular accident. The point
is that the mode of its existence is not what determines what it is. It is in this way that the
accident can be understood as a per se being in the first sense.

3.3.1.b. The Second Sense of Per Se Being
Scotus delineates a second sense of per se being:
A per se being is contrasted with one that exists in another, and in this
sense it is a thing which neither actually inheres in another nor has an
aptitude to do so. Every substance, not only one that is composite, but
matter and form as well, are all beings per se in this sense, for though a
substantial form is in the matter it informs, it does not inhere in it like an
accident, for “to inhere” says that it does not inform its subject per se.
What inheres is neither an act simply, but only in a qualified sense, nor
does it form one thing per se with the subject in which it inheres. What
informs per se has the opposite characteristics.441
Per se being in the second sense is found in the distinction between the acts of inhering
and informing. All substances, then, not only the composite substance, but also matter
and form themselves, have this type of per se being, namely, their being does not inhere
in another nor has the aptitude to do so. Even though a form is said to be in the matter, it
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Quodl. 9.7 [3]: “…ens per se prout distinguitur contra ens in alio, et sic per se ens est idem quod non
inhaerens actualiter, nec aptitudinaliter, et hoc modo quaecunque substantia non tantum composita, sed
etiam materia, et forma est ens per se, quia forma substantialis, licet in sit materiae informando non tamen
inhaeret, qui inhaerere dicit non per se informare: qui inhaerens nec est actus simpliciter, sed actus
secundum quid, nec cum illo, cui inhaeret facit per se unum, opposita conveniunt ei, quod per se informat.”
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is in the matter not by way of inhering in it but rather by informing it, actualizing a
potentiality. Form is not in this matter as an accident is in a subject. Rather by informing
the matter, the form is the act of the matter. The accident is not an act simply nor does it,
in inhering in a subject, form one thing with that subject. As per my discussion on
substantial unity, that which informs is, by contrast, a simple act, such that in informing a
subject, it becomes one with it bringing about a new, whole individual with properties
unique to its wholeness and thus different from its components.

3.3.1.c. Subsistent Per Se Being
Scotus claims that there is an even higher degree of per se being. He finds this
third degree of being per se expressed in the suppositum. The suppositum is a fully
subsistent individual that is incommunicable and whose nature is repugnant to being
divided. It is this kind of per se being that enjoys the highest degree of singularity and is
that which I contend can ultimately guarantee the unity of the human being for Scotus.
What drives Scotus’ understanding of a suppositum is a theological concern, the
backdrop of which is the incarnation. If the incarnation not only reveals God as father
and son but further reveals the holy spirit, each of these three as essentially divine must
be able to be considered in themselves, that is, have per se being. If this is the case, that
each has per se being, then each would have to be a suppositum, a subsistent individual.
Alluntis and Wolter explain that suppositum is a Latin word used to translate the Greek
word, hypostasis, which Greek theologians used to indicate one of the persons in the
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Trinity.442 The theological doctrine of the trinity, that there are three distinct persons,
moves Scotus beyond the categorical definition of a substance as that which merely
enjoys independent existence and does not inhere in another. In order to explain the
distinction between the diverse persons in the trinity, there must be something more to a
substance than merely the capacity to exist independently.443 Moreover, as has already
been shown, something other than matter has to serve as that which individuates the per
se being of the substance, not only because God is immaterial but because matter in its
indeterminateness alone is incapable of grounding the understanding of per se being as a
suppositum, a being whose nature is incommunicable. The suppositum is a subsistent per
se being in the most proper sense, as Scotus explains:
Third, a per se being may refer to one which has its ultimate actuality, so
that it is simply unable to be ordered per se to some ulterior act beyond
that which it has, where the ulterior actualization would belong to it per
se, either in a primary or participated sense. A per se being in this sense is
called a suppositum, and if it is of an intellectual nature, it is called a
person. Only this third is properly said to be subsisting, in the sense the
Philosopher has in mind when he says: “Matter is only potentially ‘a this’
and the form is that in virtue of which a thing is called ‘a this,’ but that
third being compounded of both matter and form is simply ‘a this.’ In
other words, something subsisting per se has its ultimate actualization so
that it is unable to be ordered per se to some ulterior act.444
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Alluntis and Wolter 1975, 536. Alluntis and Wolter explain that suppositum is a Latin translation of
hypostasis, the term that Greek theologians used to designate a divine person of the Trinity. Theologians,
being particularly interested in understanding the union of human nature and divinity in the second person
of the Trinity, were forced to develop a clear idea of a person – human, angelic or divine. Along these
lines they retained the word, suppositum, to designate any fully subsistent individual, rational or not,
though Boethius had defined the a person as “an individual substance of a rational nature.” Richard of St.
Victor, according to Alluntis and Wolter, seems to have had a direct influence on Scotus’ own
understanding and use of suppositum. A suppositum “would seem to be the incommuicable existence of
any nature, and a person would be an intellect suppositum.
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Cross 1999, 67. Cross explains that for Scotus any independent substance exhibits three features:
existence per se, individual unity, and non-repeatability (incommunicability). It is haecceity that endows
the substance with these features. Moreover, a divine person also exhibits these three features.
444
Quodl. 9.7 [3]: “Tertio modo ens per se dicitur illud, quod habet actualitatem ultimam, ita quod non est
per se ordinabile ad aliqueactum simpliciter, ultra istum, quem habet, qui quidem actus ulterior possit esse
actus eius per se: et hoc, vel primo, vel participative: quod hoc modo est per se ens communiter dicitur
suppositum, et in natura intellectuali dicitur persona: hoc modo intelligitur maior de ente per se. Istud
solum dicitur proprie subsistens, sicut Philosophus loquitur secundo de Anima dicens, quod materia est
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That which has ultimate actuality is what cannot be ordered to another, and this is the
subsistent individual.
Scotus explains further that “a substantial form is ordered per se to the being of
the whole composite.”445 The substantial form is a per se being in the second sense.
Since it can be ordered to the being of another, it is not a per se being in the third sense.
The substantial form is ordered to the being of the whole composite, which Scotus
explains is the act of the composite primarily and of the form participatively.446 The
substantial form as part of the whole has only incidental being whereas the whole is said
to have primary being.447 It is clear, then, why the angel as an immaterial form and a per
se being in the third sense cannot be an informing form. The angel exists in a primary
way and cannot be ordered to the being of another. But what about the intellective soul of
the human being?
The immaterial intellective soul is the specific form of the human being. While it
is capable of independent existence it is still ordered per se to the being of the individual
human being. The question arises as to whether the being of the intellective soul is
identical to the being of the composite human individual. Scotus argues that it is not. As
an immaterial form that is capable of informing matter, the intellective soul in relation to
the composite has being only participatively. The being of the intellective soul is simply

potentia hoc aliquid, species autem, secundum quam aliquid dicitur hoc aliquid: tertium quod est ex ipsis,
quod simpliciter est hoc aliquid, scilicet per se subsistens habet actualitatem ultimam non ordinabilem per
se ad aliquem actum ulteriorem.”
445
Quodl. 9.8[4]: “. . . forma substantialis per se ordinatur ad esse totius.”
446
Quodl. 9.8 [4]: “Illud autem esse est actus simpliciter, compositi quidem per se primo sed formae
paticipative.”
447
Quodl. 9.8[4]: “. . . quia pars dicitur esse per se, per accidens, hoc est per se participative, totum autem
primo quod igitur est per se subsistens nec potest ordinari ad aliquod esse per se, illud non potest esse per
se forma.”
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not the being of the composite because it is part of the composite.448 The intellective
soul enjoys the first sense and the second sense of per se being but not the third; it cannot
be understood as a person.449
For the human being to be considered in the third sense of per se being, she must
be considered at the level of her substantial unity, the unity of form and matter, for it is
this unity that is the ground of her humanity and her personhood, not her soul alone. Two
questions need to be considered. First, how is the human soul both capable of informing
the body and existing independently? Second, what property does the intellective soul
have such that when it is joined to the body, the human being is understood as a person?
The first question will be considered in the following two sections. I will consider the
second question in section 3.4 of this chapter.

3.3.2 Second Argument - Informing Form Communicates Actuality
The second argument in question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions in which Scotus
explains that the angel cannot be an informing form reads “whatever can be a substantial
form has the immediate ability through its essence to give actuality in an unqualified
sense to matter itself.”450 But, Scotus argues, if it is impossible for a being to be such an
“act of matter,” then it enjoys a greater perfection as a form. Since the essence of the
angel does not include the ability to inform matter, it is therefore repugnant to it to do so.
448

Quodl. 9.43 [15]: “Videtur ergo ista neganda quod esse animae est idem, quod esse totius: quia anima
habens esse, videtur pars totius habentis esse.”
449
Quodl. 9.12 [4]: “Hinc etiam patetquare anima separata non est persona.”
450
Quodl. 9.13 [5]: “Quicquid potest ese forma substantialis hoc sibi competit immediate per essentiam
suam, scilicet posse dare actum simpliciter ipsi materiae.” Scotus here appeals to Aristotle’s Metaphysics
104a23-30 and continues: “. . . quia patet quod non est alia ratio, quare hoc posset facere per se unum cum
materia: nisi quia hoc est per se actual, et illud per se potentia et huius non est aliqua ratio ulterior: nisi
propria ratio huius et illius; ergo cui repugnat esse actum materiae, hoc praecise repugnat sibi per rationem
propriam.”
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Thus, the angel cannot be an informing form. The human soul, by contrast, is a
substantial form and therefore is essentially able to communicate actuality to matter.
Scotus considers this second argument to be a conclusive one showing that it is
impossible for the angel to be made into an informing form. The ability to inform matter
or the repugnance to do so is an essential property. Thus, if the angel would be made into
an informing form it would be essentially destroyed, i.e., no longer the angel. An
important point to take from this argument is that what something is, is determined
intrinsically and not extrinsically.

3.3.3 Third Argument - Remoteness from Matter
The third argument in question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions that Scotus
considers is based on the order of perfection in forms.451 The more perfect a form is, the
more removed from matter it is.452 But according to the intellectual soul’s own nature, it
has the ability to exist independently of matter. The angel is more perfect than the
intellectual soul, therefore it should be even more remote from matter than the intellectual
soul is.453 Scotus observes, however, that the degree of difference between the human
soul and the angel is small. Unless it were impossible for the angel to exist in matter
then it would be hard to see how the intellectual soul, which in its nature is able to exist
independently from matter, would be different from the angel.
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Quodl. 9.15 [6]: “Tertia ratio posset poni talis: ordo perfectionis in formis.”
Quodl. 9.15 [6]: “. . .videtur esse per recessum earum a materia, sicut actus perfectior plus recedit a
potentia;”
453
Quodl. 9.15 [6]: “. . . sed anima intellectiva tantum recedit a materia, quod naturae sua relicta, potest
habere esse suum proprium sine ea: ergo Angelus, qui est perfectior quacunque anima intellectiva, plus
recedit a materia, sed non videtur quod plus possit recedere, nisi sibi repugnet inesse materiae.”
452
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Scotus contends that this argument does not prove much, for there are many ways
to show that one act excels another, i.e., that one act is more perfect than another, other
than the remoteness from matter. Moreover, the intellectual soul essentially possesses the
dual capability of being able to exist independently from matter, and at the same time,
like an inferior form, being able to exist “perfectly united with matter.”454 Both of these
abilities are had by the intellectual soul essentially. These abilities, to exist
independently from matter and to be united with matter are defined independently of each
other and are not contradictories. Thus, Scotus claims, that in like manner, one could
argue that while it is true that the angel can exist without matter more perfectly than the
intellectual soul, that the angel is able to do so would not in itself preclude it from
existing in matter. As the second argument above showed, the ability to exist in matter or
not is an intrinsic ability part of the essence of a being. The angel, by its very nature, is
essentially unable to exist in matter. What distinguishes the intellectual soul from the
angel is an essential difference that defines their relationship to matter, in this case, how
remote each is from matter. Thus, the remoteness of matter does not in itself offer
conclusive evidence to show that the angel cannot be an informing form. An interesting
point that emerges from Scotus’ treatment of this argument concerns the distinction
between being dependent on matter and being united with matter. Whereas the
dependency on matter is imperfection, Scotus contends that it is not clear that the ability
to be united with matter or to communicate actuality to matter is. The angel clearly, in no
way, depends on matter. However, that the angel would be able to communicate
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Quodl. 9.16 [6]: “. . . imo anima intellectiva, licet possit esse sine materia: tamen ita perfecte potest
uniri materiae sicut aliqua forma inferior; . .”
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actuality to matter is not necessarily an imperfection. 455 The intellectual soul being able
to exist independently from matter is also able to be perfectly united with matter. Not
only is it the case that the perfection of the form that is able to exist independently of
matter is in no way diminished by the ability to “communicate actuality” to matter, but
the distinction between dependency on matter and being united with matter that Scotus
draws out here provides a way into understanding how the intellectual soul does exist in a
perfect unity with the body.
What Scotus offers here goes beyond Aristotle’s treatment of the intellective soul.
Aristotle, as seen in Chapter 1, holds that the intellectual soul is separable from the body
and does not depend upon the body for its operations. But Aristotle does not show how
the intellectual soul is then capable of existing united with the body, the nature of that
existence, or how in being separable and independent of the body is able to work with the
body especially in terms of the fact that Aristotle claims that without the images provided
through sensation there would be no thought.
To solve these issues, Scotus focuses his attention on the nature of the essence
and essential properties. At a very fundamental level of the being of any individual entity
exists a more definite structure than Aristotle understood. That Scotus works so hard to
show that the fact that an angel cannot be made into an informing form because by its
nature it is essentially repugnant to being united with matter, shows that Scotus sees that
at a fundamental level lies an intricate structure and it is this structure that must be
understood in order to explain the unity of the individual being, and in particular, the
soul-body composite.
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Quodl. 9.16 [6]: “. . . non tamen est evidens, quod posse communicare actualitatem suam materiae sit
imperfectionis;. . .”
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3.3.4 Fourth Argument – Intellective Function
The fourth argument in question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions that Scotus
considers concerning whether an angel can be an informing form derives from the
characteristic function of the angel, which is understanding.456 The argument claims that
since the act of understanding is itself an immaterial potency, then that which
understands, the intellectual nature, must itself be immaterial.457 To prove that the
activity of understanding is immaterial, Scotus argues that the nature of the agent’s
faculty as the proximate ground of the activity determines the nature of the activity.458 If
the faculty is material, then its activity cannot be immaterial.459 The angel’s faculty is
immaterial, thus, its activity is immaterial. The problem that emerges here concerns the
nature of the immateriality of the intellectual soul. If it is the immateriality of the angel,
due to its intellectual nature, that precludes it from being united with matter, then how
can it be shown that the intellectual soul, which as an intellectual nature engages in the
same immaterial act of understanding, is able to be united with matter? Scotus analyzes
three ways in which the intellectual soul can be understood as immaterial.
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Quodl. 9.17 [7]: “Quarta ratio videtur sumi, secundum aliquos, ex operatione Angeli, quae est
intelligere;”
457
Quodl. 9.17 [7]: “. . . intelligere est operatio immaterialis: ergo intellectus est potentia immaterialis: et
ulterious, ergo natura intellctualis est natura immaterialis.”
458
Quodl. 9.17 [7]: “. . . operatio enim inest operanti secundum potentiam propriam, ut secundum rationem
proximam operandi”
459
Quodl. 9.17 [7]: “. . . et per consequens, si potentia sit materialis, illa operatio non est immaterialis.”
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The first argument that Scotus considers is based on the claim that the intellectual
soul does not require a bodily organ to carry out its operations. 460 In this way,
intellection differs from sensation which is organic, i.e., each sense requires a particular
bodily organ, a distinct part of the body structured in a specific way.461 Scotus claims,
however, that the fact that intellection requires no organ does not in itself support the
claim that intellection is immaterial.462 Scotus offers fire as a counterexample. Fire is a
material form whose operation is non organic, “provided it be uniformly in the whole and
in each part thereof,” (dum tamen sit uniformis in toto et in qualibet parte).463
Scotus, however, then considers the nature of the soul as the principle of organic
life. As the principle of organic life, the soul does require not a particular or determined
part of the body, but a body as whole which is able to carry out diverse actions.464 As the
principle of organic life, the soul is somehow unlimited in its actions. It requires a body
that has unlike parts by means of which these actions can be exercised. Alluntis and
460

Quodl. 9.26 [9]: Ibid. While it is my interest here to offer a reading of Scotus’ arguments in the
Quodibetal Questions, it should be noted that Scotus gives arguments for the immateriality of soul in the
Oxon. See Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2. Scotus here argues that intellective knowledge transcends every form of
sense knowledge and offers three proofs to support this claim: first, intellective knowledge is non-organic,
second, we possess some immaterial knowledge, and third, we are able to will in such a way that we can
determine ourselves freely. In the second proof he considers three definitions of immateriality that are in
some way parallel to the three that he offers in question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions: first, immateriality
means non-organic, second immateriality means non-extended, and third, immateriality refers to the object
which is itself immaterial. I will return to this third definition of immateriality in section 3.4 of this
chapter. See Cross 2003, 263-267 for a clear discussion where these two texts are compared.
461
Quodl. 9.26 [9]: “Uno modo per oppositum ad operationes sensitivas, quae dicuntur organicae, quia
exercentur per organa determinata et sic materiales, quae requirunt determinatam partem corporis
determinate complexionatam et per oppositum intellectio est operatio non organica.”
462
Quodl. 9.26 [10]: “Sed ex isto intellectu antecedentis non videtur sequi immaterialitas formae .”
463
Quodl. 9.26 [10]: “Forma enim pure materialis, dum tamen sit uniformis in toto et in qualibet parte, non
dicitur operari per organum, sicut ignis non dicitur operari per organum.”
464
Quodl. 9.26 [10]: “Virtus autem formativa non agit per membrum proprium, et ratio huius est, quia illa
sola forma dicitur principium operandi organice, quae scilicet quodammodo ilimitata in agendo otest esse
principium difformium actionum, quae tamen non possunt elici, nisi mediantibus partibus dissimilibus, et
ideo requiritur, quod perfectibile a tali forma habeat partes dissimiles, per quas operationes illae organicae
exerceantur, et talis forma est priorie sola ania, quae propter sui perfectionem, ultra formas inferiores potest
esse principium plurium operationum per ipsam convenientium suo toti, et ideo requirit pro suo perfectibili
adaequato corpus habens partes maioris dissimilitudinis, quae coveniunt pluribus operationibus
dissimilibus, quarum potest esse principium.”
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Wolter note that there is an addition in all three manuscripts here. In this addition, Scotus
observes that it can be argued that intellection is just as material a function as vision.465
Whereas vision is a function of part of the body, intellection would be a function of the
whole. Now if the soul is the principle of intellection insofar as it perfects the parts rather
than the whole, then it could be said that the finger understands. Consequently, if the
whole is just as material as its parts, it follows that this function, which pertains to the
form as it is in the whole, is just as material as a function that pertains to a form as it is in
a part. Scotus replies that the intellectual soul, which has understanding insofar as it is
this sort of unlimited form, actualizes not a part but the whole. Thus, based on this
reasoning, the intellectual soul, though it does not require an organ to operate, in
actualizing the whole being can be understood as material.
It is clear that Scotus does not consider the inorganic argument to be successful in
establishing that because the intellect does not function by way of a specific bodily organ,
it is therefore immaterial. But his concerns go beyond this argument to the question of
how we could understand the activities of the intellective soul to be immaterial. Cross
points out that in both the Oxon. and the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus is responding to
Aquinas’ claim that the immateriality of the soul is proved by the immateriality of the
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I here cite the entirety of the addition to Quodl. 9.26 [10] In the Latin text this addition is italicized:
“Imo ex isto intellectu antecedentis videtur posse argui, quod intellectio est operatio aeque materialis, sicut
visio: quia visio potest exerceri per partem materialem determinatam: intellectio autem non per aliquam
partme, sed est totius primo: non enim manus intelligit, sed homo: sed si anima non ut perficiens totum
possit esse principium intelligendi ergo ipsa ut perficiens quamcunque partem aeque posset esse
principium intelligendi, sicut ipsa, ut perficiens totius, et tunc dici posset ita digitus intelligere, sicut homo,
quia ita digitus esset in actu per formam, et et principium intelligendi. Si ergo totium ex aeque materiale
sicut pars, vel magis sequiritur quod ista operatio, qua non competit formae unisi ut est in toto sit aeque
materialis, sicut illa qua sibi competit ut est in parte. Respondeo ad hoc, operatio quae competit formae, ut
est quodammodo illimitta perfectio, si communicetur materiae el toti, communicatur ei, quod estin actu per
formam sic illimitatam tale est totum et non aliqua pars eius respectu anima intellectiva cui ut sic illimitata
est competit intellectio.
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operation of the soul.466 Cross observes that Scotus recognizes an ambiguity in Aquinas’
use of the word “immateriality” and thus responds in both texts by offering several
different meanings. But it seems to me that it is not Aquinas, nor the ambiguity in the use
of immateriality that primarily motivates Scotus here. Rather, there seem to be at least
two problems at issue: first, how the intellect as immaterial is able to be united with the
material body, and second, how the intellect functions with the body, i.e., is able to
access the images provided by way of sensation and imagination.
For example, Scotus considers the argument based on angels’ characteristic
function, namely, understanding. From this it is argued that understanding is an
immaterial function, and therefore the intellect is immaterial.467 Scotus points out that
our soul is not purely intellectual, like the Angel, for it does depend on matter for some of
its operations.468 Considering Scotus’ counterexample of the soul as the principle of life
in the inorganic argument, as well as the argument in the addition, both make clear that
even given that the intellect does not operate through a specific bodily organ, it is hard to
see how the soul does not function by way of the whole human composite. By no means
does Scotus here reject the immateriality of the soul, but his concerns about its
functioning with the body are certainly revealed.
He considers two additional ways in which immateriality could be understood.
The second way in which understanding could be understood as immaterial concerns the
object of understanding. The process of understanding is intentional in that it “tends
466

Cross 2003, 263-264.
Quodl. 9.17 [7]: “secundum aliquos, ex operatione Angeli, quae est intelligere; et hoc sic: intelligere
est operatio immaterialis: ergo intellectus est potentia immaterialis.” Scotus here cites Aquinas, ST I, q.
50, a. 2.
468
Quodl. 9.19 [7]: “non sic manifeste tenet de natura, quae est diminute intellectualis; et cum hoc
sensitiva quantum ad aliquam potentiam sicut ex anima nostra quia illa dependet a materia in operando,
saltem aliqua operatione, sed natura mere intellectualis nulo modo depdnedet a materia in operando.”
467
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towards an object abstracted from matter.”469 Since the object of understanding is that
which itself is abstracted from matter, the understanding itself must be immaterial
according to what Scotus earlier argued: 9.21:
. . . every act gets its specification and perfection from its object. But the
object of intellect qua intellect abstracts from matter, because the forms in
matter are all individual but the intellect does not grasp them as
individual.470
Scotus rejects this argument. He argues that the immateriality of the object is not enough
to prove that understanding itself is immaterial.471 Scotus observes that everyone agrees
that that the object of understanding is indeed the quiddity of the material object.472 But
Scotus argues:
. . . if all that is required [to prove the claim “to understand is immaterial”]
is to have immateriality in the object, i.e., abstraction from individual
matter, then the operation of our intellect is immaterial terminatively,
because it is indifferent to singular material objects.473
Scotus argues that if it is to be shown that understanding is immaterial then what truly
has to be proved is that the operation by which the universal is thought is an operation
that cannot be communicated to matter.474 He offers no such argument here.
The third way in which understanding might be shown to be immaterial pertains
to the nature of that which receives the object of intellection. What is the proper recipient
subject of intellection is the form and not the matter. Moreover, Scotus clarifies, it is not
469

Quodl. 9.27 [11]: “. . . hoc est, tendit in obiectum abstractum a materia”
Quodl. 9.21 [7]: “. . . quia ab obiecto actus quilibet recipit speciem, et perfectionem; nunc autem
obiectum intellectus, inquantum huismodi, a materia abstrahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individuales;
quas non apprehendit, secundum quod huiusmodi.”
471
Quodl. 9.27 [11]: “. . . sed ista probatio non concludi immaerialitatem simpliciter, etiam terminative,
sive obiective,”
472
Quodl. 9.27 [11]: “. . . quia secundum omnes quiditas rei materialis potest esse per se obiectum
intellectus nostri.”
473
Quodl. 9.27 [11]: “. . . sed tantummodo, si requiritur in obiecto immaterialitas, hoc st, abstrio a materia
individuali, et ex hoc sequitur quod operatio sit immaterialis terminative, hoc est, indifferens ad obiecta
singularia materialia,”
474
Quodl. 9.27 [11]: “. . . et tunc ad habendum conclusionem intentam, oprotet probare quod operatio,
quae respicit universale pro obiecto, non posset aliquo modo communicari materiae.”
470
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the form of the whole, that is, the form of the composite human being, but the form of the
part, that is, of the soul, which participates in the whole that receives the object of
understanding.475 The intellective soul, and not something material, is what receives the
object of understanding.
In this way it is clear how sensation and intellection are different cognitive
activities. In sensation, what receives the form of the sensible object is what is composed
of both matter and form, i.e., the sense organ. The sense organ is the bodily organ
endowed with a sense power. The example that Scotus gives is of the eye and the power
of sight. In order to see an object it is not enough to have an eye but that eye must be
endowed with the power of sight. Thus, Scotus explains, it is “the form of the organ as a
whole which is the proximate ground for receiving the vision, like humanity is the form
of man as a whole.”476 A sense organ endowed with the sense power is the proximate
ground of sensation because as such it is “composed of the soul as the principle of the
operation and of a part of the body structured in a certain way.”477 The power of
sensation, in other words, is by its very nature dependent on the material sense organ. So
when it is said that the power of sense is the recipient of the form of the sensible object,
what is meant is the power of sense as it is the form of the organ as a whole, both the
specific material structure and the soul (form) that actualizes it.
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Quodl. 9.28 [11]: “. . . intellectio non est primi aliotrius materialis tanquam proximi receptivi, sed eius
receptivum proximum et proprium est form, non illa totius, quae est quiditas, sicut est humanitas, sed illa,
quae est simplex, et altera pars compositi.”
476
Quodl. 9.28 [11]: “. . . sed forma totius organi eo modo quo humanitas est forma totius hominis, est
proxima ratio recipiendi visionem.”
477
Quodl. 9.29 [11]: “Ex hoc patet, quod si organum dicatur illa pars totius animalis, in qua tanquam in
proximo receptivo, recipitur sensatio, organum dicetur esse aliquid compositem ex anima, ut est principium
talis operationis, et ex parte corporis sic mixta. . .”
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In terms of intellection, however, what receives the object of understanding is
itself immaterial:
In the case of understanding, however, we have just the opposite, for its
proximate subject and formal ground for its reception is the soul or some
portion of the soul which has no matter.”478
What makes understanding immaterial is not simply that it is not organic nor that its
object is immaterial but rather that only part of the human composite receives the
intellective object. What appears to guide Scotus here is the fact that the intellective soul
can exist apart from the body such that when it is separate from the body, it is still able to
understand. If the soul can understand when it is separated from the body, then
understanding itself does not depend on the material body.479 Thus, the proximate
recipient of intellection must be immaterial. Scotus considers this argument the one that
comes closest to the truth.480 But he qualifies even this. Much of what this third
argument establishes is that since understanding is immaterial, and the human being
understands, then we find a dual commonality shared by the intellective soul and the
angel, namely, they share the same sort of intellection from which it can be inferred that
they have the same sort of immateriality, namely, being able to exist independently from
matter.481 However, Scotus observes that this argument does not justify that the
intellective soul, given its immateriality, cannot inform matter.482
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Quodl. 9.29 [11]: “Per oppositum est de intellectione, quia receptivum eius proximum, et proxima ratio
formalis recipiendi eam est anima, vel aliquid ex parte animae praecise, non includendo aliquam materiam.
. .”
479
Quodl. 9.30 [12]: “. . . intelligere est operatio immaterialis quia proximum receptiuum habet non
includens materia, saltem corporalem, et ideo sine tali materia potest ipsa operatio haberi, nunc autem
potens habere operationem sine materia potest habere esse sine materia, ergo natura illa, cuius est ista
operatio propria, potest habere esse sine materia.”
480
Quodl. 9.30 [12]: “Secundum etiam istum tertium intellectum, qui plus continet veritatis. . .”
481
Quodl. 9.30 [12]: “Et hoc ergo medio, scilicet operatione, potest concludi ipsius naturae talis
immaterialitas, hoc est, a materia in essendo separabilitas: non autem illa immaterialitas ulterior, quae est
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In Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus concerns himself with the
question of whether the angel can be an informing form. Through the four arguments
that have been examined, it is clear that the Angel cannot be such a form. By way of this
examination of the case of the Angel, Scotus is able to show the complexity of the case of
the intellective soul. Against the similarities shared by the soul and the Angel, their
distinctiveness is made clear. The issue for Scotus is how to reconcile the seemingly
opposite characteristics of being able to exist in the material body and being able to exist
apart from it. What lies at the crux of the matter is the nature of immateriality and how
the soul relates to the body in terms of function. What we can take from this discussion
concerning the three ways in which immateriality can be conceived is while Scotus seems
not to be wholly satisfied with any of them, he offers valuable insights that will serve the
discussion of cognition in Chapter 4. I will now attend to the question of the personhood
of the human being, not only as that which most fully expresses the unity of the human
being, but that which makes cognition possible.

3.4 The Nature of the Human Being as Person
In his discussion on the third sense of per se being, the suppositum, Scotus makes
the interesting claim, in two different places, that a subsistent individual that has an
intellectual nature is a person.483 It is clear that what Scotus has in mind are the divine
persons of the Trinity, the angel, and the body-soul composite of the human being. As

impossibilitas informandi materiam, et hoc est rationabile, quod est intellectione, quae est medium, et
commune animae et Angelo, possit concludi immaterialitas communis utrique.”
482
Ibid.
483
Quodl. 9.7 [3]: “. . . et in natura intellectuali dicitur persona. . .” and 9.12 [4]: “. . . in natura autem
intellectuali dicitur persona. . . “
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we saw, the intellective soul alone is not a person, the subsisting individual human being
is. He clarifies what he means by person:
Thus a person is incommunicable, because it is repugnant to him that he
be communicated not only as a universal is communicated to its singulars
but also as a form is communicable to the matter to be actualized through
it.484
Certainly a person is incommunicable because she possesses all of the characteristics of a
suppositum, the third sense of per se being. She is incommunicable because she is a
subsisting, whole, individual. What does she possess that makes her a distinct kind of
suppositum, a person? What feature does the intellective soul possess such that when
joined to the body, the human being is understood as a person?
To answer these questions on the unity of the human being and the feature of the
intellective soul that endows the human composite with personhood, I will turn to two
passages, one in the Quodlibetal Questions and the other in the Oxon. In both passages,
Scotus attends to the cognitive activity of intellectual awareness.
In Question 6 of the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus explains the intellectual
awareness that an Angel has. He writes:
Such knowledge of the existent qua existent and present is
something an angel has about himself. For Michael does not know
himself in the way he would know Gabriel if Gabriel were annihilated,
viz., by abstractive cognition, but he knows himself as existing and as
existing in a way that is identical with himself. He is also ware of his
intellection in this way if he reflects upon it, considering it not just as any
object in which one has abstracted from existence or non-existence in the
way he would think of another angel’s knowledge, if such did not actually
exist; rather he knows himself to be knowing, that is to say he knows his
knowledge as something existing in himself. This knowledge possible for
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Quodl. 9.12 [4]: “. . . et sic est persona incommunicabilis quia sibi repugnat communicari, non tantum
ut universale, singularibus, sed ut forma materiae actuandae per ipsam.”
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an angel, therefore is also simply possible for our intellective power,
because we have the promise that we shall be like angels.485
The knowledge that Scotus is concerned about here is the knowledge of self. The angel,
and thus, the human being, is able to know herself to be knowing. This activity is unique
and peculiar to intellectual natures. This is the feature of the intellectual nature that
endows the divine person, the angel, or the human being with personhood.
In the Oxon. where Scotus discusses the different meanings of immateriality, he
argues that immateriality can be understood in reference to the object, “inasmuch as this
knowledge considers the object under immaterial aspects, as for instance, abstracting
from the “here and now” and such like, which are said to be material conditions.”486
While Scotus claims that this proof is based on the object, it is the activity of conscious
reflection that grounds it. The proof rests on the fact that “we experience ourselves
reflecting on this act of knowledge.”487 Reflection is activity exclusive to an immaterial
nature, as Scotus contends that what has quantity is unable to reflect.488 The proof that he
gives amounts to a listing of all the objects that transcend sense knowledge. But what is
striking about the list is not the eight objects, it is the fact that Scotus begins each listing
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Quodl. 6.19[8]: “. . . talem autem actum cognitionis de existente, ut existens, et praesens est, habet
Angelus de se. Non tantum enim intelligit Michael se, eo modo, quo intelligeret Gabrielem, si Gabriel
annihilaretur intellectione, scilicet abstrativa: sed intelligi se, ut existentem, et ut existentem eundem sibi:
sic etiam intelligit suam intellectionem, si reflectatur supeream, non solum considerando intellectionem,
sicut quoddam obiectum abstractum ab existentia, et non existentia: quia sic intelligit intellectionem
alterius Angeli, si nulla intellectio eius esset, sed intelligit se intelligere, hoc est, intellectionem sibi
inexistentem: ergo ista intellectio possibilis Angelo est possibilis simpliciter intellectivae nostrae: quia
promittitur nobis, quod erimus aequales Angelis.”
486
Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2: “Tertio modo potest intelligi immaterialitas eius in comparatione ad obiectum, ut
scilicet respiciat obiectum sub rationibus immaterialibus, utote in quantum abstrahitur ab hic et nunc et
huiusmodi, quae dicuntur conditiones materiales.” Philosophical Writings, trans. Wolter 1987, 141.
487
Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2: “. . .experimur nos reflecti super actum istius cognitionis, . .” Philosophical
Writings, trans. Wolter 1987, 141.
488
Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2: “. . . quantum non est super se reflexivum. . .” Philosophical Writings, trans.
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of each object with “We experience. . . (Experimur).”489 He ends this litany of reflective
experience with the contention that if anyone denies that she has such experiences, she
ought to be told that she is a brute animal.490 A brute animal is not a person. It is by way
of internal perception (perceptione interiori) that we experience these acts in ourselves.491
I want to argue that the feature that endows the intellectual nature with personhood is the
activity of reflection, the knowledge of the self. How does the activity of reflection, in
particular, secure the unity of the human being? In both of the passages discussed above,
what allows the reflection to occur is the presence of some object to the intellect. Such a
presence is the occasion by which the intellect knows of its knowing and thus knows of
itself. In terms of the human being, in this life, it is only by way of sensation that there is
an object that can be made present to the intellect. Through the sensitive and intellectual
activities of the soul, which are formally distinct, the unity of the human being is realized.
Wolter observes that, for Scotus, the human being, in this life, enjoys a psychic unity.
What underlies this unity is the harmonic cooperation between the soul and body.492
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Thus, it is the idea of the knowing self that best explains the notion of person and
expresses and secures at the same time the unity of the human being.

Conclusion
The points to be taken from this discussion are as follows. First, unity is
coextensive with being such that every level of being has its own proper unity. The unity
of singularity is the highest expression of unity and is that by which all other unity is
measured. The unity of the singularity seals the integrity of the individual being.
Second, the unity of the human being is a substantial unity, that is, a unity made up of
form and matter. When form informs matter a whole new individual being is brought
about with characteristics different from its components. Scotus contends that a plurality
of forms exists in the individual human being, the intellective soul, the form of the body
and the forms of the bodily organs. This plurality of forms does not threaten the unity of
the human being, rather it makes it possible in that the human being is a person, a
suppositum with an intellectual nature. The intellective part of the soul has formally
distinct parts that require a diverse and complex body. When the soul is conjoined to the
body, it is the activity as a whole composite, the harmonic cooperation between sensation
and intellection, that secures the unity of the person. Moreover, the intellective part of
the soul acts through the whole individual. Third, in his discussion of accident, Scotus
shows that inherence is not of the essence of the accident. Not only does this help to
show how the sensible and intelligible species as accident can be present in the bodily
organs or the intellect, but it also provides a way to understand the complexity of the
intellective soul, which can exist independently from the body and exist conjoined to it.
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Fourth, the immateriality of the soul--that it can exist independently from the body--does
not preclude its existence in the body. What emerges from this discussion is that Scotus
is thoroughly Aristotelian in his understanding of the unity of the soul and the body, even
given the fact that the immaterial intellect definitely can exist apart from the body. The
distinction between the soul and the body and materiality and immateriality should be
understood in terms of the underlying unity of the whole substantial being. Thus, the
problem of the immaterial intellect working with the material sense faculties is not
Descartes’ mind-body problem.
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Chapter 4 Sense Cognition
In Chapter three I examined Scotus’ understanding of the relationship of the body
and soul. My discussion focused on Scotus’ understanding of the human being as a
person. The notion of person is reserved for per se beings with an intellectual nature.
Given that the human being is a composite of a soul and a body, through the notion of
person, Scotus is able to account for the intimate connection and the cooperation of the
body and soul. In this chapter I will now turn to the question of how phantasm is an
entity that the agent intellect is able to access, that is to act with in order to make the
intelligible species present to the intellect. I am not concerned here with the nature of the
activity of the agent intellect with the phantasm, i.e., with the process that has come to be
known as abstraction. I am concerned with what happens prior to this activity in the
process of sensation in order to come to understand the nature of the species or phantasm
and the manner in which it exists in the bodily organ.
Since Scotus accepts that knowledge begins in the senses, that the intellect is
unable to think without the phantasm but that the phantasm itself cannot be an object for
the intellect as it exists in material conditions, i.e., in a bodily organ and under the aspect
of singularity, the question arises as to the nature of the phantasm as a species such that
the agent intellect is able to attend to it, not as its object, but as that which it can act with
to produce the intelligible species. The phantasm is a species or likeness of an object that
comes to exist in a bodily organ, the internal sense memory, by way of the activity of the
senses, both external and internal. But the phantasm alone is not able to account for the
universality of intellectual knowledge, so the agent intellect must somehow work with the
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phantasm to produce an intelligible species.493 Since the phantasm is primarily produced
by way of sensation, it is Scotus’ account of sensation that is the primary concern of this
chapter. Since Scotus has been seen as basically endorsing the traditional account of
sensation, there is not much in the literature that details his account of sensation. This
chapter is divided into two parts. In part 4.1, I will discuss Thomas Aquinas’ account of
sensation. I use Aquinas’ account as a point of comparison and contrast to Scotus, thus,
in this first section I will give a detailed analysis of Aquinas’ distinction between natural
and spiritual change. In part 4.2, I will discuss Scotus’ account of sensation. The
organization of my discussion on Scotus is based on the questions that emerge from my
discussion on Aquinas. In addressing these questions I will be able to show not only the
ways in which Scotus is like and unlike Aquinas, but more importantly, I will able to
detail unique elements of Scotus’ account of sensation helpful in understanding the nature
of the phantasm..

4.1 Thomas Aquinas’ Account of Sensation
As discussed in Chapter 1, Aristotle claims that the cognitive process begins with
the senses. He explains sensation in the context of his metaphysics of potency and act
such that the process of sensation, as well as intellection, is a kind of being affected.494 In
sense perception, that which is actual acts upon the sense bringing about a some kind of
change.495 The sense is that potency or power which receives the sensible form without
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the matter.496 Aristotle uses the example of wax receiving the impression of a signet ring
without the bronze to explain sense perception.497 Thus, for Aristotle, what defines the
nature of sensitive cognition is passivity.
This passivity that defines Aristotle’s cognitive process became a subject of
debate in the late 13th and early 14th century, stemming from Boethius’ claims that
cognition is active.498 According to Robert Pasnau, a disagreement arose concerning
whether or not Aristotle’s cognitive framework could account for such an activity as
Boethius argues for on the part of the senses and intellect.499 To frame his own
discussion of Thomas Aquinas, Pasnau presents the positions of Peter John Olivi and
William of Ockham as the extreme sides of this debate, although they are not the only
ones who argued these positions.500 According to Pasnau, Olivi, siding with Augustine
that there must be an active focus by the cognizing power on its object, explicitly attacks
the Aristotelian dictum that cognition is a kind of being affected.501 Olivi argues that the
mere reception of the form by the sense or the intellect cannot itself account for
cognition. Rather, Olivi contends that the sense and the intellect must be doing something
496
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more than receiving for cognition to occur.502 It is not passivity that explains cognition,
but an attentive activity on the part of the sense or intellect that can account for cognition.
William of Ockham, according to Pasnau, argues within the Aristotelian framework for
the other extreme, namely, that cognition is entirely passive.503 Pasnau contends that
Scotus is influenced by Olivi and attempts “a broadly Aristotelian resolution” that is a
compromise between these two extreme views.504 Before turning to Scotus, it is helpful
as a point of similarity and contrast to Scotus, to consider Thomas Aquinas’ position in
some detail since his position is, like Scotus’, an intermediate position between the
extreme positions of Olivi and Ockham.505
In his Commentary on De Anima, Aquinas readily accepts Aristotle’s
characterization of all sensation as the reception of the sensible form without the
matter.506 However, he notes that the reception of form without matter is not unique to
sensation:
But this seems to be common to all patients. In fact, all patients receive
something by the agent according to what the agent is. The agent, however, acts
through its form, and not through its matter. Therefore, all patients receive the
form without the matter. And so it is the case with the sense. Air does not receive
the matter from fire as an agent, but its form. Therefore, it seems that the
reception of the species or form without matter is not proper to the sense.507
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Aquinas finds the difference between the change involved in sensation and other change
in terms of the way in which the form is received (in modo recipiendi) by the patient.508
In some cases, the form is received by the patient according to the same mode of being
(eumdem modum essendi) that the form had in the agent.509 Aquinas explains that, in this
case, the matter of the patient comes to be disposed in the same way as the matter of the
agent.510 Thus, Aquinas says that this should not be understood as a reception of form
without matter.511 He does not mean that matter is received along with the form by the
patient. Rather, what he means is that in some cases, the matter of the patient is itself
affected by the reception of the form such that, as Burnyeat explains, the patient
“becomes like the agent both in matter and in form.”512 Thus, a natural change (passione
naturali) is a material change, matter comes to be disposed in a different way. Aquinas
offers as an example of a natural change the warming of air.513
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In other cases, however, the form is received by the patient according to a
different mode of being (alium modum essendi) than it had in the agent:
Sometimes a form is received in the thing affected in keeping with a manner of
existence different from the agent’s, because the affected thing’s material
disposition for receiving is not like the agent’s material disposition. And hence a
form is received in the thing affected without matter insofar as the thing affected
is made like the agent with respect to form and not matter. And a sense receives a
form without matter in this manner because the form has a different manner of
existence in the sense and in the sense object: for in the sense object it has a
natural existence, whereas in the sense it has intentional or spiritual existence.514
This change in which the patient is made like the agent in form only is the change
peculiar to sensation as characterized by Aristotle as the reception of form without
matter. The matter of the patient does not become similarly disposed to the matter of the
agent. The form is received by the patient in a way other than a natural change because
the existence that it has in the patient is not a natural existence (esse naturale) but an
intentional or spiritual existence (esse intentionale et spirituale). The reception of the
form according to intentional existence seems not to affect the matter of the patient.
Intentional existence is traditionally associated with cognition or awareness and usually
defined as “the existence of being known.”515 Aquinas understands the change in which
the form is received by the patient according to intentional existence as a spiritual
change.516 The distinction between natural change and spiritual change allows Aquinas
to show how the change involved in perception, while fundamentally the same as other
change because all change involves the reception of form without matter, is nonetheless,
514
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not an ordinary change because the sensible form is received according to intentional
being. Turning now to a well-known passage in the ST, Aquinas explains sensation:
Sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible.
Hence, the exterior cause of such immutation is what is per se perceived by the
sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive
powers diversified.517
It is clear from this passage that Aquinas is thoroughly Aristotelian in his understanding
of sensation. He maintains Aristotle’s claim that sensation is fundamentally passive and
that sensation is a kind of being affected. 518 The diversity of sensible objects requires a
diversity of senses such that each sense has its own proper object. Of note here is that
Aquinas says here that it is the sense as a passive power that is acted upon or changed by
the external sense object. Aquinas clearly regards the power of sense as a power that
requires a corporeal organ in order to operate:
But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs, as
seeing by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other
operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore, the powers which are
the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in
the soul alone.519
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What is not clear in the claim that the power of sense is acted upon by the external
sensible object, is what is being acted upon or changed. Since the sensitive soul is
conjoined to the corporeal organ, then it would seem to follow that the sense organ as
composite is what is acted upon. But in the passage from the Commentary on De Anima,
Aquinas distinguishes between a natural change and a spiritual change in order to show
how the change involved in sensation is different from ordinary change, he designates the
spiritual change that is involved in sensation. Thus, when the external sensible object
acts upon the power of sense such that this is a spiritual change where the sensible form
is received according to intentional existence, is this a change that happens to the
corporeal organ. It is helpful to consider another passage where Aquinas attends to the
kind(s) of change involved in sensation using again the distinction between natural and
spiritual that he used in his Commentary on De Anima:
Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural
immutation takes place when the form of that which causes the immutation is
received, according to its natural being, into the thing immuted, as heat is received
into the thing heated. But spiritual immutation takes place when the form of what
causes the immutation is received, according to a spiritual mode of being, into the
thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not
thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual
immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in
the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the
sense’s action, all natural bodies would have sensation when they undergo
alteration.520
Aquinas explains that a natural change occurs when the form is received by the changed
thing (immutato) according to natural being (esse naturale). Again, he uses as an
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example of natural change the heating of a thing. A spiritual change occurs when the
form is received by the changed thing (immutato) according to spiritual being (esse
spirituale). When the pupil receives the form of color, the pupil does not thereby become
colored, nonetheless, the form of color comes to exist in the pupil when before it did not
exist in the pupil, not according to natural being, but spiritual being. In this passage,
Aquinas does not use the word “intentional” to describe change, but only spiritual,
whereas in the passage from the Commentary on De Anima he uses both words. Rather,
he says that the spiritual change is a change in which the “intentio formae sensibilis”
comes to be in the sense organ. The word “intentio” is of course of the same root as
intentionale, and as noted above, “intentionale” is traditionally associated with awareness
or cognition. Certainly, in using the words “spirituale” and “intentionale” and “intentio,”
Aquinas seeks to distinguish the change involved in perception from ordinary change as
cognitive, and this is the point that I want to make here. However, it should be noted that
these words have a rich history and are therefore, not easily defined, in particular,
because their traditional association with cognition is complex.521 Thus, I will discuss the
nature of intentional existence and the intentio in more detail later.
What can we take from this passage? First, Aquinas is concerned here with two
kinds of changes: natural and spiritual. A natural change occurs when the sensible form
is received by the patient and comes to have natural existence in the patient. A spiritual
change occurs when the sensible form is received by the patient and comes to have
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spiritual existence in the patient. Second, in each of these changes Aquinas says that the
form is received in the thing changed (recipitur in immutato). In the case of sensation,
the patient, or thing changed, is the corporeal sense organ. Thus, the question arises, do
both the natural change and the spiritual change involve a corporeal or material change?
Since both natural and spiritual changes involve the reception of form in the thing
changed, it appears that they are not to be understood in terms of a distinction between
corporeal and incorporeal change. Third, Aquinas explicitly claims that all sensation
requires spiritual change. The question arises whether sensation involves natural change
as well, and Aquinas addresses this question here:
But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in sight, while in others
we find not only a spiritual but also a natural immutation, and this is either on the
part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the
object, we find local natural immutation in sound, which is the object of hearing;
for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of the air. We find natural
immutation by alteration in odor, which is the object of smelling; for in order to
give off an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of the
organ, natural immutation takes place in touch and taste; for the hand that touches
something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of
flavors. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective
operations by any natural immutation, except accidentally.
Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or
in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all
the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a
natural immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect
than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves.
Touch and taste are the most material of all (of their distinction we shall speak
later on). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a
medium united to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as
happens as regards these two senses.522
522

Aquinas, ST, I, q. 78, a. 3: “Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in
visu. In quibusdam autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte obiecti tantum, vel
etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte autem obiecti, invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in
sono, qui est obiectum auditus, nam sonus ex percussione causatur et aeris commotione. Secundum
alterationem vero, in odore, qui est obiectum olfactus, oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo
corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi, est immutatio naturalis in tactu et gustu, nam et
manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero olfactus aut
auditus nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque
immutatione naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et
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Sight, being the most spiritual and most perfect of all the senses, involves a spiritual
change only. Hearing and smelling involve a natural change, but only on the part of the
object, the sense organ is not naturally changed. Hearing and smelling are the only two
of the senses that seem to require a natural change of the object. In order for an object to
have an odor it must be changed by heat, and in order for there to be sound, there must be
a percussion and commotion of air. The natural change here makes the object
perceptible. Touch and taste, being the most material and being united to a medium,
involve a natural change. But that the natural change occurs, the hand becomes hot, the
tongue moistened, seems to be due to the fact that the sense organ is united to its
medium. Whereas in hearing and smelling the natural immutation of the object makes
something perceptible, the natural immutation of the organ in touch and taste seems to be
coincidental. The natural immutation clearly is not involved in sensation per se because
in sensation the sensible form is received not according to natural existence, but a
spiritual or intentional existence. It is the spiritual change that is sensation.523 What then,
does the natural immutation, as described above, accomplish? 524 In a passage in the ST
where Aquinas discusses the various powers of the soul, he writes:

communior. Et post hoc auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex parte obiecti.
Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII Physic.
Tactus autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Et inde est quod alii
tres sensus non fiunt per medium coniunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, ut
accidit in his duobus sensibus.”
523
I want to be careful here in the language that I use. I do not want to say that the spiritual change
constitutes sensation in the sense that some change in the sense organ gives rise to sensation. The spiritual
change in the sense organ just is the sensation.
524
See Burnyeat 2001, 134. Burnyeat discusses this same passage and concludes that Aquinas holds that
the sense organs undergo only a spiritual change in perception. The natural change that is involved in
terms of the object and the medium is, Burnyeat contends, a “mere accompaniment” rather than any kind of
material change that underlies perception. Burnyeat is in particularly responding to and rejecting Sorabji’s
claim that there is a physiological change in the organ, i.e., the eye jelly becomes red when the eye sees red.
See Sorabji 1991. I will discuss Burnyeat’s position in more detail later.
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Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed performed
through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the
operation of the sensitive soul. For though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other
such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not
required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by the power of
such qualities; but only for the proper disposition of the organ.525
In this passage Aquinas discusses sensation as the act of a corporeal sense organ. He is
careful to distinguish here between the operation of the sensitive soul which is performed
through the sense organ, sensation, and the activities of corporeal qualities such as hot
and cold, wet and dry. The corporeal qualities constitute the corporeal organ, but it is not
by their power that sensation occurs. Rather the powers of the corporeal qualities ensure
the “proper disposition of the sense organ.” Perhaps in terms of touch and taste where the
hand is warmed and the tongue is moistened, the natural immutation occurs to ensure a
proper disposition, although this remains. Be that as it may, I do think that the distinction
between the activity of sensitive soul performed through the sense organ and the activity
of the corporeal qualities is an important and helpful distinction in understanding
Aquinas’ account of perception.
A natural change is one in which the sensible form is received by the patient such
that it comes to have natural existence in the patient, that is, the matter of the patient
comes to be similarly disposed to the matter of the agent. Only in touch and taste does
such a natural change occur where the matter of the organ (at least the organ united to the
medium) becomes like the matter of the agent. If we read this passage in line with the
previous passage where Aquinas determines which senses need natural change and in
525

Aquinas, ST, I, q. 78, a. 1: “Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidem fit per organum
corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilis, quia etsi
calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates corporeae requirantur ad
operationem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis
procedat; sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi.” Trans. Pegis 1945, 322.
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what way this natural change occurs, either of the object or of the organ, then it seems
fair to say that, to the extent that a natural change is involved, its involvement in no way
brings about or is required for sensation per se, but to ensure the necessary material
conditions for sensation to occur.526
Three points can be taken from this discussion. First, while not all the senses
involve a natural change, all sensation requires a spiritual change. Second, in the cases
where there is a natural change, the natural change seems to have nothing to do with
sensation per se. Third, if there is a change to the sense organ involved in sensation, it is
not a natural change. Whether a change to the sense organ is the spiritual change or is
something in addition to the spiritual change remains unclear. What needs to be
understood then is the nature of spiritual change and whether it is a corporeal or
incorporeal event.
For Aquinas the cognitive process includes both sensation and intellection.
Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that both sensation and intellection are fundamentally
passive, both are a kind of being affected. Both sensation and intellection require an
object, sensation requires an external object whereas intellection requires an internal
object. In both sensation and intellection a likeness of the object is received by the
cognitive power. In sensation the sensible form is received according to intentional
existence, and in intellection the intelligible form is received by the possible intellect.

526

See Burnyeat 2001, 145. Burnyeat contends sensation, for both Aristotle and Aquinas, requires no
underlying material process. That said, he does contend that there are necessary material conditions that
must be present for sensation to occur: “According to Aristotle, the eye must contain transparent liquid, the
ear still air, and the organ of touch must be a mean of temperature and hardness. But these are static,
standing conditions, not processes or events underlying the act of perception. Aquinas is as usual less
detailed on physiological matters, but he clearly take the same line. Provided the sense organ has the
proper disposition, it is ready for the spiritual change which is perception.” See also Burnyeat 1992.
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That the sense and the intellect are capable of receiving a form of another thing, in
addition to their own, is what makes them cognitive activities:
The cognizant are distinguished from the noncognizant in this respect, that the
noncognizant have nothing but their own form alone, whereas a cognizing entity
is suited to have the form of another thing as well. For the species of the thing
being cognized is in the one cognizing.527
In order for there to be cognition at all, a form or species must come to exist in the one
doing the cognizing. But as we have seen, the change that is required to effect such an
existence of the form in the cognizer, is not a natural change, but a spiritual change in
which the form exists in the cognizer according to a spiritual or intentional existence.
Thus, something is cognizant if and only if it is able to have, in addition to its own form,
intentionally existing forms of other things.528 How are we to understand intentional or
spiritual existence, and are we to understand that they are immaterial? Aquinas uses the
terms, ‘intentional,” “spiritual,” and “immaterial” almost interchangeably.529 Aquinas
agrees with Aristotle, however, that, whereas intellection does not require a bodily organ,
sensation is an act of a corporeal organ such that the sense organ is a composite of the
body and soul.530 Since sensation is the act of a corporeal organ, and Aquinas contends
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Aquinas, ST, Q. 14, a. 1: “. . .cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non
cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei
alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. . .” Trans. Pasnau 1997, 32.
528
Pasnau 1997, 34. I think that Pasnau is correct in this claim. In the ST, q. 78, Aquinas claims that all
sensation requires a spiritual change.
529
Pasnau 1997, 38-39. Pasnau notes that it is hard, in fact, to find passages where Aquinas does not
discuss one of these terms without another of them.
530
Aquinas, ST, I q. 77, a. 5: “Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod
sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed coniuncti. Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto
sicut in subiecto. Non ergo sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum suarum. Respondeo dicendum
quod illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari, omne enim accidens denominat
proprium subiectum. Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod eius sit
potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia.
Manifestum est autem ex supra dictis quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo
corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut
in subiecto. Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per
oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et
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that “nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal.,” how are we to
understand a spiritual change in terms of sensation as the act of a corporeal sense
organ?531 This is a complicated question that has given rise to much and varied debate. I
will discuss briefly here some of the arguments in the literature, not only to clarify how
Aquinas understands the spiritual change in terms of sensation as the act of a corporeal
sense organ , but even more to allow the complexities of the issues involved to emerge.
The received understanding Aquinas’ account of perception is given by Hamlyn:
[Aquinas] views sense perception primarily as a form of change in which the
sense-organ is altered. But this cannot be all that is involved, for along with the
physical change there goes the reception of a sensible form without matter. The
latter Aquinas takes to be not something that happens to the sense-organ, but
something that happens to the faculty of soul or mind. It is, in his words, a
spiritual change.532
Hamlyn contends that “along with” the physical change to the sense organ, there is a
spiritual change that happens to the soul or mind.533 This is in line with what Aquinas
ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima
sola.”
531

Aquinas, ST, I, q. 84, a. 6: “Et quia incorporeum non potest immutari a corporeo. . .” Trans. Pegis 1945,
394.
532
Hamlyn 1961, 46. Hamlyn’s interpretation of Aquinas’ account of perception is discussed and
referenced in much of the recent literature concerning the nature of the spiritual change in Aquinas’
account of sensation. While I can here only consider some of the key arguments made in several of the
articles, there are many more that weigh on this topic. See, for example, Mortimer J. Adler, “Sense
Cognition: Aristotle vs. Aquinas,” in New Scholasticism 42(1968): 578-591; Burnyeat 1992; Burnyeat
2001, 130, Gerard Casey, “Immateriality and Intentionality,” in At the Heart of the Real, ed. Fran
O’Rourke (Dublin, 1992); Sheldon M. Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of
Sensible Forms,” in The Philosophical Review, XCI, n. 2 (1982): 193-209; John Deely, “The Immateriality
of the Intentional as Such,” in New Scholasticism 42 (1968): 293-306; John J. Haldane, Aquinas on SensePerception, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 92, No. 2 (1983): 233-239; Paul Hoffman, “St. Thomas
Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCIX, No. 1 (1990):
73-92; Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (New York, 1993); Nussbaum and Putnam 1992, Sorabji
1991;Martin M. Tweedale, “Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation is an Immaterial Reception of
a Form,” in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1992): 215-231;
533
Hamlyn here uses the word “physical” to describe a change other than the spiritual change. As seen
above, Aquinas contrasts the natural change with the spiritual change. A natural change, it is true, is a
material change, but it is more precisely, a change in which the form is received according to natural
existence, where the matter is informed in the way the matter of the agent is informed, that is, the form
exists in the patient in the same manner as it exists in the agent. As a material change, it is not inaccurate to
describe it as a physical change, if one understands that the physical change is defined by the physics that is
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says in It is not clear what the physical change is nor what its relationship to the spiritual
change is, but Hamlyn contends that it is the spiritual change that produces the phantasm
which he characterizes as a particular mental entity.534
Sheldon M. Cohen rejects Hamlyn’s interpretation arguing that Aquinas regards
the reception of form without matter, whether natural or spiritual, always as a physical
event, and claims, moreover, that the phantasm is not a mental entity but a physical
likeness.535 One of the points that Cohen makes is that sense organ must be viewed as a
composite of body and soul. To be fair, Hamlyn recognizes this as well, but Cohen takes
issue with Hamlyn’s claim that the spiritual change is something that happens in the soul,
making the soul the recipient of the phantasm. Cohen explains that while the intellective
soul is a subsistent form, the sensitive soul is a substantial form which cannot exist
outside of matter.536 The sensitive soul itself cannot therefore, be the recipient of
anything, for it is always conjoined to the bodily organ. The composite of sensitive soul

embrace. Since Aquinas embraces Aristotle’s physics, and Aristotle’s physics includes both matter and
form, then the natural change is a physical change, and change in which matter is informed. Thus, without
keeping the physics in mind, it can be misleading to cast the distinction between spiritual change and
natural change as one between the physical and nonphysical or mental. This point is of course at issue in
the debate in the literature. Often the word ‘physical’ us used to refer to the corporeal and as I pointed out
above, the distinction between the spiritual change and the natural change is not necessarily a distinction
between the incorporeal and the corporeal. Corporeal means bodily and in terms of Aristotle’s
understanding of the relationship between the soul and the body, ‘body’ always refers to the living body.
Thus, corporeal does not simply mean material, as it is already a composite of form and matter, it refers to a
body that is organic and has life. The word “physical” is problematic when discussing any theory of
sensation based on Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics and therefore, some clarification is in order.
Hamlyn is not alone in the use of this word, others use it as well, including Pasnau, whose use of this term I
will discuss later. The word “physical” and “physics” share the same root. See Burnyeat 1992 and
Burnyeat 2001. Burnyeat stresses the difference between Aristotle’s physics and ours and contends that
Aristotle’s physics is “deeply alien” to us and therefore should be “junked.” While I do not agree with
Burnyeat on this point, I do appreciate his contention that we need to be careful in our use of the word
“physical” when working in the Aristotelian framework.
534
Hamlyn 1961, 48.
535
Cohen, 1982, 193.
536
Cohen 1982, 203.
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and the particular bodily organ receives the form and thus, for Aquinas, “sensation is not
a per se act of the soul, but an act of the composite.”537
Paul Hoffman sees Cohen’s point to be that Aquinas understands that “the
immaterial reception of sensible forms is always a physical event,” but criticizes Cohen
for not taking into consideration Aquinas’ claim that corporeality and materiality come in
degrees.538 Hoffman points out that since senses are the powers of corporeal organs,
whatever is received by them must be received corporeally and materially, and therefore
with individuating conditions.539 Hoffman here cites a passage from Aquinas’
Commentary on De Anima in which Aquinas contends that since “everything is received
in mode of the recipient,” (unumquodque autem recipitur in aliquo per modum sui) the
sense necessarily receives the sensible form materially and corporeally.540 Hoffman
explains that Aquinas must say that the sense receives the sensible form immaterially and
materially:
In order for sensible forms to play their essential epistemological role of securing
cognition of particulars, he is led to say that they are received corporeally and
materially. Yet he also asserts that they are received immaterially, as it seems he
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Cohen 1982, 205. See also Tweedale 1992, 216. Tweedale thinks that Cohen’s argument that the
sensible form is received by the organ and not the sensitive soul is correct.
538
Hoffman 1990, 73, 79.
539
Hoffman 1990, 83.
540
Hoffman 1990, 84. See also Aquina, Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 12, n. 5: “Circa ea vero quae hic
dicuntur, considerandum est, quare sensus sit singularium, scientia vero universalium; et quomodo
universalia sint in anima. Sciendum est igitur circa primum, quod sensus est virtus in organo corporali;
intellectus vero est virtus immaterialis, quae non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Unumquodque autem
recipitur in aliquo per modum sui. Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc, quod cognitum est aliquo modo in
cognoscente, scilicet secundum similitudinem. Nam cognoscens in actu, est ipsum cognitum in actu.
Oportet igitur quod sensus corporaliter et materialiter recipiat similitudinem rei quae sentitur. Intellectus
autem recipit similitudinem eius quod intelligitur, incorporaliter et immaterialiter. Individuatio autem
naturae communis in rebus corporalibus et materialibus, est ex materia corporali, sub determinatis
dimensionibus contenta: universale autem est per abstractionem ab huiusmodi materia, et materialibus
conditionibus individuantibus. Manifestum est igitur, quod similitudo rei recepta in sensu repraesentat rem
secundum quod est singularis; recepta autem in intellectu, repraesentat rem secundum rationem universalis
naturae: et inde est, quod sensus cognoscit singularia, intellectus vero universalia, et horum sunt scientiae.
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must if he is to maintain a distinction between the cognitive and non-cognitive
reception of forms.541
In order to reconcile these apparently opposing claims that forms are received
immaterially and materially, Hoffman contends that Aquinas posits a “halfway state of
sensible being” that shows that Aquinas thinks that immateriality and materiality admit of
degrees.542 Hoffman infers that the activity of the senses is neither wholly corporeal nor
wholly incorporeal. Thus, whereas Cohen understands the spiritual reception of sensible
forms as a “wholly physical process,” Hoffman contends that it is corporeal to the extent
that the forms are received materially (under individuating conditions) and incorporeal to
the extent that the sensible forms are received immaterially.543 While the immaterial
reception of the sensible form is a corporeal event, Hoffman is careful to distinguish it
from a corporeal change. In other words, the spiritual change is an incorporeal change
that takes place in a corporeal organ.544

541

Hoffman 1990, 84.
Hoffman 1990, 85. See also Aquinas, Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 5 n. 4-6: “Huiusmodi autem
viventia inferiora, quorum actus est anima, de qua nunc agitur, habent duplex esse. Unum quidem
materiale, in quo conveniunt cum aliis rebus materialibus. Aliud autem immateriale, in quo communicant
cum substantiis superioribus aliqualiter. Est autem differentia inter utrumque esse: quia secundum esse
materiale, quod est per materiam contractum, unaquaeque res est hoc solum quod est, sicut hic lapis, non
est aliud quam hic lapis: secundum vero esse immateriale, quod est amplum, et quodammodo infinitum,
inquantum non est per materiam terminatum, res non solum est id quod est, sed etiam est quodammodo
alia. Unde in substantiis superioribus immaterialibus sunt quodammodo omnia, sicut in universalibus
causis. Huiusmodi autem immateriale esse, habet duos gradus in istis inferioribus. Nam quoddam est
penitus immateriale, scilicet esse intelligibile. In intellectu enim res habent esse, et sine materia, et sine
conditionibus materialibus individuantibus, et etiam absque organo corporali. Esse autem sensibile est
medium inter utrumque. Nam in sensu res habet esse sine materia, non tamen absque conditionibus
materialibus individuantibus, neque absque organo corporali. Est enim sensus particularium, intellectus
vero universalium.”
542
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Hoffman 1990, 86.
Hoffman 1990, 86. Hoffman further contends that Aquinas distinguishes between the corporeality of
activities and the corporeality of change. The corporeality of activities admits of degrees, while the
corporeality of change does not. If by “event” Cohen means change, then Hoffman contends that Cohen’s
claim that the spiritual reception of sensible form is a physical event is false.
544
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Burnyeat largely agrees with Cohen that the reception of form without matter in
sensation is a “peculiar kind of physical event.”545 Burnyeat contends that Aquinas
understands a spiritual change as a kind of bodily change.546 He argues that Aquinas
follows Aristotle in understanding that the reception of the form without matter is simply
perceptual awareness and requires no underlying material process.547 While there are
necessary bodily conditions for perception to occur, it is not the case that these material
conditions in any way either give rise to or account for perception, nor is it the case that
these necessary conditions are material changes in the sense organ.548 As discussed
above, Burnyeat emphasizes that Aquinas claims that the corporeal qualities are only
necessary for the proper disposition of the organ. As Aquinas maintains that the activity
of sense is primarily passive, the sense organ must be properly disposed to receive the
sensible species. The spiritual reception of the species is clearly a corporeal event for
Burnyeat, but not a material change to the sense organ. Still, Burnyeat contends that the
presence of the sensible form in the sense organ is a physical fact.549
I would like now to enter into an extended discussion of Pasnau’s reading of
Aquinas’ account of sensation because I feel it is a useful means of illustrating the
complexity of the issues involved. As will become clear in my discussion, I feel that
Pasnau seriously misstates Aquinas’ position through the introduction of extraneous
modern terms that have no place in Aquinas’, and for that matter, Aristotle’s system. The
goal of this discussion is to come to a clearer understanding of the key issues and
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elements of Aquinas’ account of sensation and to highlight any difficulties that Scotus
will need to address.
Pasnau offers, on his own account, a controversial reading of Aquinas,
controversial, he says, due to uncertainty about the meaning of the terms “physical” and
“material.”550 He contends that while there is a natural presumption that favors a literal
reading of Aquinas that “sensation involves not natural but spiritual alteration,” there is
textual evidence to override this presumption.551 It is hard to know exactly what Pasnau
means here because he accepts the difference between a natural change and a spiritual
change, according to Aquinas, as a difference in the manner in which a form is received
by the patient.552 In fact, he begins his argument with the observation that, for Aquinas,
cognition requires that the form of the cognized object be in the cognizer, not according
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Pasnau 1997, 35. In his effort to clarify what he means when he uses the term “physical” Pasnau
appeals to a contemporary understanding that even he admits is confused. The real problem of Pasnau’s
reading, as I see it, is not due to any contemporary confusion, for even if there were none, the use of
modern terminology would still fail to appreciate the medieval use of Aristotle’s physics. Moreover,
Pasnau’s own use of “physical” is not always clear. I will give two examples. First, he contends that,
according to Aquinas, the human being is not wholly physical due to the rational soul.(36) But on the very
same page he says that, while he is inclined to believe that nonhuman animals are wholly physical, for
Aquinas, he is not arguing this point, nor will he take a position on it. But if what makes the human being
not wholly physical is the rational soul, and nonhuman animals do not have the rational soul, then why is it
not immediately clear that nonhuman animals are wholly physical? Second, Pasnau contends that Aquinas
says that sense organs are “entirely physical” (45) and that the sense powers are entirely physical powers
because they use corporeal organs (36, 43). But then he notes that it is the nonphysicality of the intellect
that makes us qualitatively different cognizers than other beings that can cognize, that is, on Pasnau’s
account, receive forms according to intentional existence.(55) The degree of immateriality, for Aquinas,
determines the degree of cognitive ability and “immateriality” is identified with “intentional,” meaning the
ability to receive a form without taking on the characteristics of that form. (56) But Pasnau uses the word
nonphysicality interchangeably with immateriality. Earlier Pasnau explained that he uses the word
“physical” to refer to objects that are wholly material (in the modern sense), that is objects that lack
spirituality. If the word physical means material, and the sense organ is wholly physical, then how could it
ever be cognitive if it is only cognitive to the degree that it is immaterial, that is, nonphysical? At times
Pasnau wants to identify immaterial with intentional where intentional is not incompatible with physicality.
But at other times he identifies immaterial as nonphysical and argues that something is cognitive to the
degree that it is nonphysical. He criticizes Hoffman however for making sensation partly nonphysical. (45)
Pasnau claims that sensation is a wholly physical process while allowing that nonphysicality is what
determines cognition.
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to natural existence, but according to intentional existence.553 As we have seen, Aquinas
understands spiritual change as the reception of the sensible form according to intentional
existence, and on Pasnau’s own account, it is just such a reception that distinguishes the
cognizant from the noncognizant.554 What Pasnau argues is that sensation does involve a
spiritual change, but spirituality, and for that matter, immateriality, “are not what they
seem to be.”555 Sensation, for Aquinas, according to Pasnau, is a “wholly physical
event.”556 A spiritual change, though different from a natural change, is nonetheless a
physical change.
Pasnau contends that Aquinas defines intentional existence only in negative
terms: “All we are told is what it is not: it is not natural existence,” and if we want to
know further what intentional existence is, “Aquinas remains silent.”557 Forms received
according to intentional existence come to exist in the patient without the patient
becoming the sort of thing that the agent is, that is, “the form of p exists in the recipient
without the recipient’s taking on p.”558 And because the sensible form is received in the
physical sense organ according to intentional existence, this reception is a “physical”
event: “for a body, such as a physical organ, to receive a form is simply for that body to
be altered from one physical state to another.”559
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Pasnau 1997 41. See also Burnyeat 2001, 142. Burnyeat makes the same point in terms of the negative
definition of intentional existence. Burnyeat observes that both Aristotle and Aquinas explain the change
involved in sensation in terms of what is not. Sensation is not an ordinary alteration. Aristotle says that the
form is received without the matter. Aquinas says that the form is received according to intentional
existence. The use of the terms “intentional” or “spiritual” do little more than remind us that perception
involves a different kind of change, that what is being discussed is “perceptual cognition.” Still, Burnyeat
contends that the terms “intentional” and “spiritual” are good labels.
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At the heart of Pasnau’s argument that sensation is a wholly physical event is his
contention that “Aquinas sees no incompatibility between intentionality and
physicality.”560 Pasnau contends that Aquinas almost always uses the terms
“intentional,” “spiritual,” and “immaterial” interchangeably.561 However, he also
observes that Aquinas “associates the mental with the nonphysical.”562 Aquinas
understands the intellect as immaterial, thus, if Aquinas uses the terms “intentional,” and
“spiritual,” and “immaterial” interchangeably, intentionality and spirituality would be
associated with the mental (intellectual) as well. But Pasnau contends that Aquinas does
not restrict intentionality to the mental.563 Since intentionality is not restricted to the
mental, Pasnau concludes that intentionality and thereby cognition, “can occur in wholly
corporeal or physical entities.”564 Pasnau understands a “wholly physical” entity as an
entity that is wholly material, lacking in anything spiritual, and moreover, claims that the
sense organ is a “wholly physical entity.”565 Thus, on Pasnau’s reading that sensation is a
wholly physical event, the spiritual or intentional existence of the sensible form in the
sense organ is not “some kind of ghostly, incorporeal state of existence.”566
One of the problems that arises from the claim that something is cognitive insofar
as it is suitable to receive a form intentionally, concerns the fact of the medium that exists
between the external sense object and the sense organ. In embracing an Aristotelian
account of sensation, Aquinas holds that the likenesses or species of an external object
are transmitted to the sense organ through the medium, for example, the species of a
560
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color is transmitted through the air to the pupil. The species of the color exists in the air
according to intentional existence.567 Thus, the “species in medio” is an intentio. Does
this make air cognitive?
Aquinas’ contends that what distinguishes the cognitive from the noncognitive is
the suitability to receive forms intentionally. Pasnau claims that what Aquinas means is
“something is cognitive iff it is suited to have not just its own form but also the
intentionally existing forms of other things.”568 It seems clear that Aquinas contends that
what is cognitive must be able to receive forms intentionally. But it is not clear that if
something is able to receive forms intentionally, it is thereby cognitive. Air is able to
receive forms intentionally. Somehow the species of color is in the air without coloring
the air. Pasnau clearly states that air is not cognitive.569 But because he wants to insist
that cognition is simply a matter of being able to receive forms intentionally, he is in a
predicament, for which he finds a way out in the claim that, according to Aquinas, “being
cognitive is a matter of being (literally) informed.”570 Pasnau reads Aquinas as
identifying being “informed” with “taking in or receiving.”571 Thus, he says: “air and
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other media exhibit the same capacity as the sense organs, intellect and even God: all
contain intentionally existing forms.” In fact, he claims that each “receives information”
from the external world.
Aquinas understands immateriality and materiality as being of degrees, the more
immaterial the recipient, the more cognitive the recipient. In ST, I, q. 84, a. 2, Aquinas
explains that in order to know material things, these material things must exist
immaterially in the knower.572 The intellect does not have immediate access to external
sensible objects so in order to know them an immaterial likeness must be in the knower.
Aquinas contends that since knowledge is in inverse ratio to materiality, only that which
is able to receive forms immaterially can come to have knowledge.573 Thus, he explains
both sensation and intellection in terms of the immaterial reception of forms:
Consequently, things that are not receptive of forms, save materially, have
no power of knowledge whatever—such as plants, as the Philosopher says. But
the more immaterially a being receives the form of the thing known, the more
perfect its knowledge. Therefore the intellect, which abstracts the species not
only from matter, knows more perfectly than the senses, which receive the form
of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions.
Moreover, among the senses themselves, sight has the most perfect knowledge,
because it is the least material, as we have remarked above. So too, among
intellects, the more perfect is the more immaterial.574
Aquinas understands immateriality and materiality, and thereby, cognition, in terms of
degrees, there is a hierarchy of immateriality, of cognition. Since air can receive a form
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according to intentional existence, whereas a plant cannot, it seems as if it is in some
sense cognitive, though less so than the sense organs which are less cognitive than the
intellect. Pasnau argues that the real difference that separates one cognizer from another
is not the manner in which the form is received, but rather “the kinds of forms that a thing
receives and, in particular, the degree of their universality.”575 Air can only receive
forms that are entirely particular and unstructured. Human beings, in contrast, are able to
have truly universal intellectual representations. But the kind of forms that can be
received is determined by the suitability of the receiver, and this is finally what shows
that air is not cognitive according to Pasnau. Whereas human beings are suited to have
universal concepts, air is so poorly suited to receive intentionally existing forms that it is
not cognitive. Air is simply not suited to receive species in the way that senses or the
intellect can.576 Pasnau then wonders why Aquinas invokes the notion of intentional
existence at all, given the problems that arise on his reading, and contends that the truly
critical and determining feature of the cognitive is that “they are suited to contain a great
deal of information about their environment.”577
What can we take from this lengthy discussion of Pasnau’s reading of Aquinas?
There are several issues to consider. First, Pasnau’s use of modern terminology often
confuses the issues and misconstrues the problems. Aquinas is working in an Aristotelian
framework and thus embraces the Aristotelian physics, where there is nothing that is
wholly material. The fundamental components of Aristotle’s physics are form and
matter. Moreover, Aquinas embraces Aristotle’s hylomorphic understanding of the body
and soul relationship. Thus, the sense organ is not “wholly physical” but is a composite
575
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of soul and body. The fact that the sense organ is able to do what it does is precisely
because it is ensouled, alive.
Second, in order to show that sensation is a “wholly physical event,” Pasnau
claims there is no incompatibility between spiritual or intentional and physicality. He
then argues that cognition is defined as the suitability of receiving forms according to
intentional existence, and this is a suitability that something entirely physical, for
example, a sense organ has. But since even air receives forms intentionally, but air is not
cognitive, Pasnau must look for another way to define cognition, and he finds this in the
hierarchy of immateriality and cognition, where the kinds of forms that are received and
the suitability of the recipient become the distinguishing features of the cognitive. But
even these features only differ by degrees such that Pasnau claims that Aquinas’ account
implies that media theoretically participate in the same sorts of operations as do the
“properly cognitive” faculties of sense and intellect.578 I would argue that Aquinas’
account, only on Pasnau’s reading, implies such a thing. The sense organ is a highly
structured organ that is connected to the living body and therefore has the ability to
operate as an animate being unlike the air which is inanimate.
Third, the claim that, for Aquinas, something is cognitive iff it is suitable to
receive forms intentionally is fallacious, even with the modifications that Pasnau makes.
Pasnau himself points out that Aquinas agrees with the Augustinian contention that
“attention is required for the act of any cognitive power.”579 In the Summa Contra
Gentiles, Aquinas claims, “the cognitive power doesn’t actually cognize anything unless
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an attention (intentio) is present.”580 The meaning of intentio, for Aquinas, Pasnau argues,
implies “a certain order of one thing to another.”581 Pasnau argues thus, intentio means
the same thing as conversio, a turning toward the object.582 Not only does Aquinas claim
that the intellect must turn towards (conversio) the phantasm in order to cognize but he
also claims that:
A power can cognize something only by turning itself to its object—as sight
cognizes something only by turning itself to a color.583
That a power can only cognize something by tending towards it (convertendo) seems to
be necessary condition for cognition according to Aquinas. Thus, even if something is
cognitive if it is suited to receive an intentional form, the suitability to receive an
intentional form does not make something cognitive. What does make something
cognitive, in addition to receiving an intentional form, is the ability to tend towards the
object. It seems then, that Aquinas holds that any definition of cognition must include
the ability to attend to the object, and this is something that air clearly cannot do, and
therefore, air is not cognitive precisely because it cannot participate in the same
operations that the sense and the intellect do, theoretically or not. Given that Aquinas
associates intentio with conversio, it also seems clear why he would invoke intentional
existence in terms of the reception of the form in sensation. Aquinas clearly claims that
sensation requires a spiritual change. It is true that he does not fully explain exactly how
the spiritual change occurs. And this gives rise to the debate about whether it is a
580
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corporeal or incorporeal change. That the sense organ is an ensouled entity connected to
the living being determines its capacity to sense or perceive. It seems that the reception
of the sensible form according to intentional existence by the sense organ must involve
cognitive attention.
While it is clear that though Aquinas has some notion of cognitive attention,
Pasnau still observes that a real tension exists for Aquinas between the passivity of
sensation and an activity of cognitive attention.584 According to Pasnau, while Aquinas
does not give an account of what cognitive attention is, he does explicitly and often
maintain that the senses are primarily passive.585 For example, Aquinas claims that,
“things outside the soul are related to the exterior senses as a sufficient agent with which
the patients do not co-operate but only receive.”586 In yet another passage Aquinas writes
that, “for a sense’s complete operation the impression of its active [object] in the manner
of passion alone suffices.”587 Based on his reading of Aquinas, Pasnau does not find
resolution of this tension in Aquinas.588
The points to be taken from this discussion on Aquinas are as follows: 1)
Aquinas embraces Aristotle’s account of sensation and interprets Aristotle’s claim that
the form is received with matter by his distinction between the natural change and the
spiritual change. Sensation requires the spiritual change, the reception of the form
according to intentional existence in the sense organ, 2) It is not clear exactly how this
spiritual change happens nor whether it is a corporeal event itself or an incorporeal event
584
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in a corporeal organ, 3) It is not clear how the sensible form exists intentionally in the
sense organ, that is, in ordinary change, the patient is informed, that is, receives the form
in the manner in which the form is in the agent. Such a change is in line with Aristotle’s
framework. But how can the presence of a form that does not inform its patient in this
ordinary way, be explained? 4) Aquinas maintains that the senses are primarily passive,
and thus, a problem arises in accounting for cognitive attention.

4.2 John Duns Scotus’ Account of Sensation
Along with Aristotle, Scotus contends that all our knowledge arises from sense
perception.589 Even more importantly however, is Scotus’ understanding, in line with
Aristotle, that the sense requires the presence of an external sensible object whereas the
intellect requires the presence of an internal intelligible object. The intellect does not
have direct access to the external object in this life and therefore, depends upon sensation
to provide an object by way phantasm. Such a dependency requires an intimate
cooperation between the sense faculty and the intellective faculty. Thus, it is important to
understand Scotus’ account of sensation as it is the origin of knowledge. It is noted in
several places in the literature that Scotus does not spend much time delineating his
account of sensation. Tachau points out that the process of sensation and the
multiplication of species theory seemed “well-established and largely uncontroversial” to
Scotus.590 In his chapter on Scotus’ account of cognition in The Cambridge Companion
to Duns Scotus, Pasnau makes the same point explaining that a substantial consensus on
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the basic elements of cognition existed by the end of the 13th century, and Scotus mostly
endorses this view.591 Scotus’ treatment of sensation varies throughout his texts, for
example, he discusses it in more detail in his questions on Aristotle’s De Anima (QDA),
as is to be expected, but rarely mentions it in his Quodlibetal Questions. Moreover, his
treatment of sensation in the Quodlibetal Questions differs from his treatment of
sensation in the QDA.
Scotus basically embraces Aristotle’s, and thereby, Aquinas’, account of
cognition, including the distinction between sensation and intellection, that sensation is
an organic process whereas intellection is an inorganic process, that there are five
external senses as well as the internal senses of the brain, and the understanding that what
is material cannot act on what is immaterial, thus, the senses cannot directly act on the
intellect.592 My understanding of Scotus is that he is thoroughly Aristotelian in his view
of the cognitive processes such that, while there are elements in his own account of
cognition that find their source in Augustinianism or his own theological beliefs, it is my
contention that these influences serve to enhance and deepen his understanding of
Aristotelian metaphysics which in turn provides the cohesiveness of his own thought.593
In my discussion of Scotus’ understanding of sensation I am interested to see if
there are elements in his account that can address the questions that emerged from the
discussion of Aquinas’ account of sensation. The organization of this section follows
these questions: 4.2.1) Does Scotus accept the distinction between natural change and
591
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spiritual change where the spiritual change demarcates sensation? 4.2.2) Is the change
that is involved in sensation a corporeal change or an incorporeal change? 4.2.3) Can
Scotus account for the presence of the sensible form in the sense organ, and how does he
understand the nature of this form, that is, what is its ontological status? 4.2.4) Does
Scotus maintain, as Aquinas does, that the senses are primarily passive or does he offer a
different account in which he accords an activity to the senses such that he is in a better
position to account for the activity of attending to the object? I will address each
question in order beginning with the first.

4.2.1 Scotus’ Account of Natural Change and Spiritual Change
In his Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima (QDA), Scotus
discusses Aquinas’ distinction between natural change and spiritual change in regards to
sensation in Questions 4 and 6.594 In both questions he claims that in a natural change the
form is received by the patient according to real being (esse reale) and according to the
594
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disposition of matter as in the agent, the example being, warming. A spiritual change is
one in which the form is received according to intentional being, and the example that he
uses is vision. He agrees with Aquinas that vision only involves the reception of the
form according to intentional existence, and therefore is the most noble of all the
senses.595 He also recognizes that the other senses involve natural changes in respect to
the object or the organ in the same way as Aquinas.596
In Question 5, Scotus considers whether the sense is receptive of the species
without matter. In his response he basically follows Aquinas’ account in terms of the
natural change, which he clearly sees as change involving matter. Scotus claims that in
some cases the patient receives the form according to the same mode of being that the
form has in the agent.597 This is a natural change (actione naturali) in which the “agent
and the patient communicate in matter.”598
In Question 5, Scotus does not call the change that is involved in sensation a
spiritual change here nor does he explain it in terms of intentional change (he does in
Question 6), though in addressing the principal arguments, he refers to the an intentional
change in terms of touch.599 Scotus explains that in some other cases, the patient is not
disposed materially in the same way as the agent, and then it receives without matter,
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meaning that the patient receives the form without preceding material conditions.600
Scotus explains that the sense is not disposed to receiving the species or the form of the
sensible object as prime matter is so disposed, therefore, the sense receives without
matter, that is, without material disposition.601
Scotus then considers an objection that since the sensitive power is the same as
the essence of the soul, and the soul is purely spiritual and can only receive something
from a purely spiritual agent, then the sensitive power cannot receive the species of the
sense object which is corporeal.602 But Scotus contends that the sensitive power is not the
soul alone, but includes the organ, and thus is able to receive the species of the corporeal
sense object, and moreover, he claims that the sensitive power, even as it includes the
organ, remains really identical to the essence of the soul. 603 Thus, the “sensitive power
with the organ is such a cause of sensing.”604 Scotus further claims that two partial
causes, the sensitive power and the organ, unite (concurrunt) in the act of sensing itself in
such a way that the sensitive power is inseparable from the organ.605
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From these passages it is clear that Scotus accepts the distinction between natural
change and spiritual change, where spiritual change is the change involved in sensation
such that the form is not received according to material disposition, but according to
intentional existence. That the spiritual change is a corporeal event is also clear from
these passages, for Scotus says explicitly that what receives the form is not the sensitive
power alone, but the composite of the organ and sensitive power receives the form.
Whether the change involved in sensation is a corporeal change the question that I turn to
now.

4.2.2 Sensation: Corporeal or Incorporeal Change
In the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus claims: “to feel or be sentient is to have
sensation as a form.”606 He clarifies the meaning of this statement observing that “. . . the
sense in which the sensation is subjectively received would be sensing.”607 And so he
concludes, “To sense, then is to receive or have a sensation.”608 Scotus is clear that what
receives the species in sensation is the sense organ, or the organic part of the sense.609 In
another passage in the Ordinatio he carefully characterizes the organ as the composite of
a part of the body and the power of the soul and to say that the object is in the organ such
that the whole object is sufficiently present when the species is present in that part of the
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body.610 In Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus explains how he understands
the sense organ that receives a sense object:
The proximate recipient of any sensitive operation, however is primarily
composed of matter and form, as is clear from the opening passages of De sensu
et sensato, for what is the subject of vision is not the soul itself, but the organ
composed of soul and a definite part of the body. It is not the soul, nor any part
thereof, nor the form of the chemical compounds that are in a definite part of the
body, but it is the form of the organ as a whole which is the proximate ground for
receiving the vision, like humanity is the form of man as a whole.
Hence it appears clear that if we call an “organ” that part of the whole
animal which is the proximate subject of sensation, we must say it is composed of
the soul as the principle of the operation and of a part of the body structured in a
certain way, and then it will be clear why a blind eye is an “eye” only in a
qualified sense, for it is only one part of that composite which is meant to be
called an eye and is missing the other part needed for a complete eye.611
Scotus insists here that it is the “form of the organ as a whole” (forma totius organi) that
is the “proximate ground of receiving” (proxima ratio recipiendi).
Scotus is not original in his claims here and appears to be influenced by Giles of
Rome, who, according to Alluntis and Wolter, while not originating this notion of “the
form of the whole,” popularized it. 612 It appears that the notion of the form of the whole
indicates that the union of the bodily organ with the soul brings into being a different
kind of entity unlike the inanimate wax in Aristotle’s example. Considering how Scotus
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Scotus, I Ord. d. 3, p. 3, q. 1 [Balic III: 236-37]: “Sed potentia organicae dedit ut possit habere
obiectum sit praesens non in potentia ipsa sed in organo, hoc est in parte corporis quam perficit potentia
organica: et ista praesentia sufficit, quia totum—compositum ex parte corporis sic mixta et ex potentia—
est organum; et huic toti obiectum sufficienter est praesens quando species est in illa parte corporis.”
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Quodl., 9.28, [11]: “. . . quaelibet autem operatio sensitiva est primo compositi ex materia et forma,
sicut proprii receptivi sicut patet in principio De Sensu et Sensato enim ipsa anima est immediate receptiva
visionis, sed ipsum organum, quod est compositum ex anima, et determinata parte corporis est proxima
ratio recipiendi visionem, nec est anima, nec aliquid animae nec illa forma mixtionis, quae est in
determinata parte corporis, sed forma totius organi eo modo, quo humanitas est forma totius hominis, est
proxima ratio recipiendi visionem. Ex hoc patet, quod si organum dicatur illa pars totius animalis, in qua
tanquam in proximo receptivo, recipitur sensatio, organum dicetur esse aliquid compositum ex anima, ut est
principium talis opeationis, et ex parte corporis sic mixta, et tunc patet, quare oculus caecus non est oculus,
nisi secundum quid: quia non est nisi altera pars compositi, quod natum esset dici oculus oarens alia parte,
qua complete oculus est oculus.” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 227.
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Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 227. See also, Giles of Rome, Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia,
ed. E. Hocedez (Louvain, 1930), 44-45.
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understands the whole as greater than the sum of its parts and his careful treatment of
unity, Scotus’ focus here becomes even more intriguing. While certainly Aquinas too
understands the sense organ as the composite of the sensitive soul and a bodily organ, he
insists that sensation is primarily passive. Scotus’ emphasis in this passage, that the form
of the organ as a whole is the proximate ground of receiving the species, recognizes the
unique capacities that the sense organ as a composite has over and above the
characteristics that either of its components has alone, that is, the sense organ is alive and
therefore has capacities or powers that are peculiar to a living being. It seems clear that
Scotus embraces Aristotle’s homonymy principle, namely, a body that is not living can
be called a body in name only, for he says that an eye that is blind cannot be properly
called an eye.613 Not only does Scotus’ use of the notion of the “form of the whole”
emphasize the complete unity of the ensouled bodily organ, but it also reshapes the view
of sensation from a primarily passive process to an active process. Wax may be able to
receive the impression of the gold ring, but, I contend, a living sense organ receives the
form as an attentive receiver. I will return to this claim later, the point to take here is that
Scotus clearly understands the sense as a composite of the sensitive soul and the bodily
organ.
In Question 13 of the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus discusses Aristotle’s claim
that the senses are acted upon. Since the senses are acted upon, they are altered, and
Scotus understands this alteration as a bodily movement: “for sensation results from a
bodily movement and the sense being acted upon.”614 Scotus contends further that the
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See Cross 2003, 275.
Scotus, Quodl. 13.61 [21]: “. . . et ipsi sensus alterantur, patiuntur enim: actio enim ipsorum motus est
per corpus, patiente aliquid sensu. . .” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 300. (Text is italicized in the
Wadding edition.)
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sense can be said to be altered, because: “in this something composite receives
something extended and from a natural agent locally present.”615 It is clear that Scotus
understands that sensation involves a bodily change, that it is not simply an event that
takes place in a corporeal organ, but the corporeal organ is itself altered. He does not
elaborate however, on what this change is.
In the QMA Scotus claims that the action of the species in the organ is a real
action.616 Since Aristotle claims in De Anima that sensible qualities in excess destroy the
organs of sense, Scotus contends that the sensible qualities only do this by way of the
species that is received by the sense organ, and therefore, the species is a source of real
action.617 The sensible species, Scotus says, seems to be a real accident.618 Etzkorn and
Wolter explain that the species is an accidental quality in the subject in which it exists,
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Ibid. See also, Dominik Perler, “What Am I Thinking About? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on
Intentional Objects,” Vivarium 32:1 (1994), 78; Perler 2003; and Dominik Perler, “Duns Scotus on
Signification,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 3: 97-120. Perler explains the ontological status of the
species as an accident. (103) Perler also explains the difference between sensible species and the
intelligible species: “The intelligible species is a mental entity—ontologically speaking, a quality of the
intellect—which is produced by the intellect on the basis of a sensible species and which functions to
represent the understood thing. . .Sensible species and intelligible species are distinct, since they are in two
distinct parts of the soul. In contrast to the sensible species, the intelligible species is not merely a passing
imprint of the thing, but a cognitive image that can exist even when the represented thing is not present.”
(102-103) I want to point out here the real difference between sensible species and the intelligible species
is not how long they remain, rather the difference is that the sensible species is held in a bodily organ
whereas the intelligible species is in the inorganic intellect. Following from this difference, the sensible
species exists under material conditions, which Scotus understands as both “the here and the now” and
singularity. The intelligible species does not exist under material conditions and is able to represent the
object as a universal. Since Scotus follows Aristotle in holding that the intellect cannot think without the
phantasm, there is a sense image or phantasm that is held in the internal senses and remains longer than the
passing sensible species. The phantasm mediates between the sensible species and the intelligible species.
The important point to note here is that the sensible species, the phantasm, and the intelligible species,
being species, all have the same ontological status of accident, they differ in terms of how they represent
the object. As will be discussed in the next section, Scotus recognizes the species as an intention, that is, it
exists according to intentional existence.
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whether this be the object itself, the medium, or the soul of the knowing subject.619 From
this passage, it seems that the corporeal change involved in sensation is the reception of
the species which is itself an accident and as such effects a real change. But what is the
nature of this species? What is its ontological status?

4.2.3 The Ontological Status of the Sensible Form
That Scotus understands the species as an accident is important. As discussed in
Chapter 3, we saw that Scotus argues that accident is not synonymous with inherence,
and that the accident is an individual thing in its own right such that it does not depend on
its inherence in a substance to be what it is. As Scotus contends in the QMA: “the entity
of the accident is formally other than the entity of its subject.”620 In the discussion of
Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions, we saw that in his account of per se being,
Scotus contends that the accident can be a per se being when it does not inhere in a
subject. Given that Scotus understands the species as an accident, the fact that an
accident is not necessarily synonymous with inherence, helps to understand how the
sensible quality can be received in the sense organ without inhering in it in the ordinary
way in which an accident inheres in a subject. What has to be resolved is how the
sensible species as an accidental quality can effect a real change in the sense, a corporeal
change, without actually inhering in it, as well as what this corporeal change is. I will
attend first to the question of how the sensible species can be present in the sense organ
without inhering in it, at least in an ordinary way. To this end, I will consider Scotus’
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Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 449.
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discussion of lux and lumen in the Ordinatio. In the course of this discussion Scotus
argues that lux is able to exist totally in air without changing air and it does so as an
intention (lumen) that is neither spiritual, nor corporeal, though, it is extended.621
In the Ordinatio, b. 2, d. 13, Scotus investigates the distinction between lux and
lumen.622 In his discussion Scotus contends that lux is not a substance because it is
sensible through itself. A substance can never be directly sensed, it is always indirectly
known through the sensing of accidents.623 Scotus claims that lux is an accident.624 He
contends further that lumen, the species of light, is not “a complete substance, that is,
subsisting through itself; because it is neither spiritual, since it is extendable, nor
corporeal, because then it would be two bodies at the same time.”625 Now, lux is
completely in air in such a way that it neither moves air when it arrives, nor moves air
when it leaves.626 If lux somehow moves air, that is, changes or alters air, then air would
621

See Tachau 1988, 58. Tachau notes that Scotus “specificially rejects the possibility that species are
spiritual, corporeal, material, or that they are a substantial form,” as Henry of Ghent did before him. See
also, Scotus, I Ord. d. 3, p. 3, q. 2: That Scotus does not consider the species to be spiritual is something
that I will attend to in the course of the discussion in section 4.2.3, after I discuss how he understands the
nature of an intention. That it is not spiritual is an important claim in terms of understanding the
corporeality of the process especially in regards to the questions that emerged from the discussion of
Aquinas’ account. As will be made clear, Scotus gives real being to the species, but it is a diminished
being (esse diminutum).
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in II Sent. d. 13. [edited and examined in the four extant versions by Edward R. McCarthy, Medieval Light
Theory and Optics and Duns Scotus’ Treatment of Light in D. 13 of Book II of his Commentary on the
Sentences, Ph.D. dissertation, The City University of New York, 1976.] I will here use McCarthy’s
translation of the Ordinatio, b. 2, d. 13 passages as well as the Latin version that is found in his dissertation.
Following McCarthy, I will leave “lux ” and “lumen” untranslated in my discussion. As will become clear
in the discussion, Scotus understands “lumen” to be the intention or proper species of the sensible light
(lux).
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Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13: “. . . quia lux est per se sensibilis. Non sic substantia, nisi per accidens.”
Trans. McCarthy 1976, 329. See also Wolter . Wolter observes that Scotus emphasizes repeatedly that
substance is not something that we can sense, rather it is the accident that moves the sense.
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Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13: “Lux etiam in aliquo est accidens; ergo in nullo est substantia.” Trans.
McCarthy 1976, 330.
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not be breathable when illuminated.627 Somehow lux is in air without altering air
because lux is in air by way of its species, lumen. This leads Scotus to consider the
distinction between a sensible quality and a quality in which exists the species or
intention of the sensible quality.628 Thus, he considers the meaning of intention:
It should be noted that this word intention is equivocal. Intention is in one
way said to be the act of the will. In another way, it is the formal
distinction in re. However the intention of the thing from which the genus
is derived, differs from the intention, from which the difference is derived.
The third way, is said to be common. The fourth way, is said to be an
inclination toward an object, as a likeness is called a relationship to that
which it is alike.629
It is the fourth meaning of intention that applies to the sensible species.630 The sensible
species is an intention precisely because as a likeness (similitudo) it tends toward an
object:
Hence an intention is not said to be that, which is held by the senses,
because this way the object would be the same as the intention. But the
intention is said to be that, through which, as a formal principle it is
connected with the object. So whatever is the sign is the thing. According
to Augustine in De Trinitate and De Doctrina Christiana, it is not
convertible. Therefore in the distinction between a thing and a sign, the
thing is taken as it is in reality, which is not as a sign. Although that
which is a sign is also the thing. So in the distinction between a thing and
its intention, although the intention is the thing itself and the sensible form
to which this sense tends, that thing however is said to be the intention,
which is not only the thing itself toward which the sense tends, but it is the
inclination to something else, which is its proper similitude.
By this way I say that lumen is an intention or proper species of
sensible light (lux ) itself. Which is provable then, because, if it is not an
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Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13: “Cum autem genus qualitatis quantum ad tertiam speciem distinguatur in
qualitatem sensibilem, et in qualitatem quae est species sive intentio qualitatis sensibilis. . .” Trans.
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intention, then when applied on the sense it would impede sensation,
because what is only sensible is not the cause of sensation. If it were put
on the sense, it would impede sensation, because the sensible alone
applied to a sense is not perceived. Thus lumen applied to the eye would
hinder vision. Which case is false and contrary to the statement of the
Commentator of the De Sensu et Sensato, where the Commentator wants
to say, that it is necessary for lumen to be applied to the eye, so that it can
receive the species of color and thereby see.631
The senses do not perceive the intention, rather it is by way of the intention that the
senses apprehend the object. The intention, in effect, leads the senses to the object,
without itself be perceived. Through the intention the sense tends towards the object. As
we saw, according Pasnau, Aquinas claims that intentio means the same thing as
conversio. In Pasnau’s discussion of Scotus’ account of cognition, he explains that to
tend (tendere) towards another is “to represent another.”632 Scotus sees the connection
between the intention and the object of which it is an intention as based on a formal
principle. That the intention tends towards something else, based on form, is what makes
it a proper similitude. In his discussion of lumen, Scotus explains that it is the proper
631
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species of the lux which is the light that is sensed. Now lumen itself cannot be sensible
because what is completely sensible cannot be the cause of sensation. The cause of
sensation, as we have seen, is the species, which tends towards the object. The species
cannot itself be sensible because if it were, it would block sensation. If you put the apple
on your eye, you will not see the apple. Scotus uses the example of light passing through
a piece of red glass to show that the species is not itself perceived.633 If you look at the
colored patch of red on the wall in order to perceive the red glass, then Scotus says you
will only know the glass in a derivate way. But if you were to stand in such a way that
your eye is in the place where the red patch of light is on the wall, and look toward the
glass, you would see the red glass properly and not see the species at all. Moreover,
when the species is in the air, it is not seen. Thus, it is the species that causes the
sensation of the apple, but it is the apple that is sensed. The species itself is not sensible
and is therefore not perceived.
In the QMA Scotus delineates three degrees of sense cognition or sensitive
knowledge:
The first is that of intuitive cognition which is of a thing present, and not
just through a species, nor only under a knowable aspect, but in its proper
nature. The second degree is of a thing known through a proper species
produced from it. The third is through some species fashioned by the
cognitive power from the proper species of certain things that were
impressed upon it. All of these cognitions are per se.634
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Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 197-198. Scotus discusses a fourth degree of sensitive knowledge that he calls
“knowledge per accident,” a knowledge of the object or its opposite by way of negation. See p. 110:
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Scotus offers the following examples: for the first, sight sees color; for the second, the
phantasy imagines a color that was seen; and for the third, the phantasy imagines a gold
mountain.635 I want to draw attention to the first degree of sensitive knowledge where the
sense apprehends the sense object as present, “not just through a species, nor only under a
knowable aspect, but in its proper nature.” Sensation, as understood at the level of
intuitive cognition, apprehends the sense object as it is actually present and existing. We
are not able to sense something whenever we wish, we only sense something that is
actually present to us. And when we do sense an object, Scotus contends that the exterior
sensation is of the object immediately, and therefore: “it is accidental that there be a
species there for the sake of sensation.”636 Scotus explains that the species is required in
the interior sense because the object is not present in itself.637 In sensation the species is
not the object of the senses, rather the object of the senses is the external sense object.
We see color, not the species of color. Etzkorn and Wolter explain:
That is, when the sensible “species” in the medium encounters the eye, its
effect is sensation; the sensation therefore is distinct from the “species”
that causes it. Though the “species” causes the sensation qua quality in
the eye, it is not what is cognitively sensed as object, and hence if it is
known by the internal sense as something on-going, this is accidental. Or
‘accidental’ may refer to the fact that it is not what is sensed, but it is the
object outside that is sensed . . .”638
The species is that by which the object is sensed, not that which is sensed.
“Ultra hos gradus cognitionis est cognitio per accidens; et hoc: vel oppositi per remotionem, vel obiecti.”
Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 198.
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From this discussion we can take the following points, the species is an accident
and therefore a thing. The species is not spiritual nor is it corporeal. This is puzzling
because Scotus contends that it is somehow extendable but not material, as he says that
lumen is an intention and as such it is extendable. That it is extendable seems to mean
that it can be in something that is material, while the intention itself is not material or
corporeal. For example, Scotus considers sense knowledge to be extended because it is
in the sense organ.639 What kind of existence does the species have? Scotus understands
the existence of the intention or species as diminished being (esse diminutum): “the
cognitive object has diminished being, however, the extramental object has absolute and
real being.”640 Diminished being is the being that an internal object has, or the being that
a known object has.641 In the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus claims that the proper
species of an object is a lesser entity than the object itself.642 As Perler points out,
diminished being should not be understood in terms of quantity but should be understood
as “existence in a certain respect,” opposed to existence absolutely (esse simpliciter).643
Perler explains that a stone taken in itself has existence absolutely, but a stone taken as an
intelligible being has existence in a certain respect, that is, it is the object of an
intellective act.644 Thus, the stone as an intelligible being has intentional existence (esse
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intentionale).645 Diminished being is identified with intentional existence. As we saw
above, Scotus contrasts diminished being with real being. In a passage in the Oxon. He
also contrasts real existence with intentional existence.646 So the species that is received
in the senses is able to be in the sense organ as an intentio, in much the same way as light
is totally in the air by way of its species, lumen, which is an intentio. Thus the species or
intentio is not a body, nor is it spiritual. As an intentio it represents its object but is of a
lesser being than its object. In sensation, Scotus says that something extended is received
by the sense organ, and this something extended is the species.

4.2.4 The Cognitive Activity of Sensation
In this section I will discuss the question concerning the activity of the sense. In
Question 12 of the QDA, Scotus’ understanding of sensation stands apart from Aquinas’
understanding. Here he considers whether the powers of the soul, intellective or sensitive
are only passive.647 In this question he specifically argues against passivity as conceived
by Aquinas. Scotus says that Aristotle’s account attributes to the impressed species,
rather than the powers of the soul, the acts of sensing and intellection. 648 Scotus claims
that “with respect to their operations, the powers of the soul are active,” adding that
645
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quam potentiae, quod falsum est; quia species non sentit nec intelligit sicut potentia.”) (9)
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otherwise they would be vilified.649 Scotus appeals to Averroes here, contending that
intellection and sensation are immanent actions in the agent.650 These actions are not
found in the object but are found in the human being who senses and who understands.651
Moreover, the actions of sensing and understanding are vital operations, and are
therefore, intrinsic, efficient principles.652 In Question 13 of the Quodlibetal Questions,
Scotus gives an extended discussion on immanent operations.
At the beginning of the discussion Scotus distinguishes between an action and an
operation. An action is “that productive action or at least an activity which in some
fashion causes its term to exist,” whereas an operation is “an intrinsic act by which the
operator himself is ultimately perfected.”653 What Scotus seeks to establish in this
discussion is that in an operation there is some absolute entity, meaning that the operation
can be understood apart from its object or term. The first proof that he considers is based
on the nature of perfection. The ultimate perfection of a living substance destined by
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Scotus, Quodl. 13.4 [2]: “. . .quia ipsa est semper ad terminum aliquem accipientem aliquo modo esse
per ipsam actionem: sed intelligitur quod sit actio, hoc est, operatio, qua agens tanquam actu ultimo
perficitur.” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 285.
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nature for sensitive and intellectual activity is not a mere relation. But its operation is the
ultimate perfection of such a substance, therefore, its operation is not a mere relation.654
Scotus argues that the “ultimate perfection of the living nature is what such a
nature desires above all else by natural desire.”655 Scotus appeals to the nature of
beatitude and the authority of Aristotle and Augustine to conclude that “the most
desirable end is an activity or consists in an operation.”656 As discussed in Chapter 2, the
beatific vision requires that the divine essence be present and existing in itself. In the
beatific vision the cognizer is able to cognize the divine essence in its actual existence.
What seems to be required is that the cognizer’s activity is not one of receptivity only but
one of actively attending to the object that is actually present as it is actually present.
Thus, the ultimate perfection of an intellectual nature must consist in an intrinsic
operation.
In the second Article of Question 13 Scotus considers whether an operation does
in fact have a real relationship with its object. In the course of his discussion he
distinguishes between intuitive cognition and abstractive cognition. He contends that any
perception involving the external senses is able to grasp its object in its actual existence,
and this is a “knowledge of the existent as such.”657 The example he offers is seeing
color, and generally any sensation involving the exterior senses.658 There is another
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exterioris.” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 290.
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knowledge in which the object is known, but not existing as such.659 In this case the
knowledge of the object is indifferent to the object’s actual existence. The example that
Scotus gives imagining color since one can imagine color both when it exists and when it
does not exist.660 He then contends that this same distinction is found at the intellectual
level.
Scotus says that it is obvious that there is intellectual knowledge of the
nonexistent, but he contends that there can be intellectual knowledge of the “existent qua
existent,” and the beatific vision must be just such a case. If the knowledge of the
beatific object is indifferent to the object’s actual existence, then the blessed could be
happy with a nonexistent object, but this is absurd. In the beatific vision there is a “clear
face-to-face vision of this object, since the act of knowing it tends to this object as
present in itself with its own actual existence.”661 The intellect must be able on its own to
tend to an extramental object that is present to it.
In Question 6 of the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus makes these same points.
Abstractive cognition is
indifferent as to whether the object is existing or not, and also whether it is
present in reality or not. We often experience this act in ourselves, for
universals and the essences of things we grasp equally well whether they
exist extramentally in some subject or not, or whether we have an instance
of them actually present or not. . . This act of understanding which can be
called “scientific,” because it is a prerequisite condition for knowing the
conclusion and understanding the principle, can very appropriately be
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non existit: vel saltem illa cognitio non est eius, ut actualiter existentis.” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975,
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called “abstractive” because it “abstracts” the object from existence or
non-existence, from presence or absence.”662
Thus, abstractive cognition is a cognition that is indifferent to the existence of the
object. Intuitive cognition, on the contrary, is cognition that is of the object as present
and existing in itself:
It is knowledge precisely of a present object as present and of an
existing object as existing. . . On the other hand, a sense power has such
perfection in its knowledge, because it can attain an object in itself as
existing and present in its real existence, and not just diminuitively in a
kind of imperfect likeness of itself.663
Scotus again makes the same point as he does in Question 13 that the beatific vision
requires intuitive cognition:
Since abstractive cognition concerns equally the existent and the
nonexistent, if the beatific act were of this sort one could be beatifically
happy with a nonexistent object, which is impossible. Also, abstractive
knowledge is possible where the object is not attained in itself but only in
some likeness. Beatitude, on the contrary, can never be found unless the
beatific object is reach immediately and in itself.664
Scotus seems to say here that the difference between abstractive cognition and intuitive is
in terms of whether a likeness is involved. This has led some to consider that no species
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is involved in intuitive cognition.665 In his account of Scotus’ understanding of intuitive
cognition, Wolter contends, on the contrary, that a species is involved in intuitive
cognition. I am in agreement with Wolter’s reading. Every time that Scotus discusses
intuitive cognition, he always uses sensation as an example of intuitive cognition, and in
particular, the seeing of a color. Sensation always involves a species. As we have seen,
the species as an 666intentio, tends to the external object. It is the external object that is
sensed. Moreover, we can only sense when there is an external object present, not any
time we wish. In sensation we are sensing an object that is actually there, as it is present
and existing. Intuitive cognition is the hallmark of sensation and redefines sensation in
subtle ways because it requires that the cognitive faculty, by way of the species, to
actively apprehend the object.
We can also consider the question of the involvement of the species in intuitive
cognition by considering a passage in Question 14 of the Quodlibetal Questions where
Scotus is concerned with the distinction between imperfect and perfect knowledge. He
defines perfect knowledge in terms of the object so that perfect knowledge “captures the
object as such; i.e., it is proper and distinct knowledge of the object as it is in itself.”667
Imperfect knowledge is knowledge that “captures the object only incidentally or in some
common and confused concept.”668 Distinct knowledge can be either mediate or
immediate where immediate knowledge means that the object is not understood by means
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of some other object, it “excludes any medium that is itself known.”669 Thus, mediate
knowledge is knowledge that is known by means of another known object. Now the
intellect is capable of distinct immediate knowledge because the intelligible species, like
the sensible species in sensation, is not itself known, but is the means by which the object
is made present to the intellect. Day considers the following passage in Question 14 to
give evidence that no species is involved in intuitive cognition:
Any such intellection, namely, that which is per se, proper, and
immediate, requires the presence of the object in all its proper
intelligibility as object [propria ratio objecti]. If the intellection is
intuitive, this means in its own existence it is present as object. If the
intellection is abstractive, it is present in something which represents it in
all its proper and essential meaning as a knowable object.670
Rather than being evidence that no species is required in intuitive cognition, this passage
explicitly says that in intuitive cognition, the object is present in its own existence. That
means that the object is actually present to the cognitive faculty, like color is present to
the seeing eye. In the case of intellective intuitive cognition, the intellect would enjoy the
same actual presence of an external object that the sense does, the example being the
divine essence in the beatific vision.671 The point that I want to make here is that
intuitive cognition in which the object is what is sensed or known requires the presence
of the object through the species, which itself is not perceived or known.. The reason that
this point is critical is that Scotus’ repeated characterization of sensation as intuitive
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cognition redefines the process of sensation and emphasizes that the sense must be active
in this process. Consider the following passage:
The cognitive potency not only has to receive the species of the
object but also to tend to the object through its act. And this second
thing is more essential to the potency, because the first is required
because of some imperfection of the potency. And the object is
more principally an object because the potency tends toward it
rather than because it [the object] impresses a species. This is
evident, for if God were to impress a species on the intellect or the
eye, [the intellect or the eye] would tend to the object just as it
does now, and the object would be just as much an object [as it
would be if it impressed the species rather than God]. But God
would not be the object, because the potency does not tend to him
and nevertheless he impressed it, just as he impresses upon an
angel the species of creatures. Therefore this is true; there is some
per se moving agent for any potency that is passive. But there is
no need that in apprehending potencies that what moves them be
the proper object of that potency under the aspect in virtue of
which it is the motive, but what is necessary is that what terminates
the act of potency is the aspect under which it is the object.672
What defines sensation is not the receptivity of the form or species, but more properly
that the cognitive faculty tends toward the object. Now the species itself is understood by
Scotus as an intentio, in representing the object it tends toward the object, in effect
leading the sense to apprehend the object. But this is where the Aristotle’s wax analogy
falls short. The wax may be able to receive an impression, but it cannot tend towards the
object through its act. Thus the operation of sense does have a real relationship to its
object, but this operation is intrinsic to sense, that is, it is an immanent operation.
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Scotus claims that unlike an action that is productive in the sense that it effects a
product, an operation is one that in tending toward its term, does not produce this term,
but presupposes it.673 He contends further, that an operation is simply the perfection of
the one operating.674 Operations are dynamic (in fieri), always in a state of becoming.675
The operation passes into its object as its term, but the object does not derive its being
from the operation, but again, the object’s being is presupposed.676 In a transient action
the form that is the term of the action lies outside the agent itself; in the immanent action,
the form is in the agent itself.677 This means that in an immanent operation, there is a
product, but the product is the operation itself, the acting itself, which is found in the
agent, for example, Scotus says, the act of seeing is in the one doing the seeing.678
The distinction between immanent and transient action is certainly not unique to
Scotus and finds its roots in Aristotle. In De Anima 2.5, as discussed in Chapter 1,
Aristotle distinguishes the alteration that is involved in sensation from ordinary alteration.
The alteration involved in sensation is a change to a thing’s disposition or nature. The
immanent operation is intrinsic to the sense organ, so that when it is operating, that is,
sensing, it is acting according to its nature, it is the perfection of the agent as agent.
Scotus’ discussion of immanent operations must be read in context of his claim about
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cognition, that cognition is most properly the activity of tending toward the object
through an act and his understanding of sensation as intuitive cognition, apprehending the
object as it is present and existing. When read in this way, Scotus’ understanding of the
immanent operation involved in sensation, shifts the process of sensation as primarily
passive to a primarily active process. In the passages in the Quodlibetal Questions where
Scotus discusses the immanent operation, characterizes it as “in fieri” which Alluntis and
Wolter translate as dynamic or becoming. That the immanent operation should be
understood as dynamic is supported by Michael Sylwanowicz’ reading of Scotus found in
his text on Scotus’ contingent causality.
Sylwanowicz argues Scotus understands being as intrinsic activity.679
Sylwanowicz understands “in fieri” as a dynamic process, such that for Scotus, essences
are self-moving processes, i.e., essences are first and foremost activity, not passive prior
to activity.680 The soul as essence is an intrinsic activity, and therefore, always fully in
act. Sylwanociz argues that being an intrinsic activity means having the capability of
responding actively to the situation at hand.681 The fact that being is itself intrinsic
activity allows us to have a change in perspective. Sylwanowicz uses the example of a
stone resting on a plank. When the plank is removed, rather than simply saying that the
stone falls, Sylwanowicz contends that the stone responds actively, the removal of the
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plank has created a new possibility.682 While Sylwanowicz is mainly concerned with the
activity of the will, his contention that Scotus understands being as an intrinsic activity
goes to the heart of Scotus’ metaphysics. The emphasis that we have seen Scotus give to
the activity of sensation over passivity, for example, is further supported if we understand
it as grounded in such a dynamic metaphysics. The sense organ is not simply a receptive
capacity, but has the ability to respond actively. Given that the sense organ is ensouled,
its ability to respond actively is much more complex than the stone on the plank. Its
active response is in terms of its operation, its sensing. Receiving the species as an
intentio that leads the sense to the object, requires that the recipient be able to actively
respond, that is, actively tend toward the object. Scotus is not unique in insisting on a
more active cognitive process, as Tachau points out, he is influenced by Olivi.683
However, against Olivi, Scotus retains the species, because his concern is to account for
the presence of the object to the cognitive faculty, both at the level of sensation and
intellection. The presence of the object is made possible through the species as intentio.
The intentio leads the cognitive faculty to apprehend the object precisely because the
cognitive faculty is of an actively responding that that object which is present to it.

Conclusion
From this discussion of Scotus’ account of sensation we can take the following
points. First, in the QDA Scotus does accept the distinction of natural change and
spiritual change and contends along with Aquinas that the sensible form has intentional
existence in the sense organ. Second, Scotus contends, as does Aquinas, that the sense
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organ is a composite of the sensitive soul and a corporeal organ. In the Quodlibetal
Questions, Scotus contends that what receives the species in sensation is the form of the
sense organ as a whole. This notion emphasizes that the sense organ has unique
capacities as an animate entity such that it is the fact that it can so act that there is
sensation. Sensation is a corporeal event in a corporeal organ for Scotus, meaning that
the presence of the species comes to exist in the sense organ. This is not a natural change
but is nonetheless a corporeal change. I contend, however, that this corporeal change
must be understood in the way that we have seen Scotus understands the sense organ as
ensouled. Third, the species that is received by the sense organ has the ontological status
of an accident, and in particular, is a quality. It is neither spiritual nor corporeal. It is
rather an intentio that is able to be in the corporeal sense organ because it is extendable
and this is comparable to the example of lux and lumen. Fourth, Scotus understands
sensation most properly as a tending toward an object and in his most mature work, the
Quodlibetal Questions, reframes the discussion of sensation by emphasizing that
sensation is intuitive cognition.
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Conclusion
The question that I have been concerned to answer in this dissertation is how does
the immaterial intellect have access to the material phantasm in order to make an object
present to the intellect? The problem is that the phantasm as a sense image or likeness
exists in a bodily organ. And as we have seen, that which is corporeal cannot act on that
which is incorporeal. But the nature of the species or the phantasm as an intentio is itself
neither spiritual nor corporeal nor material, though it exists under material conditions.
That the species is extendable simply seems to mean that it can be in a material subject,
but its being in the material sense organ, does not change the species. The species exists
under the aspect of materiality, but is not defined by it. In this way, the species is present
in such a way that the cognitive faculty, sensitive or intellective, is able to access it. The
way that the species as an intentio is in the subject is not in an ordinary way of inhering.
Just as light does not move or change air though the light is totally in the air, the intentio
resides in the bodily organ, being in the organ but not of it. Thus, the phantasm as a
species exists in the bodily organ according to intentional existence. Intentio for Scotus
means to exist as a representation or likeness (similitudo) that tends toward its object. In
a certain way its function is to signify its object. To have intentional existence does not
mean, for Scotus, to be a mental entity, but a kind of entity that represents another. This
claim is not unique to Scotus, certainly, as we saw, Aquinas understands that the species
exists according to intentional existence. What I argue is unique to Scotus is how his
understanding of intentional existence depends upon a certain cognitive attention on the
part of the cognitive faculty. To explain what this means and its full significance, it must
be understood in terms of the discussion in this dissertation.
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In Chapter One, I showed how Aristotle understands the relationship of the body
and soul as highly specific. In the first book of De Anima, Aristotle admonishes his
predecessors who do not concern themselves with the characteristics of the body, and
especially those who think that any soul could be clothed by any body. Thus, we saw
that Aristotle gives careful concern to the nature of the body, to the structure of the sense
organ, and to the processes of the body-soul composite. What emerged from this
discussion is the deep and complex understanding of unity that underlies Aristotle’s
understanding of the cognitive processes.
In Chapter Two, I discussed how the beatific object and the beatific vision inform
and guide Scotus’ cognitive project. Of critical importance is the fact that the intellect is
intrinsically able to cognize the divine essence as it is present and existing in itself. The
divine essence cannot by represented by a sense image and must be present to the
intellect in its own existence. As this is the highest cognitive experience, it is defining of
all cognitive experience. The presence of the object to the cognitive faculty in is own
existence is of central importance in Scotus’ cognitive project. Moreover, the cognitive
faculties are intrinsically capable of noticing the existence of the object as the object
actually exists. By way of the discussion on the incarnation, it was shown that the world,
and therefore, the object are worthy of being loved as the world is sacralized. Thus, the
material object is endowed with an intrinsic dignity that makes it a worthy object of
cognitive attention in itself.
In Chapter Three, I discussed how Scotus understands the soul and body
relationship. What emerged from this discussion is Scotus’ complicated and hierarchical
understanding of unity, following Aristotle. The unified whole being has characteristics
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unique to itself that neither of its components has separately. In the discussion of Scotus’
understanding of per se being, we saw that he considers an accident a per se being when
it is considered apart from its subject. The accident is not necessarily synonymous with
inherence and is something in its own right. The highest per se being is the suppositum
and Scotus understands the suppositum that has an intellectual nature as a person. The
notion of person is what finally secures the unity of the human being. What underlies the
unity of the human being is substantial unity of form and matter, but it is the cognitive
awareness that guarantees the unity of the person. It was also shown that the
immateriality of the intellective part of the soul does not preclude it from communicating
actuality to the body. Given the formal distinction between the faculties of the soul, that
Scotus embraces a plurality of forms does not threaten the unity of the person.
In Chapter Four, I discussed Aquinas’ account of sensation and in particular the
nature of the spiritual change and intentional existence. Aquinas argues that sensation
requires a spiritual change by which the sensible form comes to exist in the sense organ, a
composite of body and soul, according to intentional existence. As we saw, there is a
debate concerning whether sensation, according to Aquinas, is a corporeal change,
distinct from a natural change, or whether it is a spiritual, that is, incorporeal, change that
happens as a corporeal event. Moreover, we saw that since Aquinas maintains that
sensation is primarily passive, though he contends that cognition involves a tending
toward the object, such that intentio is identified with conversio, it is difficult for him to
account for cognitive attention. In the discussion of Scotus’ account of sensation we saw
that in an early work, his QDA, he embraces Aquinas’ distinction between natural change
and spiritual change, understanding that sensation requires the spiritual change where the
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sensible form is received according to intentional existence. It also became clear that the
way that Scotus characterizes the unity of the sense organ through the notion of the form
of the whole allows him to reshape the sense organ’s receptivity activity. It does not
merely receive the sensible species but is actively tending towards it as it has an intrinsic
operation. Again, while the notions of immanent and transient operations are not unique
to Scotus, his treatment of them, especially in regards to cognition, gives the cognitive
faculties an activity of their own, beyond receiving.
For Scotus, the sensible species is an accident and is able to inhere or to exist in
its subject in a non-ordinary way. The example of lux and lumen were offered in support
of this claim and also to show how the species can exist in the sensible organ. Sensation
for Scotus does seem to involve a complicated physiological process in which the species
comes to be present in the sense organ, having the ontological status of an accident, and
in which the sense organ is at the same time tending toward the external object. That
Scotus depicts sensation as intuitive cognition gives the sense the intrinsic capacity to “to
notice” the existence of the external object. Sensation requires the presence of the
external object. For Aristotle and Aquinas the presence of the object is required in order
to move the sense which is basically passive the reception of the sensible form. The
characterization of sensation as intuitive cognition allows Scotus to make the existence of
the object that which the sense notices. Thus, sensation for Scotus is an active tending
toward the object. The sensible species leads the sense to apprehend the object, but the
sense has the intrinsic capacity to notice the object as it is present.
In a passage in the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus explains how he understands
the activity of the agent intellect with the phantasm:
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From the phantasm or sensible image in the imagination there
would be produced in the intellect by virtue of the agent intellect an
intelligible species, or something in which a thing appears as actually
intelligible and which can be called, for brevity’s sake, an intelligible
species. And this very real production of one representation from another
is accompanied by a metaphorical “transformation” of one object into
another, namely, of something sensibly imaginable into something
intelligible. And this metaphorical description is a reasonable account of
what goes on, because the object has a similar sort of existence as object
in the one representation as it does in the other. Therefore, in the real
change whereby a spiritual representation is produced with the help of a
corporeal representation, namely, where a universal representation is
produced with the help of a singular representation, one can speak or think
of a similar “transformation” of a corporeal object into spiritual one, or of
a singular object into a universal one.684
It is clear in this passage that the phantasm is a corporeal representation. As a
representation the phantasm has the nature of an intentio. That it is corporeal means that
it exists in the bodily organ and under the material condition of singularity. It is not a
mental entity, but as that which is able to exist in a bodily organ, in the way that lumen
exists in air, it is itself not material, thus it is something that the intellect can act with.
What is interesting in this passage is that Scotus considers the real change involved in the
activity of the agent intellect with the phantasm to be a change from a corporeal
representation to a spiritual representation. The work of sensation is to ultimately make
an object present to the intellect. Such a presence can only be achieved by way of a
species or an intentio. The totality of the object is in the intentio. What this means is that
the object is an object because the cognitive faculty actively tends toward it by way of the
species.
684

Quodl., 15, 15.51 [16]: “. . .quod virtute inellectus agentis de phantasmae in phantasia gignitur species
inelligibilis in intellectus, vel aliqua ratio, in qua actus relucet intelligibile, quae breviter loquedo, dicatur
species inelligibilis: et ista gignitionem reale repraesentatius de repraesentativo dicitur concomitari quaeda
gignitio metaphorica obiecti de obiecto, se intelligibilis de imaginabilis quod ideo rationabiliter dicitur, quia
tale esse obiectivum habet obiectum in repraesensari; quale habet repraesentativum correspondens; et ideo
translatione reali facta in repraesentativo, quando de corporali gignitur spirituale, scilicet de repraesentativo
singulari gignitur repraesentativum universale, consimilis dicitur, vel intelligitur translatio in obiectis de
corporali ad spirituale, vel de singulari ad universale.”
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The consideration of the question on the nature of the phantasm not only reveals
the phantasm as having the nature of an intentio and therefore accessible by the agent
intellect, but and perhaps more importantly and interestingly, reveals how Scotus is able
to account for cognitive attention and how the sense is able to notice the object in its own
existence. The fundamental activity of cognition for Scotus is attending to an object that
is present to it. Scotus’ understanding of Aristotle, which I contend is deeper, in ways,
than even Aristotle wrote about, enables him to present a cohesive account of sensation
beyond the way in which it was traditionally understood and which still is of interest
today. There are several points that I would like to make in regards to the relevancy of
Scotus scholarship.
First, questions still remain about the exact nature of the process by which the
agent intellect acts with the phantasm to produce the intelligible species. And this is a
question worth considering, though it remained outside of the scope of this work. Given
the way that Scotus understands substantial unity, and especially the notion of person, it
appears that he would be able to show how the phantasm could be understood as that
which mediates between sensation and intellection, and thus this question is worth
investigating further.
Second, the problem of how the intellect and the body work together in cognition
is not Descartes’ mind-body problem for either Aristotle or Scotus. Both insist upon a
unity of the soul and the body that underlies their cognitive projects. It is in this way that
I think that Scotus’ project remains relevant today, if simply for the fact that in order to
understand his concerns in terms of cognition, we must set aside the separation of the
mind from the body that underlies Descartes’ cognitive approach. In doing so we come
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to understand how our own language, for example, the word ‘physical’ might not serve us
any better than it does the medieval context.
Third, the additional work that I would like to pursue based on my work here
concerns the object itself. Two things have intrigued me in regards to the object. First,
that the object is worthy of cognitive attention itself and second that we apprehend the
object as it is present and actually existing. Both of these claims seem to be significant in
terms of both phenomenology and modern science. Scotus claims that the object is a cocause with the intellect in the process of intellection such that the object accounts for the
specific character of that intellection. We are not simply knowing the form of the object,
but know the object as it actually exists, and of course, this is made possible because of
sensation as intuitive cognition. Given the inherent dignity of the object and that it is
intrinsically intelligible coupled again with the fact that the cognitive faculties are
intrinsically able to notice the presence of the object seems to be a claim that the object is
worthy of study in itself. The beauty of Scotus’ thought is that it directs us to the world
by way of his understanding of the highest cognitive experience.
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